Sheldon G., In re

Decision Date04 December 1990
Docket NumberNo. 14063,14063
Citation216 Conn. 563,583 A.2d 112
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesIn re SHELDON G. *

Bruce L. Levin, with whom, on the brief, was Serge G. Mihaly, Trumbull, for appellant (movant).

Barbara J. Sheedy, New Haven, for appellee (respondent).

Paul C. Fassler, Hartford, for appellee (respondent's father).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

This appeal concerns the scope of discretion that General Statutes § 46b-124 confers upon a trial court to order disclosure of juvenile court records to "any third party." 1 The movant, who was sexuallyS assaulted by the respondent, seeks disclosure of all juvenile court records relating to the respondent, Sheldon G., to assist her in a tort action, one count of which is directed against the respondent's father and is grounded in his allegedly negligent failure to secure recommended psychiatric treatment for his son. The trial court, Burns, J., rejected the movant's contention that her request for disclosure fell within the bounds of § 46b-124. The movant then appealed the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. Although we do not subscribe to the trial court's reasoning in its entirety, we affirm its judgment.

The facts are undisputed. On September 29, 1987, the respondent, Sheldon G., then sixteen years old, broke into the movant's home, struck her with a golf club, and then forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. On September 28, 1988, in an adult criminal proceeding in the Superior Court, he pleaded guilty 2 to sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a), in relation to his attack on the movant. On the same date he also pleaded guilty to an unrelated burglary, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101. On April 28, 1989, the trial court, Curran, J., imposed on Sheldon G. an effective sentence of forty years imprisonment, to be suspended after twenty-five years with five years probation.

The movant instituted a civil suit for damages against Sheldon G. and his father in November, 1988. Counsel for Sheldon G. in the civil action subsequently provided the movant's counsel with medical and psychological reports regarding his client. One of these reports was a psychosocial history prepared by Whiting Forensic Institute (Whiting) in March, 1989, for the youth's sentencing in the Superior Court. That report indicated that Sheldon G. had "a history of sexual offending behaviors" and referred, in turn, to an earlier report, dated July 23, 1987, from "Connections Inc.," a counseling and treatment facility in Middletown, which recommended placement in a treatment program to prevent "more serious sexual misbehavior." The Whiting report noted that these treatment recommendations had not been "activated in a timely manner due to numerous canceled appointments by parents according to [Department of Children and Youth Services] staff."

The movant inferred from the Whiting report the existence of records of adjudications, in either neglect or delinquency proceedings regarding Sheldon G., in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. She thereupon moved for disclosure of any such records that might exist, arguing that she had demonstrated a "compelling need" for the records because they "[might] well disclose evidence or lead to evidence" that Sheldon G.'s father had "long had knowledge of his son's aberrant sexual conduct." Although counsel for Sheldon G. had provided the movant with the Whiting report and with an authorization for the release of medical records, counsel for the movant acknowledged at oral argument that he had not used the authorization to seek discovery of such records from service providers, 3 nor had he attempted to depose either Sheldon G. or his father on the movant's behalf. The movant instead contended that any privilege or privacy right that Sheldon G. had possessed in regard to any juvenile record was attenuated by his release of medical records and by the fact that he would be incarcerated for many years.

The movant maintained at trial, as she does here upon appeal, that § 46b-124 confers "broad discretion" upon the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters to order disclosure of juvenile records to "any third party" having an interest therein. She notes that the predecessor of this statute, General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 17-57, vested such discretion in the juvenile court, and she construes the subsequent statutory amendments as effectively specifying the circumstances in which disclosure is mandatory rather than discretionary. The trial court, to the contrary, interpreted the present statute to permit disclosure only in the circumstances enumerated in its various exception clauses or when required by overriding constitutional concerns such as the right to confront witnesses in a criminal proceeding.

We have not previously had the occasion to consider the scope of the discretionary authority vested in the trial court by § 46b-124. Our analysis of the statute is divided into two parts. First, we must decide whether the statute affords the trial court any discretion to permit disclosure of the records of juveniles in circumstances other than those either enumerated as exceptions to the rule of confidentiality or required for the protection of constitutional rights. Second, if we determine that the trial court continues to have residual discretion to order disclosure, we must decide whether that discretionary authority encompasses the request of the movant in this case. It is our conclusion that the statute's strong presumption of confidentiality, although it allows some room for discretion, can be overcome only by a showing of compelling need, which this movant has not made. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

We turn first to the language, history and policy concerns of § 46b-124 to determine whether the statute affords the trial court discretion to disclose information from juvenile records to parties other than those to whom the statute expressly grants access. After its most recent revision, the statute provides, in relevant part: "(a) All records of cases of juvenile matters as defined in section 46b-121, or any part thereof, including studies and reports by probation officers, social agencies and clinics, shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party, including bona fide researchers commissioned by a state agency, only upon order of the superior court," with certain exceptions that are not directly applicable to this case. On its face, the statute enjoins confidentiality without precisely delineating the scope of the disclosure that the Superior Court may nonetheless order. In light of this patent ambiguity, it is appropriate for us to consider the legislative history of the statute and the policy that it was intended to further. State v. Mattioli, 210 Conn. 573, 576, 556 A.2d 584 (1989).

