Shefts v. Petrakis
| Decision Date | 12 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-cv-1104 |
| Parties | JAMISON J. SHEFTS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN PETRAKIS, KEVIN MORGAN, and HEIDI HUFFMAN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
This matter is before the Court on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the issue of whether the Access2Go Board could and did grant post-hoc authorization to Defendants' accession of Plaintiff's Access2Go email. (Docs. 213 & 223). Both Motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
As the general background of this case has been explained multiple times by the parties and the Court over the course of this litigation, it is unnecessary to review it in detail. In Count III of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, by accessing Plaintiff's stored emails on his Access2Go-provided email account, emails on his personal Yahoo! web-based email account, and his text messages, violated the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2701. As explained in its November 29, 2011 Orders on the parties' earlier Motions for Summary Judgment, the SCA, also referred to as Title II of the ECPA, creates acause of action when any person "intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains...access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system." 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). Authorization to access a "facility" can be given by the entity providing the electronic communications service, which includes a private employer that provides email service to its employees - Access2Go itself thus had the right to authorize access to Plaintiff's Access2Go email account. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2003); Devine v. Kapasi, 729 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1028 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (). If Defendants were authorized to access Plaintiff's communications, there was no SCA violation.
In the briefing leading up to the November 29, 2011 Orders, Petrakis raised the argument that he had authorization from Access2Go to access Plaintiff's Access2Go-provided email because the corporation had ratified his actions after the fact. In the Court's Order on Plaintiff's second Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court explained that a definitive ruling on that question was not possible because both legal and factual issues were as yet insufficiently developed. (Doc. 210 at 16-18). Now the parties present Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, each arguing for a definitive ruling in their favor on the question of whether the Board could and did ratify Defendants' actions in order to exempt them from § 2701 liability.
"On cross-motions for summary judgment, the same standard of review in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies to each movant." Continental Cas. Co. v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 427 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir.2005). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that courts "look to the burden of proof that each party would bear on an issue of trial; we then require that party to go beyond the pleadings and affirmatively establish a genuine issue of material fact." Diaz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 499 F.3d 540, 643 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Santaella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir.1997)).
Summary judgment should be granted where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence on record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. SMS Demag Aktiengesellschaft v. Material Sciences Corp., 565 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 2009). All inferences drawn from the facts must be construed in favor of the non-movant; however, the Court is not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record. Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court draws only reasonable inferences. Id.
Once the movant has met its burden of showing the Court that there are no genuine issues of material fact, to survive summary judgment the "nonmovant must show through specific evidence that a triable issue of fact remains on issues on which he bears the burden of proof at trial." Warsco v. Preferred Tech. Group, 258F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). If the evidence on record could not lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-movant, then no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. McClendon v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1997). At the summary judgment stage, however, the court may not resolve issues of fact; disputed material facts must be left for resolution at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
Access2Go is a Peoria, Illinois-based telecommunications company. From January 1, 2000 to January 1, 2006, Plaintiff owned 100% of the voting stock in Access2Go and was the sole member of its Board of Directors. (Doc. 170, Ex. A ¶¶ 3-6). On January 1, 2006, Plaintiff sold shares of Access2Go to Defendants Petrakis and Morgan, as well as John Tandeski. (Doc. 152, Ex. A at ¶ 4). Plaintiff, Petrakis, and Morgan each owned 30% of the stock, and Tandeski owned 10%. (Doc. 152, Ex. A at ¶ 4). These men constituted the four-member Board of Directors for Access2Go, with each having one vote. (Doc. 152, Ex. A at ¶¶ 4-5; Doc. 170, Ex. A at ¶ 8).
