Shell Oil Co. v. Cummins
Decision Date | 23 November 1955 |
Docket Number | No. 33592,33592 |
Citation | 131 N.E.2d 64,7 Ill.2d 329 |
Parties | SHELL OIL COMPANY, Appellant, v. Roy F. CUMMINS, Director of Labor, et al., Appellees. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Verlie, Eastman, Schlafly & Godfrey, Alton, and Oliver L. Stone, and Irving Slifkin, New York City (J. F. Schlafly, Jr., Alton, of counsel), for appellant.
Emerson Baetz, Alton, for appellees.
This is an appeal by the Shell Oil Company, hereinafter called the Company, from a judgment of the circuit court of Madison County which affirmed a decision of the Director of Labor that certain employees of the appellant's Wood River, Illinois, refinery were entitled to unemployment compensation as a result of a work stoppage from August 22 to September 11, 1950. Since the appellant contends that these determinations were without evidentiary support and against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must now look to the facts of this case as disclosed by the record.
During the period with which we are concerned, 14 labor unions were represented at this refinery, namely (1) the Pipefitters, (2) the Asbestos Workers, (3) the Laborers, (4) the Bricklayers, (5) the Painters, (6) the Railway Carmen, (7) the Blacksmiths, (8) the Boilermakers, (9) the Electricians, (10) the Teamsters and Chauffeurs, (11) the Sheet Metal Workers, (12) the Carpenters, (13) the Operating Engineers, and (14) the Machinists. In addition to being affiliated with its corresponding international union, each of these locals, with the exception of the Operating Engineers and the Machinists, were members of the Metal Trades Council of Wood River. Their international counterparts were also affiliated with the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor. The purpose of the Metal Trades Council and the department was to assist the individual unions in the conduct of their affairs and in negotiations with their employer.
In accordance with their customary practice and at the suggestion of the Metal Trades Council, negotiations for a new contract were commenced on March 14, 1950, between the Company, on the one hand, and a committee representing the Metal Trades Department and each of the 12 international unions, on the other, resulting in a proposed agreement which, although for the most part equally applicable to all the signatory unions, was also designed to cover problems peculiar to each craft. Thereafter, upon its being formally presented by the negotiating committee, this agreement was ratified and signed by each of the represented unions with the exception of the Pipefitters and Asbestos Workers, who demanded increased wages and different working conditions. Being unable to gain those additional concessions, a strike was ordered by these two unions on August 22, 1950, and a picket line composed exclusively of pipefitters and asbestos workers was immediately established. As a result, refinery operations were completely curtailed until September 11, at which time, and after negotiations were held between the Company and the Pipefitters' international, the strike was called off and the picket line withdrawn. Immediately, however, a strike was called and a picket line set up by the Operating Engineers, who were also demanding a wage concession. This, of course, resulted in the continued shutdown of refinery operations.
On September 17, 1950, and while the latter strike was in progress, the Company informed the Metal Trades Department that in view of current economic conditions and in order to get all their employees back to work, they were prepared to offer a substantial wage increase. Thereafter, on September 21 and 22 joint conferences were held between the Company and representatives of the Metal Trades Department, the Metal Trades Council and all 14 of the individual unions, resulting in an agreed wage increase for all employees and termination, on September 23, of the strike being conducted by the Operating Engineers.
The claimants herein were members of the ten unions which, along with the Pipefitters and Asbestos Workers, made up the Metal Trades Council, and who, during the course of these labor disputes, had filed claims for unemployment compensation benefits. These claims were referred to a deputy commissioner who found (1) that there were two distinct and separate labor disputes involved-one being between the Company, on one hand, and the Pipefitters and Asbestos Workers on the other; the second being between the Company and the Operating Engineers, (2) that the employees could not cross the picket line without fear of bodily harm, but (3) that these claimants, along with the striking Pipefitters and Asbestos Workers Unions, 'were all equally represented by one bargaining agent' and one contract, and were therefore directly interested in the dispute, in the same class or grade as the members of the striking unions, and thus, ineligible for benefits for the period from August 22 to September 11, the date that the above-mentioned unions terminated their strike. The deputy commissioner, however, was of the opinion that these claimants were eligible for unemployment compensation during the strike conducted by the Operating Engineers, who were not members of the Metal Trades Council. This latter ruling, having never been appealed, is not now in issue.
Having been denied benefits for the period from August 22 to September 11, 1950, these claimants thereupon appealed to the Director of Labor, who reversed the deputy commissioner in this respect and held that these employees were entitled to compensation payments for the period above-mentioned. Upon administrative review, the circuit court of Madison County remanded the cause to the Director of Labor for the sole purpose of determining whether the claimants received the same general wage increase as was awarded the striking unions. After a hearing was had thereon, the record was transmitted back to the circuit court, where the Director's decision was affirmed. Direct appeal was then taken to this court.
Section 7(d) of the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1949, chap. 48, par. 223) provides that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute, except where it is shown 'that (1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work and (2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute'. To relieve the employee of this ineligibility, it is incumbent upon him to prove, not one, but both of these exceptions. Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 Ill. 384, 91 N.E.2d 381. This statute further provides by section 7(a) that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits 'For the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause and the six weeks which immediately follow such week.' The appellant contends that these claimants (1) were directly interested in the labor dispute, (2) belonged to the same grade or class as those who did participate, (3) that by failing to cross the picket line they either participated in the dispute or voluntarily left work without good cause, and (4) that the award of compensation payments under these circumstances would violate the public policy of this State. These are the points which we will now consider.
In support of its first contention, the Company points out that the 12 local unions, being members of the Metal Trades Council, did not carry on collective bargaining negotiations on an individual basis, but rather, such negotiations were conducted jointly with the view to entering into one contract which would be applicable to and binding upon each of the 12 organizations. It argues that by participating in both the original negotiations and the conferences of September 21 and 22, and by accepting the wage increase which resulted therefrom, these claimants made the...
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