Sheets v. Selden Lessee

Decision Date01 December 1864
Citation69 U.S. 177,2 Wall. 177,17 L.Ed. 822
PartiesSHEETS v. SELDEN'S LESSEE
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

THE State of Indiana, being owner of the Northern Division of the Central Canal, and of certain adjacent lands, authorized its Board of Internal Improvement, to cause any surplus water, of which there was some, along 'with such portions of ground belonging to the State as might be necessary to its use, to be leased.' Under this act leases were made in 1839-40,—one to Yandes & Sheets, another to Sheets; each for the term of thirty years.

The leases reserved certain rents, payable semi-annually on the first of May and November, and they provided that if any rent should 'remain unpaid for one month from the time it shall become due,' 'all the rights and privileges' of the lessees 'shall cease and determine, and any authorized agent of the State, or lessee under the State, shall have power to enter upon and take possession of the premises,' &c. The first lease, that to Yandes & Sheets, in addition to the use of the water-power, in consideration of the rents reserved, leased, also, as necessary, 'for the use of the waterpower hereby leased,' and for the same term and on the same conditions 'the particular portion of ground belonging to the State at said point, included within the following boundaries to wit, [here a particular piece of ground was described] containing a little more than half an acre.' The second lease, that to Sheets, in consideration of the rent reserved, leased also for the same term, and on the same conditions as the water-power was leased, 'such part of the ground belonging to the State as in the opinion of the engineer having charge may be necessary to the use of the water-power hereby leased,' to wit [here, also, a particular piece of ground, as thus necessary, was described]. The lease to Yandes & Sheets was executed on the part of the State by the President of the Board of Internal Improvement, and by the lessees in this form:

D. H. MAXWELL, [SEAL.] President of the Board of Internal Improvement.

DANIEL YANDES, [SEAL.]

WILLIAM SHEETS. [SEAL.]

The lease to Sheets was executed by N. Noble, Acting Canal Commissioner, and Sheets, in this form:

N. NOBLE, Acting Commissioner for the Northern Division of the Central Canal.

WILLIAM SHEETS.

The 'seals' which appear to the lease to Yandes & Sheets were ink scrawls. No seals of any kind appeared on the second lease, that to Sheets.

Some time subsequently to the making of these leases the State passed two statutes. By the first, entitled 'An act to authorize the Governor of Indiana to compromise with, and to cause suit to be brought against lessees of the water-power of the Northern Division of the Canal,' the Governor was authorize to sell 'all the right, title, and interest of the State of Indiana, in and to the Northern Division of the Central Canal, and all the rents that shall become due after the sale of the said property, and the water-power and appurtenances thereunto belonging.'

By the second, tntitled 'An act to authorize the sale of the Northern Divisior of the Central Canal,' the Governor and Auditor of the State were 'authorized to make sale and dispose of all the right, title, interest, claim, and demand which the State holds in the Northern Division of the Central Canal, situate in the said State of Indiana, with all the water-power and appurtenances thereunto belonging,' and authorizing those officers to convey the same to the purchaser, on behalf of the State, in the name of the State of Indiana.

The Governor accordingly made public sale of certain property, advertised for sale, as 'being all the right, title, interest, claim, and demand which the State may hold or possess in the Northern Division of the Central Canal, and all the rents which may have become, or shall become, due after the sale of said property, and the water-power, and the appurtenances thereunto belonging, including its banks, margins, tow-paths, side-cuts, feeders, basins, right of way, dams, water-power, structures, and all the appurtenances thereunto belonging.' And having reported the sale to the legislature, that body confirmed it, directing him to convey the said portion of the canal, with the rights, privileges, and appurtenances, to the purchaser in fee.

The Governor and Auditor of the State (J. A. Wright and E. W. H. Ellis) afterwards executed to F. A. Conwell, who held under the purchaser, an instrument, which made one of the questions in the case. It purported to be made 'between Joseph A. Wright, Governor of the State of Indiana, and Erastus W. H. Ellis, Auditor of said State, of the first part, and F. A. Conwell of the second part,' and recited the sale, and referred to the several acts under which the instrument professed to have been executed, which are those hereinbefore recited; and acknowledged the payment of the purchase-money.

It then makes known that, by virtue of the power vested in them by the acts and joint resolution therein named, 'We, Joseph A. Wright, Governor of the State of Indiana, and Erastus W. H. Ellis, Auditor of the said State, do hereby convey to the said F. A. Conwell,' &c., in fee, all the estate, &c., herein described; the description being just as the property was sold, and as the same is above described; nothing, however being described by metes and bounds, or in any form more specific than that above given; and, as the reporter inferred from the argument, neither parcel falling within the specific designation of 'bank, margin, tow-path, sidecut, feeder, basin, right of way, dam, or structure.'

