Shelby v. Mercer Cnty.

• Decision Date: 04 November 2015
• Docket Number: No.: 15-4092-SEM-TSH,: 15-4092-SEM-TSH
• Parties: DAVID SHELBY, Plaintiff, v. MERCER COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

DAVID SHELBY, Plaintiff, v. MERCER COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No.: 15-4092-SEM-TSH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

November 4, 2015

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

This cause is before the Court for a merit review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, of Plaintiff David Shelby's claims.

I.MERIT REVIEW UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, the Court is required to carefully screen a complaint filed by a plaintiff who seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or a portion thereof, if the plaintiff has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. The test for determining if an action is frivolous or without merit is whether the plaintiff can make a rational argument on the law or facts in support of the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief if the complaint does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).

In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true and liberally construes them in plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7^th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1^st Cir. 2012)(holding that, in order to determine if a complaint states a plausible claim, the court must take non-conclusory, non-speculative facts as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and isolate and ignore statements that simply rehash claim elements or offer only legal labels and conclusions). Instead, sufficient facts must be provided to "state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7^th Cir. 2013)(internal quotation omitted).

II.ANALYSIS

Shelby originally filed this case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. That court dismissed Shelby's case and informed him that his case should be filed, if at all, in the Central District of Illinois because his claim is against Mercer County Jail Correctional Officers.

So, Shelby has re-filed his case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with this Court. Therein, Shelby alleges that, prior to being transferred from the Cook County Jail to the Mercer County Jail, two Mercer County Jail Correctional Officers subjected him to an improper strip search. During this strip search, these two Mercer County Jail Correctional Officers made Shelby feel very uncomfortable; they laughed at Shelby while he was naked; they humiliated Shelby; and they conducted the search in a dirty, small room. Shelby claims that the officers' actions violated his constitutional rights.

Because Shelby was a pretrial detainee during the relevant time, his "claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause but is governed by the same standards as a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against crueland unusual punishment." Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 715 F.3d 188, 191 (7^th Cir. 2013); Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 820-21 (7^th Cir. 2012)("Although the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted persons, pretrial detainees . . . are entitled to the same basic protections under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, and we apply the same deliberate indifference standard in both types of cases.")(internal quotation omitted). "The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime for which an inmate was imprisoned, or are totally without penological justification." Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 415 (7^th Cir. 1987)(citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 600 (7^th Cir. 1986)).

In evaluating Eighth Amendment claims, courts conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry. The objective prong asks whether the alleged deprivation or condition of confinement is "sufficiently serious" so that "a prison official's act or omission results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)(quotations omitted). If the conditions complained of pass this threshold, courts then must determine the prison official's subjective state of mind; that is, whether "he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 847; Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 149 (7^th Cir. 1995).

In the context of bodily searches performed upon those incarcerated in the prison system, only those searches that are "maliciously motivated, unrelated to institutional security, and hence 'totally without penological justification' are considered unconstitutional." Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 418 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7^th Cir. 2003). In other words, the search must amount to "'calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs,'" Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 418 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984)), with the intent to humiliate and inflict psychological pain. Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 505 (7^th Cir. 2004)(citing Calhoun, 319 F.3d at 939).

Here, Shelby has alleged that the John Doe Defendants' search was performed in such a manner so as to humiliate him and was not related to any legitimate prison need. Accordingly, Shelby'sComplaint states a Due Process claim in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Shelby also claims that his constitutional rights were violated in being transferred to the Mercer County Jail. Shelby states that he had no charges pending in Mercer County, that he was improperly housed with federal prisoners while at the Mercer County Jail, and that the transfer to the Mercer County Jail made it difficult for his counsel and his family to visit him.

However, the Northern District Court has previously advised Shelby that such allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As that court explained, "[a] constitutional liberty interest does not exist to remain in or prevent a transfer to a particular institution. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Ramirez v. Turner, 991 F.2d 351, 353 (7^th Cir. 1993). So long as Mercer County Jail's conditions were not substantially more restrictive such that the transfer amounted to punishment, which is not indicated in the complaint, there was no constitutional violation. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979)." Shelby v. Dart, NDIL, 14-7043.

Shelby has not alleged that the Mercer County Jail's conditions were substantially more restrictive than the Cook County Jail's conditions. Shelby has only alleged that he did not want to be transferred to the Mercer County Jail, but his transfer in and of itself did not violate his constitutional rights.

Finally, Shelby's Complaint only alleges a valid claim against the two John Doe Correctional Officers who conducted the strip search in violation of his constitutional rights. Shelby's Complaint does not state a Monell claim against Mercer County or Cook County. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Likewise, Shelby's Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendant Sheriff John Mueller and Defendant Chief Corrections Officer Joseph Olson because neither was personally involved in any alleged violation of Shelby's constitutional rights. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7^th Cir. 2010)(quoting Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7^th Cir. 2003)); Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 622 (7^th Cir. 2010)(holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior has no application to § 1983 actions).

Nevertheless, the Court will keep Defendant Olson in this case to perfect service of process and to assist in identifying the twoJohn Doe Correctional Officers. Once Shelby has identified the two John Doe Defendants through the discovery process, he should move to substitute the two Correctional Officers as party Defendants by name and move to dismiss Defendant Olson.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint states a claim for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court will allow this case to proceed against Defendant Joseph Olson for service of process and to facilitate the discovery of the two Mercer County Jail Correctional Officers who allegedly violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Any additional claim(s) shall not be included in the case except at the Court's discretion on a motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2. Defendants Mercer County, John Mueller, and Cook County are dismissed as party Defendants.

3. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions in order to give Defendant notice and anopportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant's counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

4. The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing him a waiver of...