Shelby Ins. Co. v. NORTHEAST STRUCTURES
Decision Date | 14 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-487-Appeal.,99-487-Appeal. |
Citation | 767 A.2d 75 |
Parties | SHELBY INSURANCE COMPANY v. NORTHEAST STRUCTURES, INC. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present WEISBERGER, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
James S. D'Ambra, Mark P. Dolan, Providence, for Petitioner.
Rajaram Suryanar, for Respondent.
This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on February 6, 2001, pursuant to an order directing the defendant, Northeast Structures, Inc. (Northeast), to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The defendant appealed from a Superior Court summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Shelby Insurance Company (Shelby). After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown, and the appeal will be decided at this time.
In December 1994, defendant was building a "wood framed Indoor Arena and Stable" (the structure) in Westerly, Rhode Island, for Robert and Mary Lucey (the Luceys). On December 23, 1994, a storm hit Westerly, and the partially built structure collapsed, despite the temporary bracing defendant had installed. The Luceys brought suit against defendant, alleging breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty. The count alleging negligence stated that "[t]he collapse of the Structure as aforesaid, was caused as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendant, including, but not limited to, the defendant's negligence in the design, construction, erection, and/or supplying of temporary supports and/or bracing during the erection, of the Structure * * *." In its answer, defendant asserted as one of its affirmative defenses that "[t]he defendant is not liable for any damages caused the [Luceys] by an Act of God."
The plaintiff, who insured defendant at the time of the collapse of the structure, filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking to establish that it did not have the duty to indemnify or defend defendant under the commercial general-liability insurance policy (the policy) in effect at the time. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment that was granted, based on the exclusions in the policy. The defendant appealed. During the pendency of this appeal, plaintiff continued to defend the underlying action under "a reservations of rights," in accordance with our decisions in Rumford Property and Liability Insurance Co. v. Carbone, 590 A.2d 398, 401 (R.I.1991), and Conanicut Marine Services, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 511 A.2d 967, 971 (R.I.1986).
Carlson v. Town of Smithfield, 723 A.2d 1129, 1131 (R.I.1999) (per curiam). With respect to the role of an insurer, we have held that:
Peerless Insurance Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785, 787 (R.I.1995) ( ).
Here, the plaintiff contended that the allegations in the Luceys' complaint point to defendant's faulty workmanship on the structure as the cause of its collapse and the resulting damage, given that the complaint alleged no bodily injury or property damage other than to the structure itself. The plaintiff further argued that, pursuant to certain specific exclusions, the policy does not cover the damage that occurred, and therefore, it has no duty to defend or indemnify defendant. Two of the exclusions in the policy provide:
"2. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
* * *
j. Property damage to:
* * *
(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the property damage arises out of those operations; or
(6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because your work was incorrectly performed on it." The defendant contended that the Luceys' complaint alleged numerous possibilities that may have caused the collapse of the structure, including negligence in installing temporary supports. The defendant drew a distinction between the bracing and the structure itself, arguing that the structure may have been properly constructed, but the...
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