Shelby County R-IV School Dist. v. Herman
| Decision Date | 12 July 1965 |
| Docket Number | R-IV,No. 1,No. 50969,50969,1 |
| Citation | 392 S.W.2d 609 |
| Parties | SHELBY COUNTYSCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Respondents, v. William H. HERMAN, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Charles E. Murrell, Jr., Edina, Henderson & Boulware, Shelbina, for appellant.
Bollow, Crist & Bollow, Shelbina, for respondent.
Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Louis C. Defeo, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for amicus curiae.
HOUSER, Commissioner.
Condemnation by a school district of 45 acres of a 245-acre farm in Shelby County. Commissioners awarded landowner $11,962. Trial of his exceptions to the commissioners' award resulted in a jury verdict of $12,456.33. Landowner appeals from the judgment entered upon the verdict. Since landowner claimed damages in excess of $78,000 and offered evidence in support thereof we have jurisdiction of this appeal, as the amount in dispute exceeds $15,000. State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Salmark Home Builders, Inc., Mo.Sup., 350 S.W.2d 771; State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Howald, Mo.Sup., 315 S.W.2d 786; Constitution, Art. V. Sec. 3, V.A.M.S.
The first question is whether Shelby County R-IV School District has the power of condemnation.
We are of the opinion that this school district is a town school district, and that as such it has this power. Section 165.010(3), V.A.M.S., provides that 'All districts governed by six directors and in which is located any city of the fourth class, * * * are town school districts.' (Emphasis ours.) Shelby County R-IV School District is governed by six directors. In it are located the cities of Clarence and Shelbina. We take judicial notice of the organization of cities of the fourth class, Sec. 79.010, V.A.M.S.; City of Savannah v. Dickey, 33 Mo.App. 522, and we judicially notice that Clarence and Shelbina are cities of the fourth class. Therefore, Shelby County R-IV School District is a town school district, which is specifically granted the power of eminent domain. Secs. 165.100 and 165.327, V.A.M.S.
The fact that it came into being by reorganization under Secs. 165.657-165.707, V.A.M.S., does not militate against the fact that it is a town district. In Vanlandingham v. Reorganized School Dist. No. R-IV, Mo.Sup., 243 S.W.2d 107, a reorganized school district was recognized as a town school district. Our conclusion is confirmed by Sec. 165.687, V.A.M.S., which provides that the directors whose election is provided for in enlarged or 'reorganized' districts 'shall be governed by the laws applicable to six-director school districts' (inter alia, town districts).
Landowner takes the untenable position that a reorganized school district is a new creature of the law--a corporate school entity separate and apart from common, consolidated, town and city school districts; that as such it has no power to condemn because that power is not mentioned in the laws applicable to the reorganization of school districts (Secs. 165.657-165.707). There is no basis for this argument. Section 165.010 classifies into four classes (common, consolidated, town and city) the public school districts organized under any of the laws of this state. Section 165.010 in its present form was enacted by Laws 1955, p. 533, after the enactment of Secs. 165.657-165.707, and therefore in contemplation thereof. Reorganized school districts, as such and by that name, are not included in the statutory classification. If we adopt landowner's contention we would judicially add a fifth class of school districts to the four provided for by Sec. 165.010. Sections 165.657-165.707 do not expressly, or by implication, create a new fifth class of school districts, actually or by name. In those sections the district to be reorganized is referred to 16 times as the 'proposed' or the 'enlarged' or the 'new' district; only once as the 'proposed reorganized district.' And in referring to the district after reorganization it is referred to 26 times as the 'enlarged district' or the 'enlarged school district(s).' Only twice in the 17 sections is there a reference to a 'reorganized district,' and that occurs in Sec. 165.685 in an adjectival sense only. Looking at the substance of these 17 sections, they deal only with the method of enlarging districts under reorganization plans by which smaller units are combined into larger units in order to make better provision of schools and school facilities. They do not undertake to provide for so-called reorganized districts a comprehensive scheme prescribing the general powers, duties, and procedures for the operation and workings of the schools therein. These matters are provided for in Secs. 165.163-165.260 for common school districts; in Sec. 165.263 et seq., for city, town and consolidated districts. There are special provisions applicable to school districts in cities of certain population. Secs. 165.315, 165.377-165.553, 165.563-165.653.
