Shelton v. State
Decision Date | 25 June 2009 |
Docket Number | No. CR 08-1035.,CR 08-1035. |
Citation | 2009 Ark. 388,326 S.W.3d 429 |
Parties | Glen Homer SHELTON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
J. Thomas Sullivan, Little Rock, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Deborah Nolan Gore, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
*1 Appellant, Glen Homer Shelton, Jr., filed this interlocutory appeal from the order of the Jefferson County Circuit Court denying his plea of prior jeopardy, in which he had moved for dismissal of the capital-murder charge pending againsthim. This interlocutory appeal requires our interpretation of the Arkansas Constitution, therefore, jurisdiction is properly in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. l-2(a)( l ). We find merit to Appellant's argument that there was no overruling necessity to support the trial court's granting of a mistrial, and therefore conclude the trial court erred in denying Appellant's plea of prior jeopardy. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss.
Appellant was charged by felony information with the May 5, 2007 murder of Melanie Hughes, after Hughes was run over by a tractor driven by Appellant. Trial by jury began on February 19, 2008. After a jury was selected and sworn, both sides presented opening statements. At the conclusion of Appellant's opening statement, the State moved for a *2 mistrial based on comments made by defense counsel during opening statement that the State alleged amounted to a change in defense theories. The trial court granted the State's motion for mistrial over Appellant's objection and discharged the jury. The trial court then reset the case for jury trial and denied Appellant's motion to set bond.
Appellant filed a plea of prior jeopardy and moved to dismiss the charges pending against him. After a hearing on May 8, 2008, the trial court took the matter under advisement and ultimately issued a written order denying without explanation Appellant's plea of prior jeopardy. This interlocutory appeal followed.1 An order denying a motion to dismiss charges because of double jeopardy is an appealable decision. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977); Smith v. State, 307 Ark. 542, 821 S.W.2d 774 (1992); Jones v. State, 230 Ark. 18, 320 S.W.2d 645 (1959).
This court reviews de novo a circuit court's denial of a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds. Koster v. State, 374 Ark. 74, 286 S.W.3d 152 (2008). When the analysis presents itself as a mixed question of law and fact, the factual determinations made by the circuit court are given due deference and are not reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id. However, the ultimate decision by the circuit court that the defendant's protection against *3 double jeopardy was not violated is reviewed de novo, with no deference given to the circuit court's determination. Id.
Koster, 374 Ark. at 81-82, 286 S.W.3d at 159-60.
In the instant case, Appellant specifically contends that there was no overruling necessity to grant the mistrial as required by section 5-1-112(3). It is undisputed that the State bears the heavy burden of proving an overruling necessity, which is a circumstance that is forceful and compelling and is in the nature of a cause or emergency over which neither court nor attorney has control, or which could not have been averted by diligence and care. Koster, 374 Ark. 74, 286 S.W.3d 152. Determining whether there is an overruling necessity *4 that requires the grant of a mistrial is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and we will not disturb that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
In Koster, this court affirmed a finding of overruling necessity when the jury was exposed to matters outside the courtroom that could affect its judgment in the case. Other examples of overruling necessity found by this court are illness of a juror, Shaw v. State, 304 Ark. 381, 802 S.W.2d 468 (1991); illness of a material witness for the State, Jones v. State, 288 Ark. 162, 702 S.W.2d 799 (1986); and intoxication of defense counsel, Franklin v. State, 251 Ark. 223, 471 S.W.2d 760 (1971). These are all examples of emergencies that are outside the control of the court and counsel, that could not have been averted with diligence or care, and that prevented the trial from proceeding.
The situation presented in the present case, however, is entirely distinct from those cases, as a review of the record below clearly demonstrates. At the core of this case are remarks of defense counsel made during opening statement regarding evidence that the prosecuting attorney had already explained to the jury would be admitted at trial. Indeed, the first reference to the challenged subject matter of the victim's death being accidental was, in fact, made by the prosecution in its opening statement:
You'll also hear that once the defendant to the—to the sheriff's office that he was advised of his rights and that he gave a statement. And I anticipate that you're going to see that statement. It was a video statement where he gives explanation as to what was involved and why—what happened happened. And in that statement, I anticipate you're going to hear several different explanations that range from being mad to range from she had my *5 cell phone to range that it was an accident to, "I just meant to bump her, but I didn't mean to kill her." Several different explanations.
(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel then proceeded with his opening statement, describing the events leading up to the death of Hughes:
(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel went on to assert that the evidence would show that Appellant acted in self-defense:
If you look at the evidence, beginning in 2004 when Glen has it in his mind that she will assault him and she will hurt him and combine that with the evidence in 2007 when this time she has a gun and she fires it, we think you'll be satisfied that he was acting in self-defense when he got in that tractor. Thank you.
(Emphasis added.)
(Emphasis added.)
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