Shelton v. Wallace

• Citation: 886 F. Supp. 1365
• Decision Date: 19 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. C-1-94-405.,C-1-94-405.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: James SHELTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Chris WALLACE, et al., Defendants.

886 F. Supp. 1365

James SHELTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Chris WALLACE, et al., Defendants.

No. C-1-94-405.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

April 19, 1995.

David Ian Thompson, Cincinnati, OH, for Jimmie Shelton, Inetha Shelton.

Neal David Baker, Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, OH, for Chris Wallace and Joe Staft.

Philip Lewis Zorn, Jr., Asst. Pros. Atty., Cincinnati, OH, for Simon Leis, The Com'rs of Hamilton County and Dale Honnert.

Robert Forrest Cowdrey, Jenks, Surdyk & Cowdry Co., Dayton, OH, for Bill Bridgeford, Kurk Nordblum and Fred Ramono.

Lawrence Edward Barbiere, Schroeder Maundrell Barbiere & Powers, Cincinnati, OH, for Clayton Smith.

Christopher A Benintendi, Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, OH, for John Benner.

ORDER

CARL B. RUBIN, District Judge.

This matter is before the court upon the partial motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs James and Inetha Shelton (the Sheltons) and upon motions for summary judgment filed by defendants John Benner (Benner), member of the Village of the Fairfax, Ohio, Police Department; Joseph Staft (Staft), a member of the Blue Ash, Ohio, Police Department; Chris Wallace (Wallace), member of the Blue Ash, Ohio, Police Department and Lieutenant and field commander of the Drug Abuse Reduction Task Force (DART); Clayton Smith (Smith), member of the Hamilton County, Ohio, SWAT team; the Commissioners of Hamilton County (Commissioners); Simon L. Leis (Leis), Sheriff of Hamilton County, Ohio; Dale Honnert (Honnert), deputy sheriff of Hamilton County, Ohio; Bill Bridgeford (Bridgeford), member of the Wyoming, Ohio, Police Department; Kirk Nordbloom (Nordbloom), member of the Montgomery, Ohio, Police Department; and Fred Ramono (Ramono), member of the Springdale, Ohio, Police Department. As set forth, infra, this court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment is denied.

I. PROCEDURAL SUBMISSIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Sheltons filed their motion for partial summary judgment on Feb. 1, 1995. Doc. No. 30. Smith filed his response in opposition to such motion on Feb. 14, 1995. Doc. No. 40. Staft and Wallace filed their response in opposition on Feb. 24, 1995. Doc. No. 43. Benner filed his response in opposition on Feb. 27, 1995. Doc. No. 44. The Commissioners, Leis and Honnert filed their motion in opposition on Feb. 28, 1995. Doc. No. 46. This court did not receive a reply in support of such motion from the Sheltons.

Bridgeford, Nordblum and Ramono filed their motion for summary judgment on Feb. 3, 1995. Doc. No. 31. The Sheltons filed their response in opposition on Feb. 27, 1995. Doc. No. 45. This court did not receive any reply thereto.

The Commissioners, Leis and Honnert filed their motion for summary judgment on Feb. 6, 1995. Doc. No. 33. The Sheltons filed their response in opposition to such motion on Feb. 27, 1995. Doc. No. 45. The Commissioners, Leis and Honnert filed their reply in support of their motion on March 3, 1995. Doc. No. 48.

Wallace and Staft filed their motion for summary judgment on Nov. 1, 1994. Doc. No. 23. The Sheltons filed their response in opposition to the Wallace and Staft summary judgment motion on Feb. 6, 1995. Doc. No. 34. Wallace and Staft filed their reply in support of their motion for summary judgment on Feb. 13, 1995. Doc. No. 37.

Smith filed his motion for summary judgment on Jan. 17, 1995. Doc. No. 25. The Sheltons filed their memorandum in opposition on Feb. 10, 1995. Doc. No. 36. Smith filed his reply on Feb. 14, 1995. Doc. No. 40.

Benner filed his motion for summary judgment on Jan. 20, 1995. Doc. No. 27. On Jan. 26, 1995, Benner then filed an addendum to supplement his summary judgment motion. Doc. No. 28. The Sheltons filed their opposition response on Feb. 14, 1995. Doc. No. 38. On Feb. 27, 1995, Benner filed his reply in support of his motion for summary judgment. Doc. No. 44.

