Shelton v. M & A Elec. Power Co-op.
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | STONE; TITUS, P.J., and HOGAN |
| Citation | Shelton v. M & A Elec. Power Co-op., 451 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. App. 1970) |
| Decision Date | 29 January 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 8891,8891 |
| Parties | Clay C. SHELTON and Ruby M. Shelton, his wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. M & A ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant. |
Dalton, Treasure & Bullard, Kennett, for defendant-appellant.
Ward & Reeves, James E. Reeves, Caruthersville, for plaintiffs-respondents.
On the theory of inverse condemnation, plaintiffs Clay C. Shelton and Ruby M. Shelton, his wife, instituted this action at law on August 3, 1967, against defendant M & A Electric Power Cooperative, a corporation, by the filing of their petition for damages allegedly sustained by reason of defendant's 'conversion and appropriation' in 1961 of 'a power line easement and right-of-way' across plaintiffs' 60-acre farm about 14 miles north of Kennett in Dunklin County, Missouri, and the construction and maintenance of an electric transmission line over and along that right-of-way. In its answer, defendant pleaded an easement indenture executed by plaintiffs on August 11, 1960, and recorded in Dunklin County. By way of reply, plaintiffs admitted execution of that easement indenture but averred that it was 'null and void and of no defense to plaintiffs' petition' because (a) it was without consideration, (b) there was a failure of consideration, and (c) the indenture was procured by fraud and misrepresentation. 'In the alternative,' plaintiffs asserted that, even if the easement indenture was valid, it authorized recovery of the damages sought in plaintiffs' petition. When the case came on for trial, defendant stood on its motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' case, and the jury returned a verdict of $1,250 upon which judgment was entered. Defendant appeals.
During 1960, a representative of defendant contacted plaintiff Clay, the postmaster at Clarkton, Missouri, on several occasions concerning an easement for an electric transmission line along the north line of plaintiffs' farm, a distance of about one-half mile. According to plaintiff Clay, defendant's representative stated that plaintiffs would be paid for 'all the poles that were erected there' and for 'any damage incurred on the farm in any way,' but no representation was made as to, and plaintiffs did not know, how many poles would be erected or what damage might result. These conversations, with plaintiff Ruby also present, terminated in and were merged into a written easement indenture captioned 'Right-of-Way Easement' admittedly executed and delivered by plaintiffs to defendant on August 11, 1960.
The here material provisions of the easement indenture are that plaintiffs 'do hereby grant' unto defendant, its successors or assigns, 'the perpetual right to enter upon' plaintiffs' 60-acre farm as described and 'to construct, reconstruct, repair, operate and maintain' thereon an electric transmission line or system and
The contemplated electric transmission line was constructed by defendant during the summer of 1961. Thereafter, to wit, 'about a year or more' after plaintiffs had executed the easement indenture on August 11, 1960, a representative of defendant called on plaintiff Clay and said that he had come 'to settle with me (plaintiff) and pay me for the easement.' The gist of plaintiff Clay's account of the ensuing conversation was that defendant's representative offered to pay the sum stipulated in the easement indenture for two poles but refused to 'allow' anything for alleged damage to fences, while plaintiff Clay insisted that he should be paid for seven poles and for alleged damage to fences and crops during the construction period. According to plaintiff Clay, he said 'if that's all you're going to pay me for, just two poles, I'll take nothing,' and defendant's representative concluded the conversation by responding 'you'll get nothing.'
On cross-examination, plaintiff Clay readily conceded that he had not located or determined the north boundary line of the 60-acre farm by survey, but opined that 'the property line is in the vicinity of this fence row, approximately where the fence row is, and the poles are in the fence row.' The pictorial exhibits portray a dense fence row several feet wide (plaintiff Clay expressly disclaimed any knowledge as to the width of the fence row) and likewise several feet high, a veritable thicket of shrubs, bushes and gross vegetation. There is also a woven wire fence, about one-half mile in length, along the entire north line of plaintiffs' farm. But in the seven photographs of the fence row and defendant's transmission line, the woven wire fence is not visible and we are able to discern only what may be the tips of two posts. In short, there was no evidence fixing the location of the north boundary line of plaintiffs' farm or the location of any pole or poles in defendant's transmission line with reference to that boundary line, and the record would not have permitted a finding as to the number of poles actually set on plaintiffs' farm.