In construing a statute, "our goal is to 'ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.' " State v. Champagne, 206 Conn. 421, 428, 538 A.2d 193 (1988), quoting State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987). To discern the intent of the legislature, we look first to the words of the statute. State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986). We normally resolve any ambiguity in the statutory language "by turning for guidance to the legislative history and the purpose the statute is to serve." State v. Champagne, supra; State v. Kozlowski, supra.

The history of § 46b-124 begins with the enactment of legislation in 1921 that created a separate system of juvenile courts. That legislation directed that the records generated by juvenile court proceedings be kept separately from other court records, but at the same time it implicitly conferred upon juvenile court judges broad discretion to open those records for "public inspection." 4 Public Acts 1921, c. 336. A legislative amendment in 1941 limited public access to juvenile records "only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court." General Statutes (Sup.1941) § 283f. 5 The 1941 amendment, however, continued to authorize judicial discretion to determine precisely who might have "a proper interest" in the information contained in juvenile court records. Juvenile court judges construed this provision to authorize disclosure of juvenile records "whenever in the opinion of the court it is in the best interests of a child." Practice Book, 1963, § 1137 (presently incorporated in amended form in Practice Book § 1061).

In 1969, the legislature significantly amended the juvenile records statute in order to strengthen its confidentiality provisions. The 1969 amendment expressly provided that records of cases brought before the juvenile courts, "including studies and reports by probation officers, social agencies, and clinics, shall be confidential and for the use of said court, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party only upon order of said court." (Emphasis added.) Public Acts 1969, No. 794, § 3. Although the amended statute was not designed to eliminate all judicial discretion to order disclosure, it was expected to tighten the authority of the court to prevent indirect disclosure by others. The proponents of the amendment, including an experienced juvenile court judge, urged its enactment "to clarify and strengthen the present provisions with regard to confidentiality." Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary and Governmental Functions, Pt. 1, 1969 Sess., p. 49, remarks of Judge Margaret C. Driscoll. 6 After the enactment of the 1969 amendment strengthening the presumption of confidentiality of juvenile records, the legislature in subsequent years turned its attention to...

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22 cases
  • In re Annessa J.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • August 3, 2021
    ...denial of a motion to release such confidential records rests squarely within the discretion of the court. See In re Sheldon G. , 216 Conn. 563, 577, 584, 583 A.2d 112 (1990)." In re Sheldon G. involved a delinquency proceeding, but the principles of confidentiality embodied in § 46b-124 an......
  • Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit Dist.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 15, 1995
    ...of the legislature and then resolve any ambiguity by turning for guidance to the legislative history and purpose. In re Sheldon G., 216 Conn. 563, 568-69, 583 A.2d 112 (1990). In this case, the plain meaning of the statutes, in conjunction with the principle that no statutory phrase or word......
  • State v. Streater
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • January 26, 1995
    ...at the time of trial. His juvenile records were presumptively confidential pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-124. See In re Sheldon G., 216 Conn. 563, 583 A.2d 112 (1990). Section 46b-124(a) protects the confidentiality of "[a]ll records of cases of juvenile matters as defined in section 4......
  • World Pub. Co. v. White
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • June 12, 2001
    ...to determine whether to sue city was not entitled to unredacted docket sheets showing juvenile actions.]; In re Sheldon G., 216 Conn. 563, 583 A.2d 112, 112 (1990) [Only showing of compelling need justified non-consensual disclosure of information contained in juvenile records for purposes ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Discovery and Visitation in Connecticut's Juvenile Courts
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 65, 1990
    • Invalid date
    ...whose file was disclosed, and, therefore, is of limited precedential value. 8. 2 C.S.C.R. 1104 (1987). 9. 4 C.S.C.R. 765 (1989). 10. 216 Conn. 563, A.2d 11. Id. at 584. 12. Id. at 578-79. 13. Id. at 575-76. 14. Id. at 584. 15. Id. at n.17 16. PRACTICE BOOK § 1061 provides for disclosure of ......

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