Shell v. Bechtold, 16629

CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
Citation175 W.Va. 792,338 S.E.2d 393
Decision Date18 December 1985
Docket NumberNo. 16629,16629
PartiesBernard SHELL III v. Lee BECHTOLD, Commissioner, State of West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "The proper forum for attacking the constitutional validity of a prior traffic offense conviction when that offense is the foundation for adverse administrative action by the commissioner of motor vehicles is the county in which such a conviction was initially rendered if the conviction is a West Virginia conviction, or the state courts of the state in which the conviction was initially rendered if it is an out-of-state conviction. To the extent that State ex rel. Vance v. Arthur, 142 W.Va. 737, 98 S.E.2d 418 (1957) and State ex rel. Lemley v. Roberts, 164 W.Va. 457, 260 S.E.2d 850 (1979) are to the contrary, they are overruled." Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168 W.Va. 593, 287 S.E.2d 166 (1981).

2. " ' "Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments." Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, W.Va. , 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).' Syllabus Point 1, Newton v. Dailey, 167 W.Va. 347, 280 S.E.2d 91 (1981)." Syl. pt. 3, ACF Industries v. Credit Thrift of America, 173 W.Va. 83, 312 S.E.2d 746 (1983).

3. " 'A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith.' Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908)." Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Simpkins v. Harvey, 172 W.Va. 312, 305 S.E.2d 268 (1983).

Leo Catsonis, Michael T. Clifford, Charleston, for appellant.

Wyatt Hanna, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether a municipal court conviction for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol may be used to enhance the administrative sanction of driver's license revocation.

The appellant, Bernard Shell III, a West Virginia resident and holder of a West Virginia driver's license, was twice convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. As a consequence of each conviction, the appellant's driver's license was revoked. These convictions and revocations were not appealed.

The first conviction occurred in November, 1977, when the appellant pleaded guilty in the Municipal Court of Huntington, West Virginia, to a charge of driving while intoxicated, a violation of Huntington municipal ordinance 22-89. An abstract of judgment was transmitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), pursuant to Code, 17B-3-4 [1951]. 1

In May, 1982, the appellant was convicted, in the County Court of Palnech County, Florida, of driving while under the influence of intoxicants, a violation of Florida state law. In June, 1982, the State of Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles notified the West Virginia DMV that the appellant had been convicted and that his driving privilege had been revoked for a period of six months, pursuant to Florida Statute 322.28.

The commissioner of the West Virginia DMV then revoked the appellant's driver's license for a period of ten years. The appellant made a timely request for a hearing, and in September, 1982, the appellant appeared, pro se, before a hearing examiner. The records of prior convictions were made part of the administrative record. The appellant admitted his Florida conviction, but testified that he was institutionalized outside the State of Florida at the time judgment was entered against him.

Following the hearing, the commissioner issued a final order revoking the appellant's driver's license for ten years, in accordance with Code, 17B-3-3 [1951]. 2 The appellant appealed the commissioner's order in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The case was submitted on briefs, and the circuit court affirmed.

As a preliminary issue, the appellant contends that neither DUI 3 conviction is a proper basis for revocation because neither one is valid. He asserts that the Florida conviction was the product of an involuntary guilty plea and that he did not have counsel at the time of his guilty plea in municipal court.

In the syllabus of Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168 W.Va. 593, 287 S.E.2d 166 (1981), we held:

The proper forum for attacking the constitutional validity of a prior traffic offense conviction when that offense is the foundation for adverse administrative action by the commissioner of motor vehicles is the county in which such a conviction was initially rendered if the conviction is a West Virginia conviction, or the state courts of the state in which the conviction was initially rendered if it is an out-of-state conviction. To the extent that State ex rel. Vance v. Arthur, 142 W.Va. 737, 98 S.E.2d 418 (1957) and State ex rel. Lemley v. Roberts, W.Va. , 260 S.E.2d 850 (1979) are to the contrary, they are overruled.

The appellant's collateral challenge of his DUI convictions will therefore not be addressed.

The appellant next contends that former Code, 17C-5A-2(c)(4) [1981] 4 did not authorize the commissioner to use either the Florida conviction or the Huntington conviction, even if valid, to revoke his West Virginia driver's license for ten years. Proper determination of the commissioner's authority necessitates interpretation of several statutes, provisions of which are no longer in effect because of amendments.

A DUI conviction in another state is ground for license revocation. Code, 17B-3-3; Wells v. Roberts, 167 W.Va. 580, 582, 280 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1981). Therefore, the commissioner had the authority to revoke the appellant's license upon receipt of the conviction record from Florida. Although Code, 17B-3-3 does not specify the length of such revocation period, Code, 17C-5A-2 specifies the period of revocation as ten years.

Former Code, 17C-5A-2 [1981] (administrative hearings and revocation), must be read in pari materia with Code, 17B-3-3 (suspension and revocation based on record of out-of-state DUI conviction) and 17B-1A-1 (Driver License Compact). As a member of the interstate Driver License Compact and by virtue of Article IV, Code, 17B-1A-1, the DMV is required to treat out-of-state convictions in the same manner as it would in-state convictions.

" 'Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments.' Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, W.Va. , 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975)." Syllabus Point 1, Newton v. Dailey, 167 W.Va. 347, 280 S.E.2d 91 (1981).

Syl. pt. 3, ACF Industries v. Credit Thrift of America, 173 W.Va. 83, 312 S.E.2d 746 (1983).

Although Code, 17C-5A-2(c)(4) mandates a ten-year revocation for a second DUI offense, the appellant contends the revocation period is limited to a maximum of one year by virtue of Code, 17B-3-8 [1981], which reads: "The department shall not suspend a driver's license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the public highways for a period of more than one year, except as provided in chapter seventeen-c of this code." (emphasis added). It is clear, that Code, 17B-3-8 applies, by its express language, to suspensions, not revocations, 5 such as this case and chapter 17C proceedings are specifically excepted from the one-year suspension limitation. We, therefore, are of the opinion that a ten-year revocation period applies to the case now before us.

The main issue in this proceeding is whether, the commissioner had authority to revoke the driver's license of a West Virginia resident for ten years, under 17C-5A-2(c)(4) [1981], where the first offense was the violation of a municipal ordinance.

In State v. Vandall, 170 W.Va. 374, 294 S.E.2d 177 (1982), we held that the provision, in former Code, 17C-5-2(d) [1976], 6 of an enhanced criminal penalty may not be invoked where the prior offense was a conviction under a municipal DUI ordinance. However, we noted a distinction between the judicial imposition of criminal penalties and the administrative revocation or suspension of a driver's license. 170 W.Va. at 375, 376, 294 S.E.2d at 179; see also Stalnaker v. Roberts, supra 168 W.Va. at 599, 600, 287 S.E.2d at 169.

The purpose of the administrative sanction of license revocation is the removal of persons who drive under the influence of alcohol and other intoxicants from our highways. Id. The revocation provisions are not penal in nature, People v. Finley, 21 Ill.App.3d 335, 340, 315 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1979); Bell v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 6 Wash.App. 736, 739, 496 P.2d 545, 547 (1972); Bolio v. Malloy, 126 Vt. 424, 427, 234 A.2d 336, 339 (1967) and should be read in accord with the general intent of our traffic laws to protect the innocent public.

"A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith." Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).

Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Simpkins v. Harvey, 172 W.Va. 312, 305 S.E.2d 268 (1983).

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