The term 'reorganized school district' is a popular term, used for administrative purposes, without legal significance in the classification of school districts as bondies corporate under the school laws of this state. A reorganized school district, by that name and as such, is not a political entity.
Next, landowner contends that the school district 'did not comply with the provisions of law to become a reorganized school district,' but does not assign reasons for this contention, or why or in what manner it failed to comply with the law. Therefore nothing has been preserved for appellate review under this point. Civil Rule 83.05(e), V.A.M.R.
Finally, landowner contends that the school district did not endeavor in good faith to agree with landowner upon proper compensation to be paid him for his land. The evidence discloses that on January 3, 1964 the board of education voted to get in touch with landowner and start negotiations for 40 to 50 acres at $300 per acre. Mr. Nevins, superintendent of schools, and two board members journeyed to Freeburg, Illinois where they talked to landowner, who stated that he did not wish to and would not sell the tract in which the school district was interested; that he would rather have his right arm taken than have part of his farm taken from him. Landowner told school district representatives to go ahead and condemn the land. No offer was made in view of landowner's attitude. Later offers of $225, $250 or $300 an acre were made by Mr. Nevins and rejected by landowner, who stated that he did not want to sell for the amount offered. There were communications by mail, in at least one of which an offer of $250 or $300 an acre was made. The letter went unanswered. One board member talked to landowner 'the better part of two hours' about purchasing the land. On April 10, 1964 the board authorized Mr. Nevins to offer $13,500 for the acreage desired ($300 per acre). An offer was made verbally and in witing, describing the land required. Landowner read the offer and refused it in the presence of Mr. Nevins. On April 14, 1964 the petition in condemnation was filed. We find no evidence of bad faith on the part of the representatives of the school district and therefore good faith on its part is not a subject for our consideration. School Dist. of Clayton v. Kelsey, 355 Mo. 478, 196 S.W.2d 860, 862.
The power to condemn being established, we turn to three alleged errors relating to the exclusion of evidence.
First, error in striking landowner's testimony as to the reasonable market value of the farm before and after the taking. Landowner disclosed that his method of arriving at reasonable market value was to take the net profit from the 94.6 tillable acres and capitalize that Figure at 4%. He testified that the income from the farm had increased 'wonderfully' in recent years, 'due to a good operator.' He further testified to the following facts with reference to the income from the farm:
year gross income expenses net profit
------- ------------ -------- ----------
1960-61 2,791.07 604.61 2,186.46
1961-62 4,111.26 965.80 3,145.46
1962-63 4,008.38 920.25 3,088.13
1963-64 8,324.17 1,764.50 6,559.67
Landowner farmed the land on a 50-50 basis, dividing the expenses and profits equally with his tenant. Landowner selected the crop year 1963-64 as the basis for his computation. Capitalizing the figure 6,559.67, he gave as his opinion that the reasonable market value of the whole farm prior to the taking of the 45 acres was $163,990, and after the taking was $85,982.50. On motion of the school district this testimony was stricken. Landowner claims that he was qualified and entitled to express his opinion of fair market value on this basis; that he was the owner of the land and knew what the land produced. Condemnor claims the court correctly struck the landowner's opinion as to value because it was incredible and manifestly untrue; that there is no rural acreage in northeast Missouri of comparable location and size that has a market value approaching $669 per acre for the whole farm and in excess of $1,700 per acre for 45 acres; that landowner used an improper standard and element in arriving at the value of the land (capitalizing the net profits of his best year and not excluding the tenant's share from the computation); and that landowner was a nonresident of Missouri, not shown qualified to testify as to land values in Shelby County.
The court did not err in striking landowner's opinion evidence of value. While ordinarily the owner of real property is held competent to testify as to its reasonable market value, 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain Sec. 18.4; 1 Orgel on Valuation under Eminent Domain, 2d Ed., Sec. 132, p. 567, and his estimate is received notwithstanding that he has not qualified as an expert, 32 C.J.S. Evidence Sec. 546(120); 20 Am.Jur. Evidence Sec. 892, upon the assumption that he is particularly familiar with it and knows of the uses to which it is particularly adaptable, his opinion is without probative...
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