Shelton v. Platt

• Decision Date: 06 April 1891
• Citation: 11 S.Ct. 646,139 U.S. 591,35 L.Ed. 273
• Parties: SHELTON, Sheriff, et al. v. PLATT
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

139 U.S. 591

11 S.Ct. 646

35 L.Ed. 273

SHELTON, Sheriff, et al. v. PLATT.

April 6, 1891.

Thomas C. Platt filed his bill (subsequently amended) against J. W. Allen, comptroller of the state of Tennessee, and A. Shelton, sheriff, and S. D. Cate, deputysheriff, of Hamilton county, Tenn., in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Tennessee, as president of the United States Express Company, a joint-stock company of the state of New York, and as one of the members thereof, on behalf of himself and his associates, who were too numerous to be joined as parties, to restrain the collection of a license tax from the said company for the years 1887, 1888, and 1889, under certain acts of the state of Tennessee of 1887 and 1889, in that behalf, alleged by him to be unconstitutional. Complainant averred that the comptroller had issued a distress warrant to the sheriff of Hamilton county, who had placed it in the hands of his deputy to execute, for the collection of the license taxes of 1887 and 1888, which warrant the said sheriff 'has levied on or is about to levy on the property of the United States Express Company,' and that the comptroller threatened to issue another distress warrant to collect the license tax for the year 1889. And the bill then proceeded: 'Your orator further shows that the property of the said United States Express Company in Tennessee is employed in interstate commerce in the said express business and necessary to the conduct of it; that if seized by the said sheriff it will gretly embarrass the company in the conduct of such business, and subject it to heavy loss and damage, and the public served by it to great loss and inconvenience. Your orator further says that your orator and the United States Express Company are without adequate remedy at law in the premises.' The prayer was for an injunction against the collection of the taxes imposed by the acts of Tennessee referred to, or either of them, and from interfering or attempting to interfere in the operation of the company's business by reason of the non-payment of said taxes, or either of them, and for general relief, process, and answer. Defendants filed a plea in abatement, setting up an act of the legislature of Tennessee entitled 'An act to facilitate the collection of revenues,' approved March 21, 1873, and insisting that, in accordance with its terms, 'complainant's only remedy is to pay under protest the taxes complained of, and then sue within thirty days thereafter for a recovery of the amount so paid; and no injunction or other restraining order or writ to prevent the collection of said tax will lie.' And also a motion to quash the writ and dismiss the bill, as amended, for the reasons, among others, that the suit was brought in a district other than that of which the defendant Allen was an inhabitant, and other than that in which he was found, at the time the writ was served on him; that, under the public laws of the state of Tennessee, (namely, the act above mentioned,) complainant's only remedy is to pay under protest the taxes complained of, and then sue to recover the same, and no restraining order will lie against the collecting officer; and that no irreparable injury or other ground of equitable jurisdiction is shown in the bill. The motion to dismiss was sustained as to the defendant Allen, and judgment entered in his favor, but the motion was overruled as to the other defendants, they excepting; the plea was heard and stricken from the files, and exceptions taken, and defendants were granted leave to rely upon the matter of the plea and the several grounds of the motion in their answer. Defendants Shelton and Cate thereupon answered, restating the grounds of the plea and motion. Replication was filed, and the cause came on to be heard upon bill, answer, and replication, and a decree was rendered perpetually enjoining defendants as prayed, and for costs, from which decree the defendants Shelton and Cate prayed an appeal to this court. The opinion of the circuit court will be found reported in 39 Fed. Rep. 712. Sections 1 and 2 of the act of the legislature of Tennessee of 1873, entitled 'An act to facilitate the collection of revenues,' (Laws Tenn. 1873, c. 44, p. 71,) are as follows: 'Section 1. That in all cases in which an officer charged by law with the collection of revenue due the state shall institute any proceeding, or take any steps for the collection of the same, alleged or claimed to be due by said officer, from any citizens, the party against whom the proceeding or step is taken shall, if he conceives the same to be unjust or illegal, or against any statute or clause of the constitution of the state, pay the same under protest, and upon his making such payment the officer or collector shall pay such revenue into the state treasury, giving notice at the time of payment to the comptroller that the same was paid under protest; and the party paying said revenue may, at any time within thirty days after making said payment, and not longer thereafter, sue the said officer having collected said sum for the recovery thereof, and the same may be tried in any court having jurisdiction of the amount and parties; and if it be determined that the same was wrongfully collected as not being due from the said party to the state for any reason going to the merits of the same, then the court trying the case may certify of record that the same was wrongfully paid, and ought to be refunded, and thereupon the comptroller shall issue his warrant for the same, whih § hall be paid in preference to other claims on the treasury. Sec. 2. That there shall be no other remedy in any case of the collection of revenue, or attempt to collect revenue illegally, or attempt to collect revenue in funds only receivable by said officer under the law, the same being other, or different funds, than such as the tax-payer may tender, or claim the right to pay, than that above provided, and no writ for the prevention of the collection of any revenue claimed or to hinder and delay the collection of the same, shall in any wise issue either injunction, supersedeas, prohibition, or any other writ or process whatever, but in all cases in which for any reason any person shall claim that the tax so collected was wrongfully, or illegally collected, the remedy for said party shall be as above provided, and in no other manner.'

G. W. Pickle and W. G. M. Thomas, for appellants.

W. W. MacFarland and Wm. Parkin, for appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question whether, even if the act under which the tax in question was imposed were unconstitutional and the tax void, complainant, on behalf of the express company, was entitled to the relief accorded, meets us on the threshold. It was ruled in Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 112, that a suit in equity will not lie to restrain the collection of a tax on the sole ground that the tax is illegal, but that there must exist, in addition, special circumstances bringing the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction, such as that the enforcement of the tax would lead to a multiplicity of suits, or produce irreparable injury, or, where the property is real estate, throw a cloud upon the title of the complainant. And Mr. Justice FIELD, speaking for the court, said: 'The equitable powers of the court can only be invoked by the presentation of a case of equitable cognizance. There can be no such case, at least in the federal courts, where there is a plain and adequate remedy at law. And, except where the circumstances which we have mentioned exist, the party of whom an illegal tax is collected has ordinarily ample remedy, either by action against the officer making the collection or the body to whom the tax is paid. Here such remedy existed. If the tax was illegal, the plaintiff protesting against its enforcement might have had his action, after it was paid against the officer or the city to recover back the money, or he might have prosecuted either or his damages. No irreparable injury would have followed to him from its collection. Nor would he have been compelled to resort to a multiplicity of suits to determine his rights. His entire claim might have been embraced in a single action. We see no ground for the interposition of a court of equity which would not equally justify such interference in any case of threatened invasion of real or personal property.' In Railway Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516, 525, 5...