Sheets v. Knight

• Decision Date: 26 October 1989
• Parties: , 115 Lab.Cas. P 56,267, 4 IER Cases 1196 Robert A. SHEETS, Petitioner on Review, v. F.E. KNIGHT, Carol Williams, and Gerald Woodward, individually and in their capacity as County Commissioners; and Tillamook County; jointly and severally, Respondents on Review. TC 23-331; CA A41675; SC S35714.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 1000

779 P.2d 1000

308 Or. 220, 115 Lab.Cas. P 56,267,

4 IER Cases 1196

Robert A. SHEETS, Petitioner on Review, v. F.E. KNIGHT, Carol Williams, and Gerald Woodward,

individually and in their capacity as County

Commissioners; and Tillamook County;

jointly and severally,

Respondents on Review.

TC 23-331; CA A41675; SC S35714.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and submitted April 6, 1989.

Decided Aug. 29, 1989.

Reconsideration Denied Oct. 26, 1989.

[308 Or. 222] David Gernant, Portland, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner on review.

I. Franklin Hunsaker, III, Portland, argued the cause for respondents on review. With him on the response were Christopher A. Rycewicz and Bullivant, Houser, Bailey, Pendergrass and Hoffman, Portland.

Robert D. Durham, Portland, argued the cause for amici curiae Oregon Educ. Ass'n; American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, Council 75; and Oregon AFL-CIO. With him on the brief were Margaret S. Olney and Durham, Drummonds, Smith & Wiser, Portland.

Elden M. Rosenthal, Portland, argued the cause for amicus curiae plaintiff Employment Lawyers Ass'n. With him on the brief was Rosenthal & Greene, Portland.

Richard C. Busse and Donald B. Potter, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Jeffrey M. Batchelor, Mark M. Loomis, Scott T. Cliff and Spears, Lubersky, Bledsoe, Anderson, Young & Hilliard, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon Ass'n of Defense Counsel and Associated Oregon Industries.

Before PETERSON, C.J., and LINDE, CARSON, JONES, VAN HOOMISSEN and FADELEY, JJ.

PETERSON, Chief Justice.

We decide whether an employee's forced resignation may be a discharge so as to serve as the predicate for a claim of wrongful discharge. If a resignation may amount to a constructive discharge, then we must determine whether the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's second claim for wrongful discharge.

THE PLEADINGS AND THE FACTS OF THE CASE

We take the facts from the plaintiff's second amended complaint. The plaintiff, Robert Sheets, was employed by Tillamook County for 14 1/2 years as a building inspector. The defendants Knight, Williams and Woodward, who were Tillamook County Commissioners, informed him that unless he resigned, they would terminate his employment.

He resigned and filed this action. In his first claim ¹ the plaintiff alleged a breach of an express contract. He alleged that the county personnel rules, together with certain "implied oral promises" by the defendants, constituted an employment contract, the terms of which were violated by his termination. The plaintiff's third claim alleged that the defendants violated Oregon's Public Meetings Law, ORS 192.610 to 192.695.

The plaintiff's second claim, which is the centerpiece of this controversy, contains a number of different theories of recovery. ² It alleges that the plaintiff had an "implied" employment contract, the terms of which were breached by his discharge. It also claims that the plaintiff's forced resignation "was a result of plaintiff's knowledge of improper activities by the defendants." Furthermore, it asserts that the defendants forced him to resign because of "personal and political considerations," thereby breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Finally, the second claim alleges that defendant Woodward, motivated by "embarrassment and personal vengence [sic ]," sought the plaintiff's resignation on account of "vindictiveness." This second claim requests damages for breach of contract and for the plaintiff's "humiliation, mental and physical pain and anguish," and it seeks punitive damages.

Because of the procedural questions discussed below, we will summarize the rulings made by the trial court on the morning of the day trial was to begin. The trial court dismissed the second claim for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim, ORCP 21 A(8), and it granted the defendants' motion under ORCP 21 B for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the third claim. In so doing, the trial court held that the plaintiff did not state a claim for wrongful discharge because the complaint failed to allege that the plaintiff was discharged for fulfilling a societal obligation. The court declined to recognize the tort of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment setting. The trial court also ruled that the second claim failed to state a claim for either intentional infliction of emotional distress or tortious interference with contractual relations.

