Sheldon Slate Products Co. v. Kurjiaka, 214

Decision Date06 October 1964
Docket NumberNo. 214,214
PartiesSHELDON SLATE PRODUCTS CO., Inc. v. Gertrude KURJIAKA.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Sullivan & Battles, Rutland, for plaintiff.

J. Malcolm Williams and Gilbert F. Myers, Poultney, for defendant.

Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and SYLVESTER, JJ.

SYLVESTER, Justice.

This is a proceeding in Chancery. The pleadings consist of the bill of complaint, defendant's answer and cross-bill, plaintiff's replication, plaintiff's replication to defendant's amended answer and cross-bill, and defendant's supplemental cross-bill.

The defendant owns and operates a farm containing approximately four hundred acres, located in the towns of Rupert, Vermont, and Heborn, New York. The matter involved here is the rights of the respective parties in and to a slate quarry, the right to take and remove minerals therefrom, and a right of way across the defendant's farm extending to the quarry in question.

The controversy arose when the defendant obstructed the right of way involved, preventing the plaintiff from reaching and working the quarry. The plaintiff instituted a bill of complaint seeking an injunction restraining the defendant, Gertrude Kurjiaka, from obstructing the right of way. A series of pleadings followed; the case was heard by the Chancellor on the pleadings and oral testimony introduced by the parties. Findings of facts were made and filed. A decree was entered decreeing a half interest in and to the quarry to each party.

The case is here on various and numerous exceptions of the plaintiff, who, while attempting by processes of the law to remove obstructions placed in its right of way by the defendant, has, by the Chancellor's decree, lost a half interest in its slate quarry.

The plaintiff maintains that it owns the entire fee in and to the slate quarry and the right to take minerals from the westerly portion of the farm premises of the defendant, including that part located in New York State and so much in Vermont as lies east of the state line for a distance of thirty (30) rods. The defendant denies plaintiff's claim and contends that she is the owner of one-half of such interest. The parties' claimed ownership is based on a series of deeds.

The farm in question was formerly owned by one Smith Sheldon, now deceased, who had good record title thereto. By a final decree in the estate of Mr. Sheldon the property was decreed on April 18, 1940, in equal shares, to his children, Hettie Ayers, Lillian M. Sheldon, Enos Sheldon and Minnie Cramer.

By quit-claim deed executed May 11, 1940, Minnie Cramer and Edward B. Cramer, her husband, Hettie E. Ayers and Frank L. Ayers, her husband, conveyed their interests in the premises to Lillian Sheldon and Enos B. Sheldon. This conveyance contained the following provisions:

'Always reserving the exclusive slate quarrying or the right to take minerals from the westerly part of the conveyed premises including that part in the State of New York and so much in Vermont as lies east of the state line for a distance of thirty (30) rods but this reservation shall apply to no other part of the conveyed premises.

'Together with a right of way in an easterly direction as the same is now used through the cultivated part of said farm to the railroad and highway above mentioned, which is also reserved.'

By a warranty deed dated April 9, 1946, Enos B. Sheldon, Blanche C., his wife, and Lillian M. Sheldon, an unmarried woman, conveyed their interest in this farm property to Leon and Hazel Ayers, husband and wife. This deed also contained a similar provision, that is, 'Always reserving unto the said Sheldons the exclusive slate quarrying or the right to take minerals.' In this last deed there was also reserved 'A right of way in an easterly direction as the same is now used thru the cultivated part of said farm.' This deed was not properly executed in that it lacked the required two witnesses to the grantors' signatures.

To correct this error of omission, on December 1, 1952, Blanche C. Sheldon, individually, as widow of Enos B. Sheldon and as administratrix of the goods, chattels and estate of Enos B. Sheldon, and Lillian M. Sheldon executed and delivered to Leon Ayers, hi wife having deceased, a quitclaim deed of the same premises described in the deed dated April 9, 1946. This quitclaim deed of December 1, 1952, contained the following provision:

'There is excepted and reserved to this grantor, her heirs and assigns, all the mineral and quarry rights of every description whatsoever, and all the rights of way previously reserved by her and which in any way pertain to the conveyed premises.'

For the purpose of correcting this same error of omission in the deed of April 9, 1946, on December 17, 1952, Lillian M. Sheldon executed and delivered to the aforesaid Leon Ayers a quitclaim deed of the same premises described in the deed of April 9, 1946. This deed contained the same exception and reservation quoted above. Both of these deeds recited that they were executed and delivered for the sole purpose of correcting an error of omission in the execution of the deed dated April 9, 1946, from Enos B. Sheldon, Blanche C. Sheldon, and Lillian M. Sheldon.

