Shefa v. Ellison

Citation968 N.W.2d 818
Decision Date12 January 2022
Docket NumberA21-0830
Parties Amreya Rahmeto SHEFA, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Attorney General Keith ELLISON, in his official capacity, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, Governor Tim Walz, in his official capacity, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, and Chief Justice Lorie Gildea, in her official capacity, Appellant/Cross-Respondent.
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Andrew J. Crowder, Blackwell Burke P.A, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant Amreya Rahmeto Shefa.

Jason Marisam, Peter J. Farrell, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota, for appellant/cross-respondent Attorney General Keith Ellison.

Barry M. Landy, Kyle W. Wislocky, Jacob F. Siegel, Ciresi Conlin LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant Governor Tim Walz.

Scott M. Flaherty, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant/cross-respondent Chief Justice Lorie Gildea.

Edwin H. Caldie, Christina J. Hansen, Stinson LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Teresa J. Nelson, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota; for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota.

Beth Forsythe, Amy Weisgram, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Julie Ann Jonas, Andrew Markquart, Great North Innocence Project, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Great North Innocence Project.

Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota; and JaneAnne Murray, Murray Law LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Robert J. Gilbertson, Caitlinrose H. Fisher, Virginia R. McCalmont, Forsgren Fisher McCalmont Demarea Tysver LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Pardon Recipients Jesse Brula, Gina Evans, Seth Evans, and Amber Jochem.

Elizabeth J. Richards, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Rana S. Alexander, Standpoint, St. Paul, Minnesota, for amici curiae Violence Free Minnesota, Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault, and Standpoint.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

This appeal requires us to interpret the language of the Board of Pardons provision found in Article V, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution. We must then determine whether the Legislature violated either that section, or the separation-of-powers provision in Article III, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution, when it enacted the unanimity requirement in Minn. Stat. § 638.02, subd. 1 (2020).

Respondent/cross-appellant Amreya Rahmeto Shefa was convicted of first-degree manslaughter. She later filed an application for a pardon absolute, which was denied because the members of the Board of Pardons did not unanimously agree that she was entitled to a pardon. Appellant/cross-respondent Attorney General Keith Ellison and respondent/cross-appellant Governor Tim Walz voted to grant her application, and appellant/cross-respondent Chief Justice Lorie Gildea1 voted to deny it. Following the denial of her application, Shefa filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the three members of the Board of Pardons. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court concluded that, under Article V, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution, the governor retains a sufficient and separate power to grant pardons. Based on that conclusion, the court declared that the unanimity requirement violates Article V, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution.2 In contrast, the court concluded that the unanimity requirement does not violate Article III, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution because the Minnesota Constitution explicitly provides for the chief justice's participation in the pardon process. The parties appealed. While those appeals were pending, we granted the Chief Justice's petition for accelerated review. On September 16, 2021, we filed an order that reversed in part and affirmed in part the decision of the district court, concluding that the statutory provisions do not violate Article V, Section 7, or Article III, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution. Our opinion explains the reasons for our decision.

FACTS

On December 1, 2013, Shefa fatally stabbed her husband Habibi Tesema. Following a police investigation, the State charged her with second-degree intentional murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2020). Shefa asserted a self-defense claim, waived her right to a jury, and asked the district court to consider the charge of first-degree manslaughter, Minn. Stat. § 609.20(1) (2020), which treats an intentional killing less severely when it is committed in the heat of passion.

After considering the evidence presented at trial, the district court found that, although Shefa credibly testified that Tesema had engaged in extensive sexual abuse, the force Shefa used greatly exceeded the degree of force required to defend herself.3 As part of its analysis, the court emphasized the number of sharp-force injuries inflicted and Tesema's level of intoxication. Ultimately, the court concluded that when Shefa intentionally killed Tesema, she was acting in the heat of passion because the sexual assault, when coupled with the proven history of extensive abuse, would have provoked a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances.4 At the sentencing hearing, the court said, "This case has been one of the most difficult of my legal career." Addressing Shefa personally, the court said, "[The] evidence proved that [you] acted in the heat of passion[,] ... but it also proved that you ... had ... options that you did not take. Instead, you brutally stabbed Habibi Tesema and ended his life." The court convicted Shefa of first-degree manslaughter and imposed a presumptive prison sentence.

