Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo
| Citation | 24 Mich. 383 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
| Decision Date | 03 April 1872 |
| Parties | Theodore P. Sheldon v. The Village of Kalamazoo |
Heard January 11, 1872
Error to Kalamazoo circuit.
Judgments reversed with costs, and a new trial granted.
J Davidson Burns and M. J. Smiley, for plaintiff in error.
Severens & Burrows, for defendant in error.
The present controversy arises out of certain action of the marshal of the village of Kalamazoo, in pursuance of a resolution of the village board, in entering upon the close of the plaintiff and throwing down his fences, on a claim that he was occupying part of a village street.
The plaintiff proved title to the land, and offered to show a resolution of the president and trustees of the village duly assembled, whereby the committee on streets were directed to notify all persons on the line of the Olmstead road so called, who had encroached upon that road within the village limits, by the erection of fences or otherwise, to remove their fences and cease to encroach on it, and on failure of any one to comply, then the committee were directed to notify the marshal forthwith to remove the fences, so that said encroachments should cease to exist. He further offered to show that his land adjoined said road and his fence stood on the line, but that defendants claimed the fence was in the road and encroached on it; that thereupon they passed said resolution, and in pursuance thereof the street committee notified the plaintiff to remove the fence, and set it back ten or twelve feet on his land, which he refused to do; that thereupon the committee directed the marshal to tear down and remove the fence, and threatened to remove him from office unless he did so; and he there upon complied with their directions and removed the fence.
The court refused to allow any evidence to be received, basing the refusal on the ground (as we infer from the objections), that the president and trustees acted in the capacity of public officer and not municipal agents, and that the corporation is not liable for their acts in the premises.
The injurious act complained of is not a public grievance, but is a wrong done to a private person. It is not a wrong arising from neglect, but is the direct operation of a willful trespass. The case is therefore freed from all those complications which attend the discussion of questions of liability for neglects and for public grievances. And as the whole control over the subject of streets in the village of Kalamazoo is in the corporate authorities, there is no room for the consideration of those difficulties which arise where corporate action is aimed at matters entirely foreign to the concerns of the municipality.
The doctrine is entirely untenable that there can be no municipal liability for unlawful acts done by municipal authorities to the prejudice of private parties. In this respect, public corporations are as distinctly legal persons as private corporations. There are officers who are corporation agents and there are municipal officers whose duties are independent of agency and with distinct liabilities. But when the act done is in law a corporate act, there is no ground upon reason or authority for holding that if there is any legal liability at all arising out of it, the corporation may not be answerable. There is no conflict whatever in the authorities on this head. The only disagreement is concerning corporate responsibility in cases of alleged neglect of duty, and concerning the bounds of what may be termed their legislative discretion, as distinguished from their other action. To hold that positive wrongs must in all cases be considered as purely individual and not corporate act, would be a novelty in jurisprudence. Although not subject like corporations to the jurisdiction of courts, it has always been understood that even states and nations may be held responsible for the wrongs of their authorized agents, and the whole system of public law rests on this assumption. The idea, therefore, that a corporate body has a discretionary power to do wrong and not suffer for it, is not in harmony with any safe principle. There may be certain cases where is, of necessity, a final discretion; but there can be no...
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