On December 22, 1952, Leon Ayers, then the sole owner, conveyed the entire farm to the defendant, Gertrude E. Kurjiaka, and her late husband, Walter. Following a description of the property conveyed is this language:

'Subject, however, to the following restrictions: Always reserving unto the said Sheldons the exclusive slate quarrying or the right to take minerals from the westerly part of the conveyed premises, including that part in the State of New York and so much of that part in Vermont as lies east of the state line for a distance of thirty (30) rods which line is marked or indicated on the premises but this reservation shall apply to no other part of the conveyed premises.'

This deed further provided that the conveyance was subject to 'a right of way in an easterly direction as the same is now used thru the cultivated part of said farm.'

By reference to a series of deeds bearing dates August 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, and September 5, 1962, admitted in evidence as exhibits, the heirs and descendants of Smith Sheldon conveyed to the plaintiff, Sheldon Slate Products, Inc., certain quarrying and mineral rights in the four hundred acre farm and a right of way thereto. These deeds refer to such rights in the following language:

'Intending particularly to convey to the grantee herein all right, title and interest of the grantors herein as heirs of the late Smith Sheldon, in and to the slate quarrying rights and privileges and the right to take minerals from the above described premises.

'Together with all right, title and interest of the parties of the first part in and to any easements or rights of way for ingress or egress to and from the premises described above as set forth in a certain warranty deed dated April 9, 1946, from Enos B. Sheldon et al to Leon Ayers and Hazel Ayers. * * *'

With the respective chains of title standing thus, the Chancellor construed and interpreted the deeds introduced as exhibits and made these findings:

'II. That Lillian Sheldon, and Enos B. Sheldon and Blanche C. Sheldon, each reserved to themselves only a life estate to the slate quarrying or the right to take minerals from the westerly part of the conveyed premises, including that part in the State of New York and so much in Vermont as lies east of the state line for a distance of thirty (30) rods and which line is marked or indicated on the premises.

'12. Said Minnie Cramer and Edward Cramer and Hattie Ayers and Frank Ayers reserved to themselves and their heirs and assigns their interest in the slate quarrying and thus their half is now in the plaintiff.

'13. Lillian Sheldon and Enos Sheldon reserved merely a life estate and thus the deed to Sheldon Slate Products, Inc., was only their life interest. Thus the slate quarrying rights are now held by Sheldon Slate Products, Inc. in one undivided half and in the defendant Kurjiaka in one undivided half.'

On these findings, the parties' rights were decreed as follows:

'6. That Lillian Sheldon, and Enos B. Sheldon, and Blanche C. Sheldon, his wife, each reserved to themselves only a life estate to the slate quarrying or the right to take minerals from the westerly part of the conveyed premises, including that part in the State of New York and so much in Vermont as lies east of the state line for a distance of thirty (30) rods and which line is marked or indicated on the premises.

'7. Said Minnie Cramer and Edward Cramer, her husband, and Hettie Ayers and Frank Ayers, her husband, reserved to themselves and their heirs and assigns their interest in the slate quarrying or the right to take minerals from the westerly part of the conveyed premises, including that part of the State of New York and so much in Vermont as lies east of the state line for a distance of thirty (30) rods and which line is marked or indicated on the premises.

'8. Sheldon Slate Products Co., Incorporated, its successors and assigns, own an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the exclusive slate quarrying or the right to take minerals from the westerly part of the conveyed premises, including that part in the State of New York and so much of that part in Vermont as lies east of the state line for a distance of thirty (30) rods and which line is marked or indicated on the premises, but this reservation shall apply to no other part of the conveyed premises.'

No facts were found bearing upon the intention of the parties as to what they intended to convey or reserve at the time the deeds in question were executed and delivered. While the Chancellor admitted in evidence the two so-called corrective deeds dated December 1, and 17, 1952, respectively, no findings or reference was made to them. This is also true of the series of conveyances executed by the heirs and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • In re Davis
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Vermont
    • June 15, 1989
    ...deed, though it is not conclusive evidence. Vermont Accident Insurance Co., supra, 87 Vt. at 397, 89 A. 480; Sheldon Slate Products Co. v. Kurjiaka, 124 Vt. 261, 204 A.2d 99 (1964); Day v. Adams, 42 Vt. 510 The case law is clear that if parties intended to execute a deed, in a proper case e......
  • Winter v. Unaitis
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • October 6, 1964
  • Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Town of Ludlow Zoning Bd. of Adjustment
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • December 15, 1995
    ...of the parties, it is also proper to consider the circumstances existing at the time the deed was made. Sheldon Slate Prods. v. Kurjiaka, 124 Vt. 261, 267, 204 A.2d 99, 103 (1964). The Lysobeys presented maps indicating that a roadway going up Okemo Mountain existed prior to the State const......
  • In re Petition of J. Michel Guite.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • June 10, 2011
    ...201 (“A deed exception takes something out of the conveyance that would otherwise pass”); see also Sheldon Slate Prods. Co. v. Kurjiaka, 124 Vt. 261, 267, 204 A.2d 99, 103 (1964) (“[A] reservation is some newly created right which the grantee impliedly conveys to the grantor, while an excep......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT