Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 24 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–13515.,11–13515. |
| Citation | 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1469,691 F.3d 1348 |
| Parties | Mackle Vincent SHELTON, Petitioner–Appellee, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondents–Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James E. Felman, Clarisse Moreno, Katherine Earle Yanes, Kynes, Markman & Felman, PA, Tampa, FL, for Petitioner–Appellee.
Wesley Heidt, Pam Bondi, Atty. Gen.'s Office, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondents–Appellants.
Steven Seliger, 2nd Cir. Pub. Def.'s Office, Tallahassee, FL, Todd A. Foster, Cohen & Foster, PA, Tampa, FL, David Oscar Markus, Markus & Markus, PLLC, Miami, FL, Vikrant P. Reddy, Texas Pub. Policy Foundation, Austin, TX, for Florida Pub. Def. Ass'n, Inc., Nat. Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al., Texas Pub. Policy Foundation, Amici Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before WILSON, ANDERSON and HIGGINBOTHAM,* Circuit Judges.
A Florida state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief, challenging the constitutionality of a Florida statute that altered the mens rea requirement for state drug offenses.1 The district court, finding a due process violation, granted relief. We conclude that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, and reverse.
Florida's Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (“Act”) provides that, except as otherwise authorized, “it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance” or “to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance.”2 Violations range from misdemeanor offenses to first-degree felonies.3
The statute does not specify a necessary mental state, an issue the Florida Supreme Court first addressed in Chicone v. State.4 Reviewing a conviction for cocaine possession, the court held that the State was required to prove that the defendant “knew of the illicit nature of the items in his possession.”5 The court reaffirmed that holding six years later, making clear that the requisite mens rea includes both knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance as well as knowledge of its illicit nature.6
The Florida Legislature responded swiftly to the latter decision. On May 13, 2002, it enacted a statute, now codified at Fla. Stat. § 893.101, amending the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. The amendment provides in full:
(1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. State and Chicone v. State, holding that the state must prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of a controlled substance found in his or her actual or constructive possession, were contrary to legislative intent.
(2) The Legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter.
(3) In those instances in which a defendant asserts the affirmative defense described in this section, the possession of a controlled substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance. It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those cases where such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall be instructed on the permissive presumption provided in this subsection.7
The Florida Supreme Court recently considered a facial challenge to the Act as amended, brought under the Due Process Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions,8 of which the district court in this case did not have the benefit. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute as constitutional and in the process provided its definitive interpretation, 9 tracking the text of the statute:
The statute ... expressly eliminates knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance as an element of controlled substance offenses and expressly creates an affirmative defense of lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance. The statute does not eliminate the element of knowledge of the presence of the substance ....10
In short, the amendment did not completely eliminate mens rea for Florida drug crimes: it converted one aspect of mens rea from an element of the crime into an affirmative defense.
A Florida jury convicted petitioner Mackle Vincent Shelton of five counts, one of which was for delivery of crack cocaine. Shelton's trial, which took place in 2005, postdated the amendment to Florida's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. Accordingly, the jury was not instructed that Shelton's knowledge of cocaine's illicit nature was an element of the offense.11 Rather, the jury was instructed as follows:
To prove the crime of delivery of cocaine, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
[1] That Mackle Vincent Shelton delivered a certain substance; and,
[2] That the substance was cocaine.12
The jury convicted, and Shelton was sentenced to eighteen years in prison.
Shelton appealed his conviction and sentence. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed without elaboration.13 Shelton then pursued state post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied. Again, the court of appeal affirmed without comment.14 At each stage, Shelton made a due process argument akin to the one presented here. Shelton then turned to federal habeas corpus relief, filing the petition giving rise to this case on May 18, 2007.
Shelton sought federal habeas relief on nine grounds. The district court rejected eight,15 but was persuaded on one ground: that the Act as amended is facially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. The court first concluded that “no deference is due to the state court's decision,” 16 leading it to review Shelton's constitutional argument de novo. 17 It then held that the Act as amended is facially unconstitutional because (1) its penalties are too harsh, (2) violations lead to substantial social stigma, and (3) it reaches inherently innocent conduct.18 The court granted habeas relief on that basis, staying relief pending appeal. 19The State timely appealed.20
As in so many federal habeas cases reviewing state convictions, setting the proper scope and standard of federal court review is critical.21 A federal court may not grant a petitioner habeas relief on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless the state court decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”22 The state court's factual findings are presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts those findings with clear and convincing evidence.23 Because Shelton brings a facial challenge, the state court's factual findings are not in dispute and Section 2254(d)(2) is not implicated.
The Supreme Court has explained the requirements of Section 2254(d)(1) as follows:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.24
That is, “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law,”25 the former “a substantially higher threshold.”26 To obtain relief under § 2254(d), the petitioner “must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”27
When reviewing the district court's grant or denial of habeas relief, we review its conclusions on legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.28 In this case, that review begins with the district court's determination of its standardof review. Drawing on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Harrington v. Richter,29 the district court concluded that the Florida appellate court rulings in Shelton's case were not “adjudications on the merits” entitled to deference because they were one-word summary affirmances.
In Harrington, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” 30 Under Harrington 's general rule, then, a state court's simple one-word affirmance is presumed to be an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner's claim.31 But the district court located what it considered to be a “state-law procedural principle to the contrary” in a 1983 Florida Supreme Court case.32 In that case, according to the district court, the Florida Supreme Court supplied a state-law procedural principle “that a per curiam affirmance has no precedential value and is not an adjudication on the merits.”33
The district court is only half-right, and not on the half that counts for federal habeas purposes. The Florida Supreme Court never held that a “per curiam appellate court decision with no written opinion” is not an...
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...petitioner is not entitled to relief, because the Eleventh Circuit has rejected it. (Doc. 27, p. 27 (citing Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012))). Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.800(a) motion filed on September 14, 2011. (Ex. P). The state circuit co......
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...F. Supp. 2d at 1298. But Shelton appears to stand alone in that assertion. And Shelton was reversed. See Shelton v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections , 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that the district court applied an improper legal standard for federal habeas review).We find it unwi......
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...limitation to challenge original conviction). (Ex. X at 55). The First DCA affirmed the decision (Ex. Y). In Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012), the Eleventh Circuit determined that there was no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing that the Due Process ......