Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Prince George's County

• Decision Date: 09 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 246,246
• Citation: Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Prince George's County, 343 A.2d 521, 276 Md. 36 (Md. 1975)
• Parties: SHELL OIL COMPANY v. SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY.
• Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Page 36

276 Md. 36

343 A.2d 521

SHELL OIL COMPANY v. SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY.

No. 246.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 9, 1975.

Roger D. Redden, Baltimore (Francis X. Wright and William Gar Richlin, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Ward B. Coe, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

We are here presented with the question of whether the Maryland Constitution permits appeals to be taken directly from the Maryland Tax Court to this Court.

A gas station owned by appellant, Shell Oil Company, was assessed by appellee, the Supervisor of Assessments of Prince George's County, at a rate of $3.00 per square foot for the tax year 1970-1971. This rate was higher than the assessment rate for commercial property other than gas stations in the area in which the station was located. Shall appealed to the Maryland Tax Court which affirmed the Supervisor's assessment. Shell then took an appeal directly to this Court from the decision of the Tax Court.

By order of March 10, 1975, we directed the parties to present argument on the issue of whether Chapter 385 of the Acts of 1971, codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1975 Repl.Vol.), art. 81, §§ 229(i) and (l), which provided for direct appeals from the Tax Court to this Court, is constitutional. The Supervisor of Assessments filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Ch. 385 is unconstitutional, and a brief in support thereof. Shell filed a brief in opposition to the motion.

As recently discussed in Montgomery Co. Council v. Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery Co., Md., 340 A.2d 302, 306-307 (1975), the Maryland Tax Court was created by Ch. 757 of the Acts of 1959, the 'principal purpose . . . (of which) was to separate the 'quasi-judicial' functions of the State Tax Commission from its 'administrative' functions.' However, despite the separation of 'administrative' and 'quasi-judicial' functions, the Legislature in Ch. 757 specifically designated the Tax Court as an 'administrative body.' Code (1957), Art. 81, § 224. And this Court has consistently recognized that the Tax Court is an 'administrative agency.' County Executive for Montgomery County v. Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County, Md., 340 A.2d 246, 247 (1975); Fairchild Hiller v. Supervisor, 267 Md. 519, 521, 298 A.2d 148 (1973).

Ch. 757 of the Acts of 1959, by adding new sections 229(i) and 229(l) to Code (1957), Art. 81, provided that appeals from final orders of the Tax Court could be taken 'to the circuit court of any county or the Baltimore City Court of Baltimore City, wherein the property or any part of the property the assessment of which is involved may be situated.' Section 229(l) further provided that the Circuit Court of the County or the Baltimore City Court 'shall hear the case de novo without a jury . . ..' New section 229(m), enacted by Ch. 757, provided for an appeal from the final decision of the circuit court or the Baltimore City Court to the Court of Appeals. By Ch. 261 of the Acts of 1966, the Legislature amended § 229(l) of Art. 81, deleting the provision that the circuit court or the Baltimore City Court shall hear a Tax Court case de novo, requiring that the case be determined 'upon the record of the Maryland Tax Court,' and requiring that the Tax Court determination be affirmed unless 'erroneous as a matter of law or unsupported by substantial evidence appearing in the record . . ..'

Ch. 385 of the Acts of 1971, the constitutionality of which was the subject of our order to the parties in this case, amended § 229(i) of Art. 81 by providing that Tax Court orders shall be final unless an appeal is taken to the 'Court of appeals' instead of to the circuit courts or Baltimore City Court. Ch. 385 repealed all of the language of Art. 81, § 229(l) and § 229(m), and substituted new language providing that '(a)ny party to the proceedings may appeal from the (Tax) Court's final order directly to the Court of Appeals.' Nothing further concerning the appeal was set forth. The old language in § 229(l), providing that the determination of the case shall be upon the record of the Tax Court, and specifying the 'substantial evidence' test of judicial review, was repealed and not replaced.