After considering these motions, responses and replies, this court requested that the parties submit briefs on as to whether the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity applies to a case, such as this, where defendants are sued in only their official capacities. Doc. No. 49. Smith filed his supplemental memorandum on March 29, 1995. Doc. No. 50. Wallace and Staft responded on March 30, 1995. Doc. No. 51. The Commissioners, Leis, and Honnert also submitted their supplemental memorandum on March 30, 1995. Doc. No. 52. Benner, likewise, filed a supplemental memorandum on March 30, 1995. Doc. No. 53. Finally, also on March 30, 1995, the Sheltons responded with their supplemental memorandum. Doc. No. 54.

II. INTRODUCTION

The Sheltons assert both federal and State law claims against defendants. See Doc. 34 at 8. The Sheltons assert a right of recovery against defendants, in their official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (a) an unreasonable search and seizure, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (b) an unlawful detainment and unlawful deprivation of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. No. 34 at 8. The Sheltons also raise State law claims for (a) trespass, (b) assault and battery, (c) false arrest, (d) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (e) interference with business relations. Doc. 34 at 8. "Significantly, with regard to the federal claims plaintiffs do not allege any conduct by the defendants beyond what the TRO ordered them to do; rather, plaintiff's complaint essentially alleges that the TRO and the execution of it violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs." Doc. 34 at 8; See also Doc. 30 at 8; Doc. 38 at 2; Doc. 36 at 8.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

During the relevant time in question, the Sheltons were owners of a commercial establishment known as Mann's Lounge, 1152 Steffen Street, Village of Lincoln Heights, Ohio. Doc. 42 at 3. On Oct. 20, 1992, the Hamilton County Prosecutor Joseph Deters filed a petition with the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Ruehlman, J., requesting a permanent injunction, preliminary injunction, and temporary restraining order (TRO) against Mann's Lounge due to alleged continuous drug activity at the premises. Doc. 30 at 2; Doc. 42 at 3. The injunctions and TRO were sought pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ch. 3767 (Nuisances), and alleged that Mann's Lounge was a "nuisance," as defined by Ohio Rev.Code 3767.01(C). Doc. 42 at 3. In support of the petitions, the prosecutor attached an affidavit from defendant Wallace. Doc. 30 at 7. That same day, the common pleas court held an ex parte hearing on the motion. See Doc. 30 at 2. Subsequently, the common pleas court granted the TRO, which, in pertinent part, stated:

There being no showing that the nuisance has been abated, it is the further order of this court that the premises be closed and padlocked or boarded as deemed necessary by DART against its use for any purpose until final decision is rendered on the application for a preliminary and permanent injunction as required by Ohio Rev.Code § 3767.04.

It is further ordered that all personal property located in the premises shall be inventoried and that only necessary personal property located there shall be removed by the occupants prior to closure and under the direction of DART. DART may, however, remove and secure at an off-site location highly mobile and valuable property, such as automobiles, cash, jewelry, and electronic equipment, which may be at risk of theft during the pendency of this order.

* * * * * *

DART shall serve this Order upon the person of James L. Shelton and shall effectuate the closing of said premises with forcible entry, based upon the affidavit of Wallace, the precondition of non-consensual entry is waived pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 2933.231 due to the serious risk of physical harm to law enforcement officers or other authorized individuals in the execution of this order.

See State of Ohio, ex rel. v. Jimmie L. Shelton, No. A9269294, Hamilton County Common Pleas Court, Temporary Restraining Order, at 3 (Oct. 20, 1992). Doc. No. 30, Exh. C at 3.

Later the morning of Oct. 20, 1995, various members from the SWAT team entered Mann's lounge and secured the premises, as authorized by the TRO. Doc. 42 at 4. DART then served the TRO and closed down Mann's Lounge. Doc. 42 at 4. Subsequently, a trial proceeded in which the common pleas court ultimately found that there was insufficient evidence to permanently close Mann's Lounge under Ohio Rev.Code § 3719.10 and Ch. 3767.

IV. DISCUSSION

a.) Summary Judgment Standard

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), in pertinent part, provides:

Summary judgment ... shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Although summary judgment should be employed cautiously, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to `secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). According to the Supreme Court, the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate if, "under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Id. (citing Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-480, 64 S.Ct. 232, 234, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943)).

b.) Qualified and Absolute Immunity

The Supreme Court has recognized the doctrines of qualified and absolute immunity as defenses to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, ___ U.S. ___,...