The deed was thus executed and tested:

'In testimony whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and affixed the seal of said State, at the city of Indianapolis, the day and year first above written.

'JOSEPH A. WRIGHT,

'Governor.

'ERASTUS W. H. ELLIS,

'Auditor of State.

'C. H. TEST,

'Secretary of State.'

{SEAL OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.}

Selden became owner of the property thus sold by the State; and Sheets, being in possession under the leases which the State had made, and having refused to pay rent, an agent of Selden, authorized by parol, formally demanded, on the first day of May, 1860, and afterwards on the first day of June, a short time before sunset, upon the premises, the rents due on the first of May of the year just named. Payment not being made, Selden, regarding the lease as forfeited, brought ejectment against Sheets (the only tenant in possession). The premises for which the action was brought were the parcels of land described in the two above leases, executed in 1839—40 by the Board of Internal Improvement, as property belonging to the State, and leased in connection with the surplus water, because necessary to the use of such water. The defences in substance were:

I. To the deed of the Governor and Auditor.

1. As not executed in the name of the State.

2. As not embracing the premises in controversy.

II. That the leases not being under seal, Selden, as grantee of the reversionary interest of the State, could not maintain ejectment upon breach of the covenants to pay.

III. That the demand for rent, if authorized at all, should have been made on the 31st May, and having been made on the 1st June, was too late; moreover, that the agent who made the demand was not authorized in writing.

The court below—the Circuit Court of the District of Indiana held none of these defences sufficient; and judgment was given for the plaintiff. The same reasons urged against recovery there were taken for reversal in error here.

Mr. Dumont, for Sheets, plaintiff in error: The deed by the Governor and Auditor is not a deed made on behalf of the State in the name of the State; which the statute declares that it must be. It is by Mr. Wright, the Governor, and Mr. Ellis, the Auditor. These persons do not profess to act even as attorneys of the State; and if they did, the thing would be irregular, for the deed should have been made in the name of the principal; that is to say, of the State by its attorneys; and not in the name of the Governor and Auditor, even if they represented themselves as attorneys of the State, which with such a mode of presentation would not be a grantor at all. 'It was resolved,' says Lord Coke, in Combe's case,1 'that when any has authority to do any act, he ought to do it in his name who gives the authority; for he appoints the attorney to be in his place and to represent his person, and therefore the attorney cannot do it in his own name, nor as his proper act, but in the name and as the act of him who gives the authority.' No rule in the law is better settled than this, and none has so uniformly received the sanction and approbation of the various judicial tribunals of the country.2 In this case, however, as we have said, the attorneys do not even profess to act in the name of the State. They act in their own name; their official titles being added, just as the same titles might well have been added, and probably would have been added,—as descriptions of who the grantors were,—if the same individuals had been conveying lands belonging to themselves personally. Indeed, it would be doubtful whether, in any kind of contract, titles thus appended would be held to be more than descriptive designation, or to relieve from personal liability; for Wright neither conveys nor signs as governor, nor Ellis as State auditor. In regard to a deed, however, the act of acts in the law, the case is stronger than the case of simple contracts, and, as we think, is quite plain. The statutes under which the sale was made have no such inherent force as to operate without regard to general law, as administered between private persons. They may or may not indicate what was meant to be sold; but they do not alter the ancient settled effect of those acts which are done. We concede that, in many cases of Government contracts, the intention to bind the Government and not the agent will prevail; as, for example, where, from the...

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  • White v. Southern Ry. Co
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1927
    ...implies a right to all the means of enjoying it, so far as the grantor was possessed of those means, " —and quotes from Sheets v. Seldon, 2 Wall. 177, 17 L. Ed. 822: "The true rule on the subject is this, that everything essential to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the property design......
  • Johnson v. Riddle
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • September 5, 2002
    ...the day of the violation is not counted in calculating the running of the statute of limitations. See Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2 Wall. 177, 69 U.S. 177, 190, 17 L.Ed. 822 (1864) (stating as a general rule of statutory construction that a cause of action measured "from ... a date named" ex......
  • White v. Southern Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1927
    ... ... was possessed of those means," ...          -and ... quotes from Sheets v. Seldon, 2 Wall. 177, 17 L.Ed ... "The true rule on the subject is this, that everything ... ...
  • Johnson v. Riddle
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • June 28, 2002
    ...timely because the day of the violation is not counted in calculating the running of the statute of limitations. See Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 69 U.S. 177, 190 (1864) (stating as a general rule of statutory construction that a cause of action measured "from . . . a date named" excludes the......
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