Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. SC96857.,SC96857.
• Parties: Mary Ann SHEFFIELD, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

800 So.2d 197

Mary Ann SHEFFIELD, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

No. SC96857.

Supreme Court of Florida.

October 25, 2001.

Teresa Byrd Morgan, Lake City, FL, for Petitioner.

W. Alan Winter, Jacksonville, FL, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, J.

We have for review Sheffield v. Superior Insurance Co., 741 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), a decision from the First District Court of Appeal that expressly and directly conflicts with the Third District Court of Appeal's decisions in Smith v. Hooligan's Pub & Oyster Bar, Ltd., 753 So.2d 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), and Porter v. Vista Building Maintenance Services, 630 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Mary Ann Sheffield sustained soft tissue injuries as a passenger in an automobile that was hit from the rear while the vehicle was stopped at a traffic light. See Sheffield, 741 So.2d at 534

. After settling with the tortfeasor, Sheffield sued her uninsured motorist insurance carrier, respondent Superior Insurance Company ("Superior"). See id.

Prior to trial, Sheffield filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude collateral source evidence regarding both insurance and other benefits provided by her employer. The trial court denied Sheffield's motion. The parties then stipulated that Sheffield would have a standing objection to the introduction of collateral source evidence and would not have to contemporaneously or spontaneously object during trial in order to preserve the objection for appeal. Thereafter, Sheffield introduced collateral source evidence in her case-in-chief, including the fact that she had group medical insurance to defray some of the costs of treatment.¹

Although the jury returned a verdict in Sheffield's favor, the jury did not find that Sheffield sustained a permanent injury and only awarded her past medical expenses and $6,554.61 for future medical expenses over a five-year period. After reducing the amount of the verdict with set-offs from collateral sources and the settlement with the tortfeasor, the trial court entered final judgment for Sheffield in the total amount of $4,170.22. Sheffield filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict on the issue of the permanency of her injuries and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to exclude evidence of collateral sources of recovery. The trial court denied the motion.

Sheffield appealed to the First District, which affirmed the denial of her motion for a new trial, finding that "her own introduction of such [collateral source] evidence precludes reversal for a new trial on that ground." Sheffield, 741 So.2d at 534. The First District reasoned that the trial court's failure to grant the motion in limine did not confer a right on Sheffield to "build error into the trial so as to guarantee two bites at the apple." Id. at 537. The First District explained that Sheffield "invited the error now invoked as a reason for a new trial." Id.

Judge Browning dissented, concluding that Sheffield did not waive any error in light of the stipulation with Superior that Sheffield would have a standing objection to the introduction of collateral source evidence. See id. at 541 (Browning, J., dissenting). Judge Browning also objected to the majority's reliance on the "invited error" reasoning, noting that Superior had never advanced the argument that Sheffield had waived the collateral source issue and that Superior argued only that the introduction of the evidence was harmless error that did not affect the amount of the jury's verdict. See id. at 539-40. In response to the majority position that Sheffield opened the door by introducing the improper evidence herself, the dissenting opinion explained that because Sheffield was faced with the trial court's incorrect ruling, Sheffield "had every right to attempt to defuse the issue and initially present collateral-source evidence." Id. at 540.

Judge Browning analogized the instant case to the Third District's decision in Porter, a case involving the plaintiff's introduction of his previous alcohol abuse after the trial court denied his motion in limine on the matter:

[P]laintiff's counsel's attempt to diminish the prejudicial impact of the damaging evidence did not, contrary to appellee's contentions, waive the error, or render the error harmless. A party cannot be penalized for his good-faith reliance on a trial court's incorrect ruling.

Sheffield, 741 So.2d at 540 (quoting Porter, 630 So.2d at 206). In addition, Judge Browning concluded that because Gormley v. GTE Products Corp., 587 So.2d 455 (Fla.1991),² constituted a landmark decision that the trial court ignored, "no excuse exists for trying a case on a misapplication of such a universally known and accepted principle of law." Sheffield, 741 So.2d at 540. Finally, Judge Browning concluded that "[i]f the admitted error of the trial judge is considered on its impact on the trial rather than on the basis of nonpreservation, the burden of proving that the error was `harmless' is borne by Superior, which induced the trial court to commit reversible error." Id. Judge Browning expressed concern that

[t]he majority's decision will encourage litigants to seek clever misapplications of law to gain an advantage, and then after so doing, if confronted by appeal, admit to error and claim it to be harmless, or claim that the opponent waived the error while struggling within the confines of a patently unfair proceeding.