Plaintiffs have never cultivated or resided on this 60-acre tract and, during their period of ownership, a tenant had stock on the farm 'a part of the time' and raised some crops on it. When defendant's transmission line was being constructed, crops were 'up and growing'--plaintiff Clay recalled 'the corn and also some cotton, and if there was any more I cannot be certain about it.' He could supply no information as to 'how many acres . . . or parts of acres were damaged or destroyed' or as to 'the extent of the crop damage,' and he knew only that he had lost 'the portion that I would receive as the landlord.' Plaintiff Clay also complained that a fence had been cut twice, that 'a small bridge . . . across a ditch' had been destroyed, and that defendant's employees had 'trafficked over the ground' during construction leaving ruts in the soil at the ends of crop rows. However, on cross-examination plaintiff Clay quickly agreed that, when contacted by defendant's representative after the line had been constructed in 1961, he had told that representative 'you talk to the tenant about the bridge and the fence and the crops,' and that subsequently he (plaintiff Clay) had been informed by the tenant 'he talked about the bridge with them.' But the tenant did not testify, and what had transpired between the tenant and defendant was not otherwise developed.
Plaintiff Ruby made a fleeting testimonial apperance confirming her presence during discussions between defendant's representative and her husband prior to execution of the easement indenture, disavowing any recollection of what had been said on those occasions since 'I was busy,' and verifying her execution of the easement indenture because, as plaintiffs' counsel phrased it, 'he (plaintiff Clay) asked you to.'
Plaintiffs closed their case with witness Scales, a real estate appraiser, who, over defendant's objections, expressed the opinion that 'the fair value' of plaintiffs' 60-acre farm was $18,000 immediately before defendant's alleged appropriation 'of the power line easement' but was only $14,545.50 immediately thereafter, and that plaintiffs thus had been damaged in the sum of $3,454.50.
By plaintiffs' sole verdict-directing instruction 5 'NOT IN MAI,' a verdict for them was ordered if the jury believed 'First, defendant appropriated plaintiffs' property rights to defendant's own use and Second, as a direct result of such appropriation plaintiffs sustained damage, unless you believe plaintiffs are not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction No. 3.' (All emphasis herein is ours.) By defendant's sole verdict-directing instruction 3 identified as 'MAI 28.11 Modified,' a verdict for it was ordered if the jury believed 'First, plaintiffs signed and delivered the easement to defendant, and Second, plaintiffs were tendered $20 for such easement, unless you find for plaintiffs under Instruction No. 4.' By plaintiffs' instruction 4 'NOT IN MAI,' the jury was told that 'Your finding must be for plaintiffs on the defense of the written easement if you believe that: First, defendant's agent agreed to pay plaintiffs as consideration for the written easement, for each pole located along plaintiffs' north line, for plaintiffs' crop damage and for plaintiffs' fence, and for plaintiffs' other damage, and Second, defendant has failed and refused to pay the said consideration.' By plaintiffs' instruction 6 identified as 'MAI 9.02 Modified,' the jury was told that, 'If you find in favor of the plaintiffs, then you must award plaintiffs such sum as you believe was the difference between the fair market value of plaintiffs' whole property immediately before the taking in 1961, and the value of plaintiffs' remaining property immediately after such taking, which difference in value is the direct result of the taking and of the uses which defedant has the right to make of the property taken.' 1 Plaintiffs' instruction 7 identified as MAI 15.01 and plaintiffs' instruction 8 identified as MAI 2.02 also were given.
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