Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, No. 17337.

• Decision Date: 07 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 17337.
• Citation: 890 A.2d 104,277 Conn. 99
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Adam J. SHELTON v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE.

Page 104

890 A.2d 104

277 Conn. 99

Adam J. SHELTON v.STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE.

No. 17337.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 20, 2005.

Decided February 7, 2006.

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Frances Mickelson-Dera, assistant bar counsel, for the appellant(defendant).

Adam J. Shelton, pro se, the appellee(plaintiff).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

NORCOTT, J.

The defendant, the statewide grievance committee (committee), appeals, following our grant of certification,¹ from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing in part the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, Adam J. Shelton, from the committee's decision to reprimand him for an alleged violation of rule 8.4(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.²Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Committee,85 Conn.App. 440, 441, 857 A.2d 432(2004).The committee claims, inter alia, that the Appellate Court improperly: (1) concluded that the committee's finding that the plaintiff had violated rule 8.4(3) was not supported by substantial evidence as required by Practice Book§ 2-38(f)(5);³ and (2) remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment rescinding the reprimand rather than with direction to remand the case to the committee to hold a new hearing.We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the committee's decision to reprimand the plaintiff was not supported by substantial evidence, and properly directed the trial court to render judgment rescinding the reprimand.We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant background facts and procedural history."The plaintiff is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Connecticut.On March 12, 2001, Barbara A. Dougherty-Shore filed a complaint against the plaintiff with the New Britain-Hartford judicial district grievance panel, claiming that the plaintiff had made an oral agreement with her regarding a debt that she owed and that he unilaterally rescinded that agreement.Dougherty-Shore subsequently sent two letters to the committee, one dated March 25, 2001, and the other May 4, 2001, alleging largely the same facts presented in her complaint.

"The plaintiff had represented a party in a collection matter who had an outstanding judgment against Dougherty-Shore, her ex-husband and another individual in the amount of $5465.11.That party retained the plaintiff to secure payment of that debt from Dougherty-Shore, her ex-husband and the other individual.In February, 2000, Dougherty-Shore's ex-husband paid the plaintiff $2000 to settle his share of the debt, pursuant to a written settlement agreement dated January 31, 2000.The plaintiff then sent Dougherty-Shore's ex-husband a release from the debt.

"In her complaint and two subsequent letters, Dougherty-Shore alleged that the plaintiff had contacted her in February, 2000, and informed her that if she agreed to pay $2000 on the debt, he would send her a letter stating that she satisfied her obligation.Dougherty-Shore then began making installment payments to the plaintiff.In August, 2000, Dougherty-Shore telephoned the plaintiff and left a message advising him that she was sending $200 at that time and would send an additional $200 in September as the final payment toward her debt.Dougherty-Shore subsequently submitted to the plaintiff a check on which was written, `for final payment.'In her complaint and two letters, Dougherty-Shore alleged that after she submitted the check marked `for final payment,'she telephoned the plaintiff several times to ask for a release, yet she never received one.

"At the committee's hearing into the matter, the plaintiff conceded that he accepted Dougherty-Shore's payments, cashed the check marked `for final payment' and did not provide her with a release.He maintains, however, that he never made an agreement to release her for less than the full balance owed on the debt and, therefore, had no duty to provide that release.

"The committee's grievance panel, after considering Dougherty-Shore's complaint, filed its decision on May 29, 2001, finding probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had violated rules 8.4(3)and3.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.On September 5, 2001, a three person reviewing committee conducted a hearing on Dougherty-Shore's complaint.At the hearing, the plaintiff was the only witness who testified.Dougherty-Shore did not attend or testify at the hearing.The reviewing committee presented no additional evidence or witnesses, but relied on Dougherty-Shore's complaint and two letters.On June 21, 2002, the reviewing committee issued a decision reprimanding the plaintiff concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that he violated rule 8.4(3).On August 16, 2002, the entire committee affirmed that decision.The plaintiff appealed from the committee's decision to the [trial] court on September 18, 2002, pursuant to Practice Book§ 2-38.The court sustained the appeal, [but remanded the case for a new hearing before the committee]."Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Committee,supra, 85 Conn.App. at 441-43, 857 A.2d 432.The trial court's memorandum of decision was unclear as to whether the court based its ruling on a lack of substantial evidence to support the reprimand, or a violation of the plaintiff's right to due process of law due to his inability to cross-examine Dougherty-Shore.⁴

