Sheila A. by Menninger v. Finney, 68,945

Decision Date29 October 1993
Docket NumberNo. 68,945,68,945
PartiesSHEILA A. and Thomas A., by their next friend, Dr. Karl MENNINGER; Brooks B. and Darrell B., by their next friends, J. Eugene Balloun and Sheila Wombles; Karen C., by her next friend, the Reverend C.L. Bachus; David D., by his next friend, Bishop Kenneth W. Hicks; Jason E., by his next friends, Paul David Walker and Barbara Walker; Bonnie F., by her next friend, Kristy L. Simpson; and Arthur G., by his next friend, Judy Frick, Appellants, v. Joan FINNEY, Governor, Donna Whiteman, the Secretary of Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services; Carolyn Hill, Commissioner of Youth Services; Jan Waide, Director, Kansas Children in Need of Care Program; and The State of Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Appellees.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Kansas appellate courts are constitutionally without authority to render advisory opinions, and appellate review is dependent upon the existence of an actual case or controversy.

2. The rule that an appellate court will not decide moot issues applies to both private and public controversies and to law or fact issues.

3. An issue becomes moot when a judgment of the appellate court would be of no consequence.

4. For an injunction to issue, there must be some indication that there is a threatened injury.

Christopher Hansen, of the American Civil Liberties Union, New York City, argued the cause, and Christopher Dunn, New York City and Rene Netherton, Topeka, were with him on the brief for appellants.

Deanne Watts Hay, of Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees.

ABBOTT, Justice:

Plaintiffs' action challenges the adequacy of the State's Child in Need of Care program. The Governor of the State of Kansas is one of several named defendants. The trial court dismissed the Governor as a defendant because it believed it could not grant the relief sought by plaintiffs against the Governor. Plaintiffs appeal from the order dismissing the Governor.

After the appeal was docketed, plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement with the remaining defendant. Thus, we are first faced with the issue of whether this appeal is now moot in that plaintiffs are requesting an advisory opinion and no real controversy exists at this time.

Some background is necessary in order to understand the dispositive issues.

Plaintiffs brought a civil rights action on behalf of a class of children who have been placed in the Child in Need of Care (CINC) program of the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) or who are at risk of such placement. The trial court certified the class as children who are in the legal and/or physical custody of the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services as well as children who the department knows or should know are at risk of coming into the department's CINC program. Plaintiffs describe numerous instances where they contend the CINC program failed to provide adequate care for the named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert claims under federal statutes, the federal Constitution, state law, and the state constitution.

The case originally named Governor Hayden as a defendant. When Governor Finney took office, she was substituted for Governor Hayden pursuant to K.S.A. 60-225(d). Also named as defendants were the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, the Commissioner of Youth Services, the Director of the Kansas Children in Need of Care Program, and the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS).

SRS has overall responsibility for social services programs in the state of Kansas. Youth Services is one of seven departments under SRS. Within the Department of Youth Services is the Children in Need of Care Program.

The district court judge attempted several times to glean from plaintiffs exactly what relief they sought against each named defendant. At a hearing on April 27, 1992, plaintiffs' counsel indicated that they were not seeking personal damages against any defendant, but rather were seeking relief against the defendants in their official capacity. Plaintiffs' counsel also stated:

"The reason that the Governor is needed [as a party] is the Governor has the authority to appoint the Secretary and to make the Secretary comply with laws under penalty of removal. All right. The second authority that the Governor has is the Governor deals with the legislature. The Governor would have the opportunity to ask the legislature for additional funding that might be needed should plaintiffs succeed on their claims and, second, has the authority, then, to also ask the legislature for legislative changes that might be needed to bring the State into compliance if the plaintiffs succeed on their claims....

I can be quite honest that at a minimum we--plaintiffs need, for injunctive relief and for purposes of your orders, the Governor and the Secretary [of SRS] because ... the ACLU has had experience where, one, it has just been the Secretary, and after trial, or after a Consent Decree was issued, a judge attempted to force the Secretary to do certain things to be in compliance with the Court's Orders. The Governor would simply veto the order or strike it because the Governor wasn't under the authority of the Court."

At a May 4, 1992, hearing, plaintiffs' counsel stated: "I want to make it clear that the plaintiffs are not seeking--we said this before--we are not seeking different relief against different defendants.... [W]e are seeking a single form of relief that would run against all three defendants." At a July 29, 1992, hearing, plaintiffs' counsel stated:

"Much of the confusion in this motion is caused by the Governor's persistently characterizing our claims in what I think is an incorrect way. We do not claim a right to have the Governor submit a particular budget. We do not claim a right to have the Governor pass financial legislation...

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  • State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • March 11, 2008
    ...law of the land." 219 U.S. at 357-58. Kansas courts have followed the same rule as federal courts. See, e.g., Sheila A. v. Finney, 253 Kan. 793, 796, 861 P.2d 120 (1993); NEA-Topeka, Inc., 227 Kan. at 531, 608 P.2d 920; Knowles v. State Board of Education, 219 Kan. 271, 278, 547 P.2d 699 (1......
  • State v. Roat
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • June 19, 2020
    ...of the other. See, e.g., Allenbrand v. Zubin Darius Contractor , 253 Kan. 315, 317, 855 P.2d 926 (1993) ; Sheila A. v. Finney , 253 Kan. 793, 796-97, 861 P.2d 120 (1993) (mootness is jurisdictional); Board of County Commissioners v. Duffy , 259 Kan. 500, 504, 912 P.2d 716 (1996) (mootness i......
  • Sheila A. by Balloun v. Whiteman, 73288
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • March 15, 1996
    ...finding there was no remedy obtainable against her. This ruling was appealed to our court and was the subject of Sheila A. v. Finney, 253 Kan. 793, 861 P.2d 120 (1993), wherein we summarily held that since at the time of argument a settlement agreement with the remaining defendant (SRS) had......
  • State ex rel. Morrison v. Price, 96,481.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • December 7, 2007
    ...for another." See K.S.A. 60-901 (an injunction is "an order to do or refrain from doing a particular act"); Sheila A. v. Finney, 253 Kan. 793, 797, 861 P.2d 120 (1993) ("for an injunction to issue, there must be some indication that there is a threatened This injunction goes further, howeve......
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