Shelton v. Payne
| Decision Date | 28 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:21cv637 (KAD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | KENDALL SHELTON, Plaintiff, v. CO PAYNE, et al., Defendants. |
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff Kendall Shelton, an inmate in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”) at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution (“MacDougall”), [1] filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Correction Officer Payne, Lieutenant Russell DOC Director of Security A. Santiago, Lieutenant and Disciplinary Hearing Officer Dousis, District Administrator John Doe, and DOC Security Risk Group Coordinator Papoosha. Plaintiff alleges that his placement within the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) and designation as a participant in a program for gang-affiliated inmates violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights. He seeks damages and injunctive relief.[2] (Compl. ¶¶ 55-65, ECF No. 1.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will permit some of Plaintiff's claims to proceed beyond initial review.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the court must review prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and “dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, ” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Although detailed allegations are not required, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A complaint that includes only “‘labels and conclusions,' ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' or ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement, '” does not meet the facial plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). Although courts still have an obligation to interpret “a pro se complaint liberally, ” the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility. See Harris v Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).[3]
Following an arrest by the Meriden Police Department, Plaintiff entered the New Haven Correctional Center (“NHCC”) on January 26, 2020. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-12.) On that same day, District Administrator John Doe directed Plaintiff to meet with Correction Officer Payne, who accused Plaintiff being a member of the Bloods gang. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-15.) Plaintiff denied these allegations, and Correction Officer Payne responded by offering a number of Facebook posts as evidence of Plaintiff's gang affiliation. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-16.) Correction Officer Payne also indicated that Plaintiff's tattoo, which consisted of two hearts on his face, showed Blood membership. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff continued to profess that he was not affiliated with the Bloods and stated that the tattoo symbolized his crying for love that he never received due to a lonely childhood. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Shelton was then escorted to the RHU pending a determination of whether Plaintiff was a member of a Security Risk Group (“SRG”). (Compl. ¶ 22.)
DOC has a specific correctional program for individuals with an affiliation with certain gangs, which are designated SRGs. Plaintiff alleges that this SRG Program is punitive and houses inmates in a hostile environment that is similar to Administrative Segregation. (Compl. ¶ 23.) According to Plaintiff, the program has five phases, with phase one being the most punitive, and, by “penalizing” participants in the SRG program, the program incentivizes SRG-affiliated inmates to “behave in order to progress to the next phase.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) The program's ultimate goal is to have the inmate renounce his gang affiliation. (Id.)
On January 30, 2020, Plaintiff attended a hearing before Lieutenant Dousis. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-26.) Lieutenant Dousis stated that Plaintiff had no chance of “beating this affiliation” and that Plaintiff should, therefore just sign a document to “make it easier on everyone.” (Compl. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff refused to sign the document, asked for an advocate and an opportunity to call witnesses, and continued to deny any gang affiliation. (Compl. ¶ 27.) A back and forth ensued, and Lieutenant Dousis eventually became irritated, called Plaintiff a low-life gang banger, and threatened that if Plaintiff did not sign the paper, then Lieutenant Dousis would find him guilty and place him in the harshest phase of the SRG Program. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-29.) After Plaintiff hesitated, Lieutenant Dousis stood up to leave and stated that Plaintiff would be “found guilty” and held in the RHU until space opened in the most punitive phase of the SRG Program at Northern. (Compl. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff protested once again, signed the paper, and was sent back to his cell. (Compl. ¶¶ 36-37.)
On February 22, 2020, Plaintiff was transferred to Corrigan to start the SRG Program in Phase 3. (Compl. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff feared for his safety because the inmates near his cell were yelling threats, banging on the doors, and making vulgar gestures. (Compl. ¶ 39.) His cellmate inquired about his affiliation, and Plaintiff answered that he did have an affiliation but was designated based on his Facebook posts. (Compl. ¶ 40.) His cellmate stated that he was a Crip and was not going to tolerate living with a Blood. (Compl. ¶¶ 41-42.) Plaintiff explained that he was not into all that “gang stuff.” (Compl. ¶ 43.) Although Plaintiff was also approached by different individuals affiliated with different gangs, Plaintiff told the individuals that he was not affiliated despite being designated as a Blood. (Compl. ¶ 46.) A high-ranking Blood member later told Plaintiff to pay $5.00 per week for protection. (Compl. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff agreed to the terms out of fear. (Compl. ¶ 48.)
When his cellmate found out that Plaintiff was paying the Bloods, the cellmate threatened to hurt Plaintiff if he did not pay the cellmate the same fee. (Compl. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff later had a physical confrontation with his cellmate. (Compl. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff was brought to the RHU for seven days before being returned to the same unit. (Id.)
On April 17, 2020, Plaintiff was released from custody, but he reentered NHCC on May 26, 2020. (Compl. at ¶ 50.) Plaintiff was still designated as an SRG inmate and was escorted directly to the RHU (Id.) Correction Officer Payne stated that no new evidence of Plaintiff's affiliation had surfaced but explained that Plaintiff was designated as an SRG inmate because he had not finished the program during his time in custody. (Compl. ¶ 52.)
Title 42, Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” “The common elements to all § 1983 claims are: “(1) the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Lee v. City of Troy, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2021 WL 567240, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2021) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)). Further, a plaintiff must allege facts to establish the personal involvement of a defendant in an alleged constitutional violation in order to hold that defendant liable for an award of damages under § 1983. See Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006). To “hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability.” Tangreti v. Bachman, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
The Complaint contains factual allegations of several constitutional deprivations, which are actionable under § 1983, as well as a state law cause of action. Plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights-both in terms of the punitive nature of his placement in the SRG program and a deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement-and his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. To the extent the Plaintiff also intended to raise a First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court will review that claim as well.
“A pretrial detainee's claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement are governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth Amendment.” Darnell v Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Consequently, a pretrial detainee can establish a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim “for inhumane conditions of confinement either by proving an official's deliberate indifference to those conditions, or by proving that those conditions are punitive.” Id. at 34 n.12 (citations omitted). These theories are distinct, and each has its own standards for...
To continue reading
Request your trial