Shehan v. I. Tanenbaum, Son & Co.
| Decision Date | 25 June 1913 |
| Citation | 88 A. 146,121 Md. 283 |
| Parties | SHEHAN, State Ins. Com'r, v. I. TANENBAUM, SON & CO. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City; Thomas Ireland Elliott, Judge.
Petition by I. Tanenbaum, Son & Co., for a writ of mandamus against William Mason Shehan, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Maryland. From an order granting the relief prayed for defendant appeals. Reversed, and petition dismissed.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.
Arthur D. Foster, of Baltimore, for appellant. Augustus C Binswanger, of Baltimore, for appellee.
The appellee, a foreign corporation, applied to the insurance commissioner to issue to it an insurance broker's license "in its own valuable corporate name," under section 200 of article 23 of the Code. The commissioner refused to issue the license, upon the ground that the laws of the state did not authorize him to issue licenses to any but natural persons and to a bona fide copartnership. Thereupon the appellee filed a petition asking that the writ of mandamus might issue to compel the commissioner to issue such a license to it. Upon hearing had, the court passed an order directing the commissioner to issue an insurance broker's license to the appellee as prayed. Thereupon the appellant took this appeal
Section 200, art. 23, Code (1904), provides as follows: "Any person applying for the same and paying to the insurance commissioner the sum of one hundred dollars for the use of the state, and an additional sum of one dollar as a fee to the said commissioner for issuing said license, may obtain a license for carrying on the business of an insurance broker, and no license shall be issued to permit more than one person or the members of a bona fide copartnership to act thereunder." The construction put by the commissioner upon the word "person," appearing in the act, was that it did not include or apply to an artificial person or body corporate. Unquestionably the purpose of this act, in addition to the regulation of the business of insurance brokers, was the raising of revenue for the purposes of the state. With that purpose held in view what construction should be placed upon the statute?
The object of all construction of statutes is to arrive at the intention of the Legislature, and when that is ascertained it will be carried out. A leading case in this state is that of Canal Co. v. B. & O. R. R., 4 Gill & J. 152, in which the court, speaking through Buchanan, C.J., said: "Statutes should be construed with a view to the original intent and meaning of the makers, and such construction should be put upon them as best to answer that intention which may be collected from the cause or necessity of making the act, or from foreign circumstances, and when discovered, ought to be followed, although such construction may seem to be contrary to the letter of the statute." If the language of a statute is ambiguous courts are not confined to it, but may make use of extraneous aids to arrive at the meaning of the act. In such cases the intention of the lawmakers is deduced from a view of the subject-matter, the necessity of the act, and the object of the Legislature. Clark v. Mayor, etc., 29 Md. 285; Broadway v. Hankey, 31 Md. 346; Mincher v. State, 66 Md. 232, 7 A. 451. In the case of Milburn v. State, 1 Md. 17, this court said "that the policy and intention of the Legislature should be kept constantly in view, and control, in a considerable degree, the interpretation of language to be found in the revenue acts." These are a few of the many cases on the construction of statutes in this state, but they all follow the cardinal principle that the intention of the Legislature should be sought and followed. In Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 138, the rule in thus stated: ...
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