Shelton v. Jones
Decision Date | 27 June 1967 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 1364. |
Citation | 272 F. Supp. 139 |
Parties | Nellie May SHELTON, a/k/a Nellie Mae Shelton, Plaintiff, v. Charles Thomas JONES, Sr. and Lemon Jacob Bennett, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
William G. Anderson, Roanoke, Va., for plaintiff.
James C. Turk, Dalton, Poff, Turk & Stone, Radford, Va., for defendant Jones.
Linwood Holton, Eggleston, Holton, Butler & Glenn, Roanoke, Va., for defendant Bennett.
After three trials, this case is again before the court on motions by the defendants. At the first trial, held in April, 1964, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the defendants moved for a directed verdict and, without introducing any evidence, rested. A hung jury resulted. Defendants then renewed their motions which I granted on the ground that there was no evidence in the record upon which the jury could base a finding of negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the record did contain evidence from which the jury could conclude that each of the defendants had failed to keep a proper lookout. The second trial of this case, held June 2nd and 3rd, 1966, also resulted in a hung jury. The case was then tried a third time the following week on June 8 and 9, 1966, at which time the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $45,000. Defendants have moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that there is no evidence in the record upon which the jury properly could have found negligence. In the alternative, they have moved for a new trial urging that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence and is plainly wrong, and that the procedure by which the jury was selected was improper. I find no merit in either motion and, therefore, conclude that the verdict must stand.
Turning first of all to the defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it appears from the evidence developed in all three trials that the plaintiff, Miss Shelton, in freezing weather and after dark was traveling east on Route 11 a few miles west of Salem, Virginia. Earlier in the day, there had been some snow which, as the temperature had hovered about the freezing point, had melted on the roadway leaving it wet in places but, upon a bridge some eleven miles west of Salem had turned into ice. As soon as Miss Shelton entered upon the bridge, her automobile began to skid and fishtail. She attempted to bring her car to a stop and, as she had not been driving very fast, did so in about 150 feet from the beginning of the bridge, causing her engine to stall in the process. Her car came to a stop slighty askew, blocking both of the eastbound lanes in which she had been traveling. She attempted to restart the engine in order to extricate herself from the dangerous position and to continue on her way.
Before Miss Shelton could restart her automobile, the defendant Jones, who had been traveling behind her, also came upon the bridge, saw her car in front of him and applied his brakes. However, as he also was upon the ice, he was unable to stop and collided with the rear end of Miss Shelton's car, throwing her out of the car and some distance across the roadway. She picked herself up and approached the Jones vehicle. At this time, the defendant Bennett, who had been traveling behind Jones, saw the vehicles in irregular positions in the road ahead of him. He, too, attempted to stop by applying his brakes, but by that time he also was on the ice. Unable to stop, he crashed into the Jones vehicle, causing Miss Shelton to be struck and sustain substantial injury.
The facts recited above are a paraphrase of the facts which the Court of Appeals concluded gave rise to a jury issue as to the defendants' failure to keep a proper lookout. Shelton v. Jones and Bennett, 356 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1966). They are based upon the testimony of Miss Shelton and that of a highway patrolman who recounted the statements made to him by Jones and Bennett shortly after the collision. Each of the defendants had told the patrolman that he was traveling at approximately 45 miles per hour, that he applied his brakes as soon as he saw signs of the obstruction in the roadway ahead, but, when his brakes were applied, he was on the ice and was helpless.
The Court of Appeals agreed that neither one of the defendants could be held at fault for his actions and for what occurred after he saw the obstruction upon the bridge and applied his brakes. Each could have done no more than he did. However, the court did feel that there was evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that either or both the defendants had failed to keep a proper lookout. The court said at p. 428:
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to go to the jury is a matter in this case dependent upon the law of Virginia. Crosby v. Meredith, 300 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1962). The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is, in effect, the same as renewing the earlier motion for a directed verdict and, therefore, the standard by which it is to be judged is supplied by the state law. Minton v. Southern Railway Co., 368 F. 2d 719, 720 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Simmons, 346 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965); Moore, Federal Practice, Vol. 6A, § 59.085 at p. 3814 et seq.
As a practical matter, it makes little difference whether state or federal law is controlling since the general standard is:
Minton v. Southern Railway Co., 368 F. 2d 719, 720 (6th Cir. 1966); and the standard applied by the Virginia courts is:
Our inquiry is whether reasonable minds could differ in regard to the facts and the proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Charles v. Commonwealth Motors, Inc., 195 Va. 576, 577, 79 S.E.2d 594 (1954). These standards are virtually identical. For precedents, however, illustrating the applicability of the standard to a given set of facts, I have drawn upon Virginia law.
Cook, Administrator v. Virginia Holsum Bakeries, Inc., 207 Va. 815, 153 S. E.2d 209 (1967) is relevant. A collision had occurred at night on a two-lane road between plaintiff bakery's tractor-trailer which was traveling north and a southbound automobile driven by Marvin Lucas, defendants' decedent. The determination of fault turned upon whether the accident took place in the northbound or the southbound lane. The physical evidence supported either conclusion. The driver of the tractor-trailer had, on two occasions, by the testimony of the investigating patrolman denied knowledge of how the accident occurred. At trial, the driver denied ever having made these statements and testified instead that the automobile had suddenly swerved into the northbound lane immediately in front of him. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendant, but the trial judge set it aside and entered judgment for the plaintiff. On review, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that since the driver's credibility as a witness had been attacked, the jury was free to disbelieve his testimony. Finding a conflict in the expert testimony as to the conclusions to be drawn from the physical evidence and finding that the location of the debris gave rise to conflicting inferences, the court said at p. 820, 153 S.E.2d at p. 213:
In view of the conflicts in the evidence and the inferences that may be drawn from the facts proven, it cannot be said that reasonable men could conclude only that Lucas caused the accident by negligently crossing into the northbound lane in the path of plaintiff's vehicle. Hence it was error for the trial court to set aside the jury's verdict for the defendant and enter a judgment for the plaintiff.
In Giannone v. Johnson, Admx., 204 Va. 493, at p. 496, 132 S.E.2d 445, at p. 447 (1963) where the question was whether the court had improperly withdrawn the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence from the jury, the court said:
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US v. Douglas
...been properly and randomly selected for Defendant's venire, the objectivity of the selection process was frustrated. Cf. Shelton v. Jones, 272 F.Supp. 139 (W.D.Va.1967) (new trial not required where, due to emergency need for jurors, clerk telephoned persons randomly drawn from jury box ins......