Before and at all times after January 1, 2006, Access2Go owned and provided its employees with an electronic communication system comprised of computers, servers, email accounts, and software, including an email server. Plaintiff had an email account provided by Access2Go, and his emails were stored on the company's server. (Doc. 60, Ex. 1 at ¶ 29). At times between January 1, 2006, and June 18, 2008, Petrakis read and reviewed certain emails from Plaintiff's Access2Go emailaccount, with Plaintiff's express limited permission.1 (Doc. 219, Ex. 2 at ¶ 2). On June 16, 2008, at Petrakis' direction, Plaintiff's Access2Go email account was copied onto a hard drive, and stored within the "JS Directory." (Doc. 187, Ex. E at ¶ 21). The directory was opened later that day. (Doc. 187, Ex. E at ¶ 21).2
On June 18, 2008, the Board appointed Petrakis to be "employee liaison." (Doc. 219, Ex. 2 at ¶; Doc. 228, Ex. A at ¶ 8). After this date, Petrakis accessed Plaintiff's stored Access2Go email communications.3 (Doc. 219, Ex. 2 at ¶ 4). Alsoafter this date, Defendant Morgan, at Petrakis' direction, reviewed copies of Plaintiff's Access2Go emails that had been stored on a flash-memory device. (Doc. 152, Exs. 1-3).
Tandeski has testified that Huffman informed him in late 2007 and in 2008 that Petrakis used his Access2Go computer to "spy on" Access2Go employees' work activities and to obtain their personal information. (Doc. 6, Ex. 1 at ¶ 26). In early 2008, Tandeski became aware that Petrakis, Morgan, and Huffman were accessing Access2Go employees' email accounts, including the account used by Plaintiff; also in early 2008, Petrakis and Morgan told Tandeski that they were accessing Plaintiff's and other employees' stored Access2Go email.4 (Doc. 6, Ex. 1 at ¶ 20; Doc. 18 at ¶ 13). Petrakis explained that he was doing so in order to compile evidence to support firing Plaintiff. (Doc. 18 at ¶ 4). In the summer of 2008, Tandeski learned that Petrakis had been using spyware to obtain Plaintiff's electronic communications; Petrakis showed him emails taken from Plaintiff's computer, and he states that Petrakis told him in July 2008 that he had had spyware installed onthe Access2Go computers in order to monitor employee activity.5 (Doc. 18 at ¶ 8; Doc. 6, Ex. 1 at ¶ 22).
On August 21, 2008, Plaintiff sent six emails from his Access2Go email account to his personal Yahoo! email account, and later received a letter dated August 26, 2008 from Access2Go's attorneys, of the law firm Heyl, Royster, Voelker, and Allen ("HRVA"), stating that Plaintiff had sent the six emails, that they contained attachments of approximately 75 confidential Access2Go documents, and that Access2Go had suspended Plaintiff with full pay pending further investigation.6 (Doc. 205, ¶ 22; Doc. 219, Ex. 1 of Ex. 2). Tandeski received a copy of this letter prior to September 8, 2008. (Doc. 219, Ex. 2 at ¶ 6). Also prior to September 8, 2008, Petrakis told Tandeski that he had discovered that Plaintiff had sent confidential documents concerning Access2Go's business to his personal Yahoo! email account. (Doc. 219, Ex. 2 at ¶ 7; Doc. 219, Ex. 3 at 208:5-18). On September 8, 2008, Tandeski and Morgan received an email from Petrakis, with attached emailsfrom Plaintiff to several female Access2Go employees between December 3, 2007 and July 7, 2008. (Doc. 219, Ex. 4 at 48:3-12; Doc. 219, Ex. 5 at ¶ 1). Morgan knew that Petrakis had accessed Access2Go's electronic communication system to read and review the emails Plaintiff sent to the female employees. (Doc. 219, Ex. 5 at ¶ 1).
On September 9, 2008, the Board of Directors held a meeting at which Petrakis, Morgan, and Tandeski ratified Plaintiff's suspension, and recommended he be terminated based on evidence that he had, among other things, sexually harassed Access2Go employees. (Doc. 200 at 33; Doc. 205 at 4). On September 16, 2008, Tandeski, Morgan, and three HRVA...
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