The final statute bearing upon the issue before us is Ch. 448 of the Acts of 1975, effective July 1, 1975. By Ch. 448, the Legislature further amended §§ 229(i) and 229(l) of Art. 81 so as to provide that appeals from the Tax Court shall be taken to the Court of Special Appeals rather than to the Court of Appeals. Ch. 448 also amended Code (1974), § 12-308(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to add the 'Maryland Tax Court' to the enumeration of 'courts' over which the Court of Special Appeals has 'initial appellate jurisdiction.' ¹

For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we think it clear that the Legislature may not constitutionally provide for appeals directly to this Court from the Maryland Tax Court. Therefore, we hold that Ch. 385 of the Laws of 1971 is unconstitutional. Furthermore, we conclude that Ch. 448 of the Laws of 1975, insofar as it provides that after July 1, 1975, appeals from the Tax Court are to be taken to the Court of Special Appeals, is also unconstitutional. Henceforth, judicial review of Tax Court cases shall be in the circuit courts of the counties or the Baltimore City Court, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Ch. 757 of the Acts of 1959, as amended by Ch. 261 of the Acts of 1966, and codified in Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.), Art. 81, §§ 229(i) and 229(l). Appeals from final decisions of the circuit courts and the Baltimore City Court shall be taken to the Court of Special Appeals in accordance with Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.), Art, 81, § 229(m), as amended by the valid provisions of Ch. 448 of the Acts of 1975 which indicate the intent that initial appellate jurisdiction in Tax Court cases shall be vested in the Court of Special Appeals instead of the Court of Appeals. Review of the Tax Court cases in this Court shall be by a writ of certiorari in accordance with Code (1974), §§ 12-201 and 12-203 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Article IV, § 14, of the Constitution of Maryland provides, in pertinent part, that '(t)he jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals shall be co-extensive with the limits of the State and such as now is or may hereafter be prescribed by law.' Unlike the Constitution of 1851 which specified that 'the court of appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction only,' ² the present Constitution of 1867 does not expressly deal with the matter. Nevertheless, as this Court has repeatedly held, such a jurisdictional limitation is inherent in the concept of the 'Court of Appeals.' In Sevinskey v. Wagus, 76 Md. 335, 336, 25 A. 468, 469 (1892), where a statute purporting to give the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus was declared unconstitutional, the Court stated 'This Court is an appellate Court, and is so styled in the Constitution; and no provision is made in that instrument for instituting or conducting any original proceedings herein. The Constitution, Art. 4, sec. 14, in defining the jurisdiction of this Court, declares, that 'The jurisdiction of said Court of Appeals shall be co-extensive with the limits of the State, and such as now is or may hereafter be prescribed by law;' that is to say, such appellate jurisdiction as the Court then had or might thereafter have conferred upon it. The Court at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution had, under former Constitutions, appellate jurisdiction only; and the terms by which the jurisdiction is defined in the present Constitution, are substantially the same in meaning as those employed in the Constitutions of 1851 and 1864. It would therefore seem to be clear that the jurisdiction of this Court is appellate only; for if not so, and the Legislature could confer original jurisdiction upon it in cases of habeas corpus, it could also confer such jurisdiction in cases of mandamus, or in cases of any other subjectmatter of original jurisdiction. This manifestly was never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution; and therefore the attempt by the Legislature to confer such jurisdiction is simply nugatory and void.'

And in Board v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 427, 229 A.2d 388, 393 (1967), we said:

'The Court of Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction only and the Legislature cannot confer original jurisdiction on the Court . . . but the Legislature may confer the right on this Court to hear appeals in special cases provided appellate judicial functions and powers are left untrammeled.'

The Court has reiterated this principle on many occasions. Burke v. Burke, 204 Md. 637, 646, 106 A.2d 59, 64 (1954); Moore v. License Com., Pr. Geo's Co., 203 Md. 502, 505, 102 A.2d 272, 274 (1954); Arnold v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 195 Md. 700, 702, 72 A.2d 700, 701 (1950); State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 67, 51 A.2d 647, 649 (1947); Presbyterian Church v. Pugh & Co., 154 Md. 550, 553, 140 A. 844, 846 (1928); State v. Rutherford, 145 Md. 363, 368-369, 125 A. 725, 727 (1922); Hendrick v. State, 115 Md. 552, 558-559, 81 A. 18, 20 (1911); Smith v. Hooper, 95 Md. 16, 33, 51 A. 844, 54 A. 95 (1902); In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 594 (1880); State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301, 305 (1878).

Similarly, the Constitution of Maryland makes it clear that the Court of Special Appeals may exercise only appellate jurisdiction. Art. IV, § 14A of the Constitution provides:

'The General Assembly may by law create such intermediate courts of appeal, as may be necessary. The General Assembly may prescribe the intermediate appellate jurisdiction of these courts of appeal, and all other powers necessary for the operation of such courts.' (Emphasis...