Shelton v. State
| Decision Date | 13 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 45S00-9205-CR-348,45S00-9205-CR-348 |
| Citation | 602 N.E.2d 1017 |
| Parties | Stephen M. SHELTON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Nathaniel Ruff, Appellate Public Defender, Crown Point, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Julie Zandstra Frazee, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This appeal presents a question of first impression. When the State charges a defendant with certain offenses which may be enhanced by virtue of prior convictions and also alleges that the defendant is an habitual offender, must the trial proceed in three separate phases? We hold it need not.
Appellant Stephen M. Shelton was charged with the following by information: count I, attempted murder, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-42-1-1 (West Supp.1992) and Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-41-5-1 (West 1986); count II, auto theft, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-43-4-2.5(b) (West Supp.1992); and count III, possession of a handgun without a license, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-47-2-1 (West Supp.1992) and Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-47-2-23(c) (West 1986).
The State also charged three counts amounting to recidivist claims: count IV, habitual offender, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-50-2-8 (West Supp.1992); count V, auto theft with a prior auto theft conviction, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-43-4-2.5(b); and count VI, possession of a handgun without a license with a prior felony conviction within fifteen years, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-47-2-1 and Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-47-2-23(c).
Shelton was tried before a jury and convicted on all counts. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of 70 years for count I, eight years for count II, and three years for count III.
Appellant raises two issues on direct appeal: (1) Did the trial court err in holding a bifurcated, rather than a trifurcated, trial? (2) Was the evidence at trial sufficient to sustain the jury's determination that defendant was guilty of attempted murder? We affirm.
Because counts IV, V, and VI required consideration of defendant's prior convictions, the court bifurcated the proceedings and separated the consideration of defendant's guilt on counts I, II, and III from the determination of counts IV, V, and VI. After presentation of evidence in phase one, the jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder (count I), auto theft (count II), and possession of a handgun without a license (count III).
In count IV, the State charged Shelton with being an habitual offender as defined in Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-50-2-8(a): "The state may seek to have a person sentenced as an habitual offender for any felony by alleging ... that the person has accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony convictions." The statute directs the court to increase the sentence for a felony conviction if the jury finds the defendant to be an habitual offender. In support of the habitual offender charge, the State provided evidence of defendant's two prior convictions for auto theft, a class D felony, dated January 29, 1986 and June 14, 1988.
In count V, the State sought enhancement of Shelton's auto theft charge from a class D to a class C felony. Under Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-43-4-2.5(b), auto theft is a class D felony. "However, the offense is a Class C felony if the person has a prior conviction of an offense under this subsection or subsection (c)." Id. Pursuant to the statute, the State provided evidence of defendant's felony conviction for auto theft on June 14, 1988.
In count VI, the State sought enhancement of defendant's handgun possession conviction from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony. Under Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-47-2-23(c), handgun possession in violation of Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-47-2-1 is a class A misdemeanor which may be enhanced to a class D felony if the offender "has been convicted of a felony within fifteen years before the date of the offense." The State relied upon Shelton's June 1988 felony auto theft conviction to support enhancement of the instant handgun conviction.
After presentation of the evidence of appellant's prior convictions in phase two, the jury found him guilty of Counts IV (habitual offender), V (auto theft with a prior felony auto theft conviction), and VI (handgun possession with a prior felony conviction within 15 years). 1
Appellant argues that the trial court should have divided the proceedings into three phases: (1) the guilt/innocence determination on the attempted murder, auto theft, and handgun possession charges; (2) the determination of whether the auto theft and handgun possession convictions should be elevated to higher class felonies; and (3) the determination of whether Shelton was a habitual offender pursuant to Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-50-2-8.
This Court has never considered the issue of whether trifurcated proceedings are required when a defendant is charged with a felony and the State relies on the defendant's prior convictions to obtain both elevation of the predicate felony and a determination the defendant is an habitual offender. We have held, however, that bifurcated proceedings are required when the State seeks an habitual offender determination. Lawrence v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830.
In Lawrence, this Court imposed a bifurcation requirement on trials in which an habitual offender count accompanies a felony charge. The habitual offender statute was therefore amended to reflect this bifurcation requirement. Shepler v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 331, 340, 412 N.E.2d 62, 69. Under the statute, a jury is not presented with an habitual offender charge until after it has determined the defendant's guilt or innocence on the underlying felony charge. If the jury finds the defendant guilty, "the jury ... reconvene[s] for the sentencing hearing" on the habitual offender count. Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-50-2-8(c).
The bifurcation requirement of Lawrence was adopted to ensure that in habitual offender cases the consideration of a defendant's prior convictions is removed from the jury's guilt/innocence determination on the felony charge. 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830. Evidence of prior convictions "is generally inadmissible in a criminal case, because it has no tendency to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused but, if effective at all, could serve only to prejudice or mislead or excite the minds and inflame the passions of the jury." Id. at 310, 286 N.E.2d at 832. In Lawrence we concluded that any state interest in having the prior conviction evidence heard in the same phase as evidence of the felony is outweighed by the injustice to a defendant from a jury determining his guilt or innocence with knowledge of his prior conviction. See id. at 312, 286 N.E.2d at 834.
In Shepler, 412 N.E.2d at 69, we explained the rationale underlying the bifurcation requirement: "The purpose of ... bifurcated proceeding[s] is to prevent the jury from being tainted by knowledge of the defendant's prior felony convictions, in determining his guilt or innocence of the charge before them." By separating the consideration of prior convictions from the jury's initial guilt/innocence determination, the defendant is provided a fair and impartial jury to determine his guilt or innocence on the underlying felony charge. In Turpin v. State (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 1, 3, this Court explained:
It is clearly established that our habitual offender statute ... seeks to provide a fair procedure by which an individual convicted of a felony may receive an enhanced sentence. The bifurcated nature of the proceeding has been determined to be necessary by this Court in order to guarantee the accused's right to a fair trial on the underlying felony charge.
In Sweet v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 1144, this Court extended the Lawrence bifurcation requirement to a situation in which a prior drug conviction was used to obtain enhancement of a drug conviction. The statute involved in Sweet, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-48-4-10(iii), 2 provided for elevation of a drug charge from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony when the person charged had been previously convicted of an offense involving marijuana or hashish. Noting the similarity between that charge elevation provision and the habitual offender statute, id. at 1146, we applied the Lawrence bifurcation requirement to charges which allege that a person has been previously convicted of an offense involving marijuana or hashish. Id. at 1147. The Court explained, "a bifurcated trial is required as it is the best procedure to insure that the jury remains uninformed about a defendant's prior convictions until the appropriate time." Id.
The Court of Appeals has applied Sweet to other situations in which the State seeks elevation of a criminal charge based upon a prior conviction. For example, in Smith v. State (1983), Ind.App., 451 N.E.2d 57, the Court of Appeals held that the Lawrence bifurcation requirement applied when the State sought elevation of intoxicated driver charges convictions. Id. at 62. The court reasoned that the statutory provisions involved in the two cases were virtually indistinguishable in that both provide for enhancement from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony upon proof of a previous similar conviction. Id. In this case, we hold that the trial court did not err in holding bifurcated, rather than trifurcated, proceedings. The jury was not provided evidence of the defendant's prior auto theft convictions until after it had heard evidence and determined the defendant's guilt on the attempted murder, auto theft, and handgun possession charges. Therefore, the jury which determined Shelton's guilt was not tainted by knowledge of his prior felony convictions.
Holding the charge enhancement and habitual offender determinations in the same phase of a trial does not offend any interest of the defendant in a fair trial. Indeed, trifurcated proceedings do not provide defendants any additional protections beyond those which...
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