Shepherd Montessori Center Milan v. ANN ARBOR TP.

• Decision Date: 06 November 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 233484,Docket No. 234300.
• Citation: 259 Mich. App. 315,675 N.W.2d 271
• Parties: SHEPHERD MONTESSORI CENTER MILAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANN ARBOR CHARTER TOWNSHIP, Ann Arbor Charter Township Zoning Official, and Ann Arbor Charter Township Zoning Board of Appeals, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

675 N.W.2d 271

259 Mich. App. 315

SHEPHERD MONTESSORI CENTER MILAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANN ARBOR CHARTER TOWNSHIP, Ann Arbor Charter Township Zoning Official, and Ann Arbor Charter Township Zoning Board of Appeals, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket Nos. 233484, 234300.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

November 6, 2003.

Submitted April 15, 2003, at Grand Rapids.

Decided November 6, 2003, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication January 22, 2004.

Robert L. Bunting, Oxford and Robert Charles Davis, Sterling Heights, for the plaintiff.

Bodman, Longley & Dahling, L.L.P., by James J. Walsh, Sandra L. Sorini, and William B. Forrest, III, Ann Arbor, for the defendants.

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and OWENS and SCHUETTE, JJ.

SCHUETTE, J.

Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition, denying plaintiffs motion for summary disposition, and denying plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. ISSUE SUMMARY

This case involves the protections provided by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, and the fundamental guarantee of equal protection as provided by the United States Constitution. The heart of the issue concerns plaintiffs desire to operate a religious primary school for children, kindergarten through third grade, in an area zoned as an office park and defendants' refusal to permit this type of use. Plaintiff filed suit after township officials determined that plaintiffs intended use of the premises— the operation of a faith-based primary school—was prohibited by the local zoning ordinance.

RLUIPA prohibits a governmental entity from imposing on a person, or on a religious institution or assembly, a land use regulation that substantially burdens the free exercise of religion. RLUIPA also provides protection to individuals in prisons or mental hospitals in their free exercise of religion, which is not at issue in this case.

Under RLUIPA, plaintiff must fulfill two separate tests to receive the protections offered by this statute. First, plaintiff must establish one of three jurisdictional requirements specified in RLUIPA. The trial court held that plaintiff failed to meet any of the jurisdictional requirements and, therefore, the first test of RLUIPA was not met. We disagree. When the Ann Arbor Charter Township Zoning Board of Appeals examined and subsequently denied plaintiffs petition for a variance, an individualized assessment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) occurred. Therefore, plaintiff did meet one of the three jurisdictional requirements specified by Congress under RLUIPA.

Second, after meeting the jurisdictional requirements, plaintiff must also satisfy the substantial burden on religious exercise test set forth in RLUIPA. In other words, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case to invoke the statutory protections contained in RLUIPA. Plaintiff and defendants each filed motions for summary disposition on plaintiffs RLUIPA claim. We hold that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case pursuant to RLUIPA. Therefore, while the trial court's denial of plaintiffs motion was correct, the trial court's granting of defendants' motion was premature and in error.

The trial court also granted defendants' motion for summary disposition on plaintiffs claim that defendants' application of the zoning ordinance violated the equal protection guarantee of the United States Constitution. Again, the trial court erred. Genuine issues of material fact remain with respect to this issue, particularly with regard to whether plaintiff and Rainbow Rascals are similarly situated entities. The trial court ruled that plaintiff failed to establish an equal protection claim and, as a result, the burden shifting analysis (i.e., strict scrutiny analysis) required in an equal protection analysis did not occur.

II. FACTS

This case originated from a zoning dispute in Ann Arbor Charter Township. Plaintiff had a leasehold interest in the Domino's Farms Office Park and operated a Catholic Montessori day care program. In April 2000, plaintiff notified the township of its intention to lease additional property immediately adjacent to its day care facility and to operate a Catholic Montessori school for children grades K-3. Plaintiff anticipated that twenty-five students would be attending this school. Plaintiff hoped to utilize space that had been occupied by the "Rainbow Rascals," (a non-religious, pre-school day care program), which previously had received approval from the defendants to accommodate up to one hundred students.

The property at issue is zoned "OP" (office park district) pursuant to the township zoning ordinance. The township zoning ordinance expressly permitted the operation of day care centers within the OP district, but only for children of office park employees. Plaintiff requested in writing a zoning determination from the township regarding whether plaintiffs proposed use of the property would be allowed under the township's ordinance. In a letter dated May 1, 2000, the zoning official for the township informed plaintiff that the zoning ordinance classified its proposed use as "primary school." The letter informed plaintiff that primary schools were not listed as permitted uses in OP districts and denied plaintiffs proposed use of the property.

On May 30, 2000, plaintiff filed a petition with the Ann Arbor Charter Township Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) appealing the zoning official's decision. Plaintiff sought the following: (1) a reversal of the zoning official's determination so as to allow the proposed use; (2) a use variance; and (3) a determination that plaintiffs proposed use as a primary school be considered a "substituted use" of the Rainbow Rascals day care program. With respect to plaintiffs second request in the May 30 petition, plaintiff noted that defendants had granted a use variance to Rainbow Rascals on December 3, 1991, which permitted an expanded use of the premises to allow children of non-office park employees to attend the Rainbow Rascals day care program. As mentioned, the original zoning ordinance allowed the operation of a day care facility in an area zoned OP only for use by children of office park employees. With respect to plaintiffs third request in its May 30 petition, plaintiff argued that its primary school should be considered a substitution of the day care program. Plaintiff noted that the proposed use of the property would be low impact and would involve less density than the currently approved use. Plaintiff emphasized that its proposed use would be for twenty-five students.

A hearing on plaintiffs petition was held on June 26, 2000. The ZBA rejected plaintiffs appeal. The ZBA held that plaintiffs proposed use of the property for a primary school could not be considered a substitution of a non-conforming use. The ZBA determined that because Rainbow Rascals had received a variance, its use of the premises became a conforming and permitted use in the OP district. Therefore, plaintiffs use would be non-