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the committee claimed that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) the committee's conclusion that the plaintiff had violated rule 8.4(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct was not supported by substantial evidence;id., at 441, 857 A.2d 432;(2)"the plaintiff did not waive his right to cross-examine [Dougherty-Shore]";id., at 441 n. 2, 857 A.2d 432; and (3)"the plaintiff's due process rights were violated when the committee conducted its hearing in the matter absent the complaining witness."Id.The Appellate Court declined to reach the committee's second and third arguments, concluding that no substantial evidence supported the committee's finding that the plaintiff violated rule 8.4(3).Id., at 446, 857 A.2d 432.Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment as to the order remanding the case for a new hearing, but affirmed it in all other respects, directing the trial court to render judgment rescinding the reprimand.⁵Id.The committee's certified appeal followed.See footnote 1 of this opinion.

On appeal, the committee contends that: (1) because the trial court did not rule on the issue of whether the committee's decision was supported by substantial evidence, the Appellate Court should not have reached that issue; and (2) substantial evidence existed to support its findings.The plaintiff, in response, argues that his claim was properly reviewable and that the Appellate Court's conclusion and orders were correct in light of the lack of evidence presented against him at the hearing.We agree with the plaintiff.

I

We first address the committee's claim that the Appellate Court should not have considered whether the committee's decision was supported by substantial evidence because the trial court did not itself decide that issue.Specifically, "[t]he [committee] contends that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the reprimand issued by the [committee] because the trial court did not rule on the merits of the sufficiency of the evidence."

Generally, "because our review is limited to matters in the record, we will not address issues not decided by the trial court."Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp.,245 Conn. 1, 52, 717 A.2d 77(1998).Nevertheless, although the trial court's memorandum of decision was somewhat cryptic about the basis for its decision even after an articulation; see footnote 4 of this opinion; we may assess whether there was substantial evidence to support the reprimand because whether the committee's findings met the threshold for substantial evidentiary support under Practice Book§ 2-38(f)(5) was a question of law properly reviewed de novo on appeal.SeeConnecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control,216 Conn. 627, 639, 583 A.2d 906(1990)("[B]ecause the administrative record before us on appeal is identical to that which was before the trial court, the interests of judicial economy would not be served by a remand in this case....We consider the substantial evidence issue first ....");see alsoRiver Bend Associates, Inc. v. Conservation & Inland Wetlands Commission,269 Conn. 57, 70, 848 A.2d 395(2004)(whether trial court properly applied substantial evidence test was question of law subject to de novo review);Capozzi v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,229 Conn. 448, 450, 642 A.2d 1(1994)("[w]hether a factual finding of an arbitration panel is supported by substantial evidence is ultimately a question of law subject to de novo review by this court");Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,218 Conn. 646, 667, 591 A.2d 101(1991)(same).

Moreover, even without an explicit ruling by the trial court, appellate review is proper where, as in the present case, the trial court necessarily was forced to rule in the committee's favor on the substantial evidence issue before reaching the plaintiff's due process claim.SeeZahringer v. Zahringer,262 Conn. 360, 371, 815 A.2d 75(2003)(for review to be proper when "issue was not ruled on by the trial court, the issue must be one that the trial court would have been forced to rule [on]" in order to reach other issues [internal quotation marks omitted]).It is axiomatic that courts do not engage in constitutional analysis if a nonconstitutional basis upon which to resolve an issue exists.SeeState v. McCahill,261 Conn. 492, 501-502,...