The plaintiff then moved to amend the complaint to attempt to plead facts sufficient to state claims for intentional infliction The plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of the second claim, assigning as error the trial court's rulings discussed above. The Court of Appeals held that Oregon does not recognize "constructive discharge" and that "because plaintiff resigned, even if the resignation might have been at defendants' request, he has not stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge * * *." Sheets v. Knight, 92 Or.App. 539, 543, 759 P.2d 307 (1988). In the alternative, it declared that even if Oregon recognized "constructive discharge," the plaintiff's complaint was deficient because it did not allege that the defendants subjected the plaintiff to intolerable working conditions. 92 Or.App. at 542-43, 759 P.2d 307. Finally, the court also ruled that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. 92 Or.App. at 543, 759 P.2d 307. The Court of Appeals did not address the plaintiff's contention that, even without amendment, the complaint alleged facts sufficient to plead claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference with contractual relations. Because this issue was properly presented to the Court of Appeals, it is properly before us as well, ORAP 10.15(2), and will be discussed below.

of emotional distress and tortious interference with contractual relations. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it was untimely. Unwilling to proceed to trial only on the contract claim, the plaintiff requested and received a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the first claim under ORCP 54 A.

ANALYSIS

A. Does this Court have Jurisdiction?

As a threshold matter, we must decide whether this court has jurisdiction to decide this case. As noted above, after the second and third claims were dismissed with prejudice, the plaintiff requested and received a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the first cause of action pursuant to ORCP 54 A. The judgment stated in pertinent part:

"IT IS HEREBY directed that Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants based on this Court's Order dismissing Plaintiff's first claim without prejudice and dismissing Plaintiff's second and third claims with prejudice * * *."

Generally, a party may not appeal from a judgment which he or she voluntarily requested unless some previous ruling by the trial court effectively precluded recovery and the plaintiff cannot plead the facts more favorably. See Farris v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty, 273 Or. 628, 633, 542 P.2d 1031 (1975); Steenson v. Robinson, 236 Or. 414, 416-17, 385 P.2d 738 (1964). Because the trial court's dismissal of the second and third claims did not bar recovery for breach of contract under the first claim, this rule would preclude the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment entered at his request.

However, this court's ruling in Taylor v. Baker, 279 Or. 139, 566 P.2d 884 (1977), salvages this appeal. In Taylor the plaintiff sued two defendants for an injury that she sustained on the defendants' property. The complaint contained two alternative claims for relief. After the trial court granted summary judgment on the first claim, the plaintiff sought and received a voluntary dismissal of the action. 279 Or. at 141-42, 566 P.2d 884.

Citing Steenson v. Robinson, supra, the court acknowledged the general rule that a party may not appeal from a judgment which he or she voluntarily requested. 279 Or. at 142, 566 P.2d 884. The Taylor court concluded, however, that an appeal from a voluntary dismissal following a partial summary judgment was permissible under the facts in Taylor. 279 Or. at 143, 566 P.2d 884. It reasoned that the rule against appeals from voluntary dismissals is designed largely to prohibit piecemeal appeals and to preclude plaintiffs from seeking "appellate review of one portion of their claim while holding other theories in abeyance, to be refiled in the event of an adverse appellate ruling." 279 Or. at 143, 566 P.2d 884. The doctrine of res judicata, however, would prevent the plaintiff in Taylor from employing such a strategy. The court noted that res judicata not only bars relitigation of any claim necessarily The same reasoning applies here. The plaintiff's contract claim embodied in his first claim for relief arose from the same aggregate of operative facts as the claims alleged in the second claim for relief which is the subject of this appeal. The doctrine of res judicata would preclude this plaintiff from relitigating the first claim in the event of an adverse ruling on the second claim in this appeal. Therefore, under the reasoning in Taylor this court has jurisdiction. We turn then to a discussion of the merits of the appeal.

determined in a prior judgment, but it also precludes any claim that could have been alleged under the same " 'aggregate of operative facts which compose a single occasion for judicial relief.' " 279 Or. at 144, 566 P.2d 884 (quoting Del Monte Meat Co., Inc. v. Hurt, 277 Or. 615, 617, 561 P.2d 627 (1977)). It therefore concluded that a "plaintiff's willingness to forego litigation on alternative theories should be sufficient to guarantee that the partial summary judgment had the effect of rendering [a] plaintiff's nonsuit truly...