Id. at 541.

DISCUSSION

The First District majority opinion acknowledges, and we agree, that the trial court committed "clear error" in denying Sheffield's motion in limine to exclude the introduction of collateral sources of payment at trial. See Sheffield, 741 So.2d at 536

. Upon proper objection, the collateral source rule prohibits the introduction of any evidence of payments from collateral sources. See Gormley, 587 So.2d at 457; § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (2000).³ Because the subject of Sheffield's motion in limine covered collateral source benefits from her employer, there is no question that the trial court erred in denying Sheffield's motion in limine.

Given this error, the issue before this Court is whether Sheffield's counsel, by introducing collateral source evidence in Sheffield's case-in-chief after the trial court erroneously denied her motion in limine, waived any objection for appellate review. Florida appellate courts are divided on this issue.

In Porter, the plaintiff in a slip-and-fall case filed a pretrial motion to prevent the defendant from introducing evidence concerning the plaintiff's previous alcohol abuse. 630 So.2d at 206. The trial court denied the motion and during opening statement the plaintiff's counsel mentioned plaintiff's prior alcoholism "in an effort to diffuse its impact." Id. The Third District first concluded that the trial court erroneously denied the motion, because there was no dispute that the plaintiff was sober at the time of the injury and the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. See id. Next, the Third District held that "plaintiff's counsel's attempt to diminish the prejudicial impact of the damaging evidence did not, contrary to [defendant's] contentions, waive the error, or render the error harmless. A party cannot be penalized for his good-faith reliance on a trial court's incorrect ruling." Id.

Subsequently, in Smith, the Third District, in reliance on Porter, held that a party who is wrongfully denied a motion in limine does not "open the door" upon subsequently admitting this evidence in the party's case-in-chief. Smith, 753 So.2d at 599-600. In Smith, the parents of a bar patron, who was shot and killed by another bar patron, brought a wrongful death action against the bar for negligent failure to provide adequate security. Id. at 598. Before trial, the parents moved for a motion in limine to exclude as irrelevant and immaterial all evidence regarding their son's character. See id. The trial court denied the motion and the parents introduced evidence concerning their son's good character. Id. at 599.

On appeal, the parents claimed that the trial court erred in denying the motion in limine. See id. In response, the bar claimed that the introduction of character evidence was appropriate rebuttal to the parents' evidence of their son's good nature, which the parents introduced to prove the measure of their loss. See id. The Third District agreed with the parents' argument, concluding that "Smiths' counsel presented good character testimony in anticipation of [the bar's] bad character evidence and simply attempted to minimize the latter's prejudicial impact." Id. at 600.

In Duffell v. South Walton Emergency Services, Inc., 501 So.2d 1352, 1353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), Judge Ervin, in a concurring in part dissenting in part opinion, espoused a similar approach. In Duffell, a personal injury action, the plaintiff sought to exclude evidence of her drug use following her discharge from the hospital. See id. at 1353. The trial court ruled that the defendants could mention the plaintiffs drug use to the jury in the defendant's opening statement. See id. at 1353. Consequently, the plaintiffs counsel alluded to the plaintiffs prescribed drug use during the plaintiff's opening statement, and asked the jury to ignore this evidence as irrelevant to the issue of negligence. See id. The defense, in its opening statement, advised the jury that the plaintiff had a drug problem, and that the problem continued through the accident. See id. The plaintiff contended that the admission of her drug use was prejudicial and constituted grounds for reversal, but the defendant claimed that plaintiff invited the error. See id. at 1357. Although the First District in a per curiam opinion found "no reversible error" occurred,⁴ id. at 1352, Judge Ervin explained:

I think

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