Shelby Cnty. v. Taylor

• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE
• Docket Number: W2024-01756-COA-R3-CV
• Decision Date: 30 December 2025
• Citation: Shelby Cnty. v. Taylor, W2024-01756-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. Dec 30, 2025)
• Parties: SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE v. STEPHANIE TAYLOR ET AL.

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SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE v. STEPHANIE TAYLOR ET AL.

No. W2024-01756-COA-R3-CV

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Jackson

December 30, 2025

Session September 17, 2025

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County No. CH-17-0787 James R. Newsom, Chancellor

Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of her petition for writ of mandamus. Because Appellant improperly joined her original mandamus action with Appellee's petition for judicial review, an appellate action, we affirm the dismissal.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed and Remanded

Murray B. Wells, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Stephanie Taylor.

Jasen M. Durrence, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Shelby County Government.

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CARMA DENNIS MCGEE and VALERIE L. SMITH, JJ., joined.

OPINION

KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE

I. Background

On January 23, 2017, Appellee Shelby County, Tennessee terminated Appellant Stephanie Taylor's employment with the Shelby County Human Resources Department. On January 27, 2017, Appellant appealed to the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board (the "Board"). On March 21, 2017, the Board heard the appeal. By order of March 31, 2017, the Board overturned Appellant's termination and reinstated her with "full back pay." The Board's order did not specify the amount of back pay owed nor how it should be calculated.

On May 26, 2017, Appellee filed a petition for certiorari, a writ of supersedeas, and a petition for judicial review ("Appellee's Petition") in the Chancery Court of Shelby County ("trial court"). Under the writ of supersedeas, Appellee asked the trial court to stay the Board's order pending the litigation. Appellee also asked the trial court to reverse the Board's order reinstating Appellant with back pay. That same day, the trial court signed the fiat and ordered that a writ of certiorari and a writ of supersedeas be issued. Accordingly, Appellant's reinstatement and back pay were suspended pending resolution of the litigation. On March 8, 2018, Appellant filed an answer to Appellee's Petition.

Over the next several years, the parties attempted to engage in settlement negotiations but were unsuccessful. On January 19, 2022, Appellee filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, asking the trial court to enter an order dismissing its petition. That day, Appellee sent Appellant a letter informing her of her reinstatement, effective February 1, 2022. With the letter, Appellee enclosed two checks issued to Appellant: one for $7,215.45, constituting back pay, and one for $2,701.42, representing post-judgment interest. The letter indicated that Appellant's back pay was calculated from her last day of employment on January 23, 2017, through March 31, 2017, the date the Board ordered her reinstatement.

On January 26, 2022, Appellant filed a "Verified Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Mandamus" ("Appellant's Petition"), discussed further infra, asking the trial court to reinstate her to her position "with full back pay and all benefits[.]"

On January 28, 2022, the trial court entered an order on Appellee's voluntary nonsuit. In the order, the trial court: (1) confirmed that Appellee's Petition would be dismissed with prejudice; (2) lifted the writ of supersedeas; (3) assessed court costs and fees to Appellee; and (4) stated that the order constituted a final order "resolving all issues raised in [Appellee's] Petition."

On February 25, 2022, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's Petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On August 2, 2022, Appellant filed a response to the motion to dismiss, and, on August 3, 2022, Appellant filed a supplemental response. On September 15, 2022, the trial court ordered the parties to mediation, which was unsuccessful. On December 15, 2023, Appellant filed a "Memorandum of Law in Explanation of the Proper Calculations of Back[]pay" ("Proper Calculations of Back Pay Memo"). Therein, Appellant referenced other administrative appeals involving Appellee and asked the trial court to follow Appellee's procedures from those cases to define back pay in this case.

On September 26, 2024, the trial court heard the motion to dismiss, and, by order of October 25, 2024, granted it. Relying on Goodwin v. Metropolitan Board of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), discussed further infra, the trial court concluded that Appellant's writ of mandamus "d[id] not lie" with the trial court. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. Issues

Appellant raises two issues for our review, as stated in her brief:

1. Whether the [Chancery] Court erred when it applied Goodwin v. Metropolitan Board of Health to grant a motion to dismiss a writ of mandamus?

2. Whether the [Chancery Court] erred when it declared that it possessed no jurisdiction over a writ of mandamus when a petitioner's writ of certiorari and writ of supersedeas was voluntarily dismissed, while the petitioner has still failed to comply with the previously-disputed order?

III. Standard of Review

This case was decided on a grant of Appellee's motion to dismiss. The resolution of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion to dismiss is determined by an examination of the pleadings alone. Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tenn. 2002). A defendant who files a motion to dismiss "'admits the truth of all of the relevant and material allegations contained in the complaint, but . . . asserts that the allegations fail to establish a cause of action.'" Brown v. Tenn. Title Loans, Inc., 328 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tenn. 2005)). In considering a motion to dismiss, courts "must construe the complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 31-32 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Trau-Med of Am., Inc., 71 S.W.3d at 696). A trial court should grant a motion to dismiss "only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Crews v. Buckman Labs Int'l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tenn. 2002); see also Lanier v. Rains, 229 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tenn. 2007). We review the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the adequacy of the complaint de novo with no presumption that the trial court's decision was correct. Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011).

IV. Analysis

This case arises from Appellee's petition for judicial review, which was filed in the trial court. Briefly, judicial review is available to "[a]nyone who may be aggrieved by any final order or judgment of any board or commission," Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101; Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1), and is conducted in conformity with the judicial review standards set out in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") at Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114(b)(1). "Under the []APA, administrative agency decisions are subject to chancery court review that is conducted without a jury and is limited to the administrative record." City of Memphis v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n of City of Memphis, 238 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(g)) (providing, however, that review of procedural errors is not limited to the administrative record) (emphasis added). As such, when hearing a petition for judicial review, the chancery court acts in a reviewing or appellate capacity, rather than as a factfinder or trial court. This Court has explained the appropriate standard for review in these cases:

[W]hile judicial review under the common law writ does not involve review of the intrinsic correctness of the lower tribunal's decision, Willis [v. Tennessee Dep't of Correction, 113 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003)]; Robinson v. Traughber, 13 S.W.3d 361, 364-[6]5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Turner v. Board of Paroles, 993 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), and a reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence presented to the board, Gallatin Hous. Auth. v. City of Gallatin, 868 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Hoover v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 924 S.W.2d [900,] 904 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)], a court is required to review the record of the board's proceeding to determine whether there is material evidence to support the board's conclusion.

Watson v. City of LaVergne, No. M2006-00351-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1341767, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 7, 2007). In its petition, Appellee asked the trial court to review the administrative record and reverse the Board's order reinstating Appellant with back pay.

As discussed above, one week after Appellee filed for voluntary dismissal of its petition for judicial review, Appellant filed her petition. In relevant part, her petition states:

COMES NOW Cross-Petitioner Stephanie Taylor and respectfully submits this Petition for Judicial Review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-9-101 et seq., § 4-5-322, § 29-25-101, and § 29-25-102(1), and 42 USC § 1983 and requests this Honorable Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus commanding Cross-Respondent to reinstate Cross-Petitioner with full back pay and all benefits as the Civil Service Merit Board reversed Cross-Petitioner's discipline as unreasonable on March 31, 2017.^[1]

*** 9. Cross-Respondent filed a timely appeal [i]n this matter, but has wholly failed to prosecute its appeal and now seeks to dismiss its appeal voluntarily without this [c]ourt's determination of the loss and benefits due to Cross-Petitioner[.]

10. Cross-Petitioner has the right to immediate reinstatement

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