Shefa appealed her conviction, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence. The court of appeals concluded that the record supported the district court's finding that the force Shefa used greatly exceeded the degree of force required to defend herself. She filed a petition for review, which was denied.5

In February 2017, while Shefa was still in prison, the United States Department of Homeland Security alleged that she was removable to Ethiopia based on her conviction of first-degree manslaughter. Shefa filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. In her application, she alleged that if she were removed to Ethiopia, Tesema's family would try to hurt or kill her. Shefa also filed applications for U and T Visas.6 Following an evidentiary hearing, the immigration judge found that, although the concept of retaliatory killings might be culturally accepted in some Ethiopian communities, Shefa's expert testified that there is no acceptance of the practice in the formal legal system and that retaliatory killings would be unlikely in highly populated areas with a strong police presence such as Addis Ababa, the capitol of Ethiopia. The immigration judge also found that two of Shefa's siblings have moved from rural Ethiopia to Addis Ababa and they have not been harmed. She found that nothing would prevent Shefa from living in Addis Ababa. Based on these findings, the immigration judge denied Shefa's asylum application and directed that she be removed from the United States to Ethiopia.

On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that the record supported the findings of the immigration judge and issued a final order for her removal. Shefa sought judicial review. The Eighth Circuit ordered a remand to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Eighth Circuit observed that its remand would have the incidental effect of enabling Shefa to continue to pursue relief in the form of T and U Visas before the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Meanwhile, Shefa filed an application for an absolute pardon.7 In her application, she acknowledged that, unlike a pardon extraordinary, a pardon absolute is rarely granted.8 According to Shefa, a pardon absolute was warranted in her case for two main reasons. First, although her conviction is lawful based on the number of wounds inflicted on Tesema, it is unjust because when victims of abuse and rape are prosecuted for their resistance, questions of reasonableness and intent become murky. Second, returning to Ethiopia will likely be life-threatening because Tesema's family has sworn an oath to kill her if she returns to Ethiopia.

On June 12, 2020, the Board of Pardons considered Shefa's application for a pardon absolute. The Governor and the Attorney General voted to grant her application, and the Chief Justice voted to deny it. Lacking unanimous support, Shefa's application was denied under Minn. Stat. § 638.02, subd. 1, which provides:

The Board of Pardons may grant an absolute or a conditional pardon, but every conditional pardon shall state the terms and conditions on which it was granted. Every pardon or commutation of sentence shall be in writing and shall have no force or effect unless granted by a unanimous vote of the board duly convened.

(Emphasis added.)

In July 2020, Shefa filed a civil action against the Attorney General, the Governor, and the Chief Justice, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Shefa sought three primary forms of relief. First, she requested a declaration that the unanimous vote required to grant a pardon under Minn. Stat. § 638.02, subd. 1, is unlawful and invalid. Second, she requested an order requiring the Governor to reconsider her application for a pardon absolute without the unconstitutional unanimity requirement. Third, she requested an order requiring the Attorney General to take steps to ensure all future pardon applications are assessed under the framework set out by the Minnesota Constitution, which empowers the governor to grant clemency "in conjunction with" the Board of Pardons.

The parties stipulated to the relevant facts and filed motions for summary judgment. The attorney representing Shefa argued that the unanimity requirement violates Article V, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution (the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Schroeder v. Simon
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • February 15, 2023
    ...of Article VII, Section 1. Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law, which we review de novo. Shefa v. Ellison, 968 N.W.2d 818, 825 (Minn. 2022)." 'The rules applicable to the construction of statutes are equally applicable' to the construction of the Minnesota Constitut......
  • Schroeder v. Simon
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • February 15, 2023
    ...of Article VII, Section 1. Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law, which we review de novo. Shefa v. Ellison, 968 N.W.2d 818, 825 (Minn. 2022)." 'The rules applicable to the construction of statutes are equally applicable' to the construction of the Minnesota Constitut......
  • In re Marriage of Legred
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Minnesota
    • April 24, 2023
    ...the Minnesota Constitution, appellate courts first examine the language of the constitutional provision to determine whether it is ambiguous. Id. "'The rules applicable to the construction statutes are equally applicable' to the construction of the Minnesota Constitution." Id. (quoting Clar......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT