Shelton v. State
| Decision Date | 27 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 71A03–1408–CR–309.,71A03–1408–CR–309. |
| Citation | 26 N.E.3d 1038 |
| Parties | Tyrone SHELTON, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Thomas P. Keller, South Bend, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
, Judge.
[1] Appellant–Defendant, Tyrone D. Shelton, Jr. (Shelton), appeals his conviction of Count I, possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.Code § 35–48–4–11 (2006)
; Count II, possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35–48–4–6(b)(1) (2006) ; and Count III, possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35–48–4–7(a) (2006).
[2] We affirm.
[3] Shelton raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that was seized during the course of a warrantless search.
[4] In 2004, following his conviction of Class A felony cocaine possession, Shelton received a twenty-year sentence. As an alternative to incarceration in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), the trial court ordered Shelton to serve his sentence in the DuComb Community Corrections of St. Joseph County (Community Corrections) in South Bend, Indiana. As a condition of his home detention/work release, Shelton was outfitted with an electronic monitoring device and required to report daily to his case manager, Judi Ross (Case Manager Ross).
[5] On July 7, 2006, Shelton entered into a contract with Community Corrections, whereby he agreed to the terms governing his home detention. In part, Shelton “[c]onsent[ed] to allow [Community Corrections] staff and/or law enforcement officers to enter [his] residence at any time, without prior notice or warrant, to make reasonable inquiry into the activities of the residents of the home or assist in investigations of rule violations.” (State's Exh. 1). He further “[a]gree[d] to submit to searches of person, residence, vehicle, or personal property at any time by staff or law enforcement officers.” (State's Exh. 1). By signing the contract, Shelton acknowledged that his failure to abide by Community Corrections' regulations could result in the revocation of his placement in order to serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC.
[6] On November 3, 2006, the Metro Special Operations Section—i.e., the narcotics unit for St. Joseph County—received an anonymous tip on the Crime Stoppers hotline that “Shelton was talking about having some marijuana in his house, and he was on house arrest or something like that, and the marijuana supposedly was stolen from a South Bend police car.” (Transcript p. 15). The information was passed on to Officer Charles Flanagan (Officer Flanagan) of the South Bend Police Department for further investigation.
[7] A day or two earlier, Officer Flanagan learned that marijuana had, in fact, been stolen from a squad car. The theft was not released to the public, and only a few police officers were even aware of the incident. Officer Flanagan was privy to the information because he worked as a K–9 handler, and the stolen marijuana was intended to be used for training the drug-sniffing dogs. Because the informant had specifically mentioned Shelton's house arrest through the DuComb Center, Officer Flanagan contacted Community Corrections, and Case Manager Ross verified that Shelton was serving a sentence on home detention. Case Manager Ross also stated that Shelton had signed a consent to have his house searched at any time, so she offered to do a surprise inspection.
[8] At approximately 2:30 p.m., Case Manager Ross—along with Officer Flanagan, his K–9 partner Dixie (K–9 Dixie), and a few other officers—arrived at Shelton's home, located at 55185 Melrose Avenue in South Bend. Case Manager Ross explained the purpose of the search to Shelton, and Shelton denied that there were any narcotics in the home. Officer Flanagan then escorted K–9 Dixie throughout the house and the attached garage. K–9 Dixie, who was trained to detect eight types of drugs, did not indicate that any drugs were present inside the house. Once in the garage, K–9 Dixie detected an odor and “worked her way back to a cooler ... and she started alerting on the cooler by scratching at it[,] knocking it over.” (Tr. p. 112).
[9] Inside the cooler, Officer Flanagan found a plastic grocery bag containing seven (Tr. p. 112). There was also a digital scale in the cooler. A field test confirmed that the leafy substance was marijuana, but the officers were advised not to arrest Shelton until after the evidence could be submitted for chemical and fingerprint analyses.
[10] Further testing confirmed that the bag of white powder consisted of 4.04 grams of cocaine. The three pills were identified as Ecstasy (MDMA) tablets and had a net weight of 0.92 grams. The marijuana weighed a total of 428 grams. In addition, a fingerprint analyst concluded that two latent fingerprints found on two of the clear plastic marijuana bags were left by Shelton, and one of the fingerprints found on the plastic grocery bag contained (Tr. p. 150).
[11] On January 25, 2007, the State filed an Information charging Shelton with Count I, possession of marijuana, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35–48–4–11 (2006)
; Count II, possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35–48–4–6(b)(1) (2006) ; and Count III, possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35–48–4–7(a) (2006)
. On April 1, 2014, Shelton filed a motion to suppress “any and all items of evidence seized ... on the grounds that said seizure was done without warrant and beyond the terms of his contract with [Community Corrections].” (Appellant's App. p. 89). On April 4, 2014, the trial court held a hearing and denied Shelton's motion.
[12] On July 28 and 29, 2014, a jury trial was conducted. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all Counts.1 On August 26, 2014, the trial court sentenced Shelton to concurrent terms of one year on Count I, five years on Count II, and two years on Count III.
[13] Shelton now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
[14] Shelton claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the warrantless search of his property. However, Shelton appeals from a completed trial, and “[d]irect review of the denial of a motion to suppress is only proper when the defendant files an interlocutory appeal.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind.2013)
. Therefore, this “appeal is best framed as challenging the admission of evidence at trial.” Id.
[15] Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court and are subject to review only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 259–60
. It is an abuse of discretion if the trial court's decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. On review, our court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will consider only the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's evidentiary ruling. Nowling v. State, 955 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), clarified on reh'g on other grounds; trans. denied.
[16] Shelton asserts that the search of his property violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.2 See Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 464–65 (Ind.1998)
(). In general, searches may only “be conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause.” State v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.2010), reh'g denied. Absent a well-delineated exception, evidence that is seized in violation of the warrant requirement is subject to exclusion from the defendant's prosecution. Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 260
.
[17] It is undisputed that Officer Flanagan did not obtain a warrant prior to searching Shelton's residence. Nevertheless, it is well-established that certain “special needs” beyond the normal need for law enforcement “may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements.” Kopkey v. State, 743 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)
, trans. denied. Such “special needs” have frequently been found in situations relating to the supervision and rehabilitation of criminal offenders who are on probation. See
Purdy v. State, 708 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). In these cases, a warrantless search may be justified because “probationers do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.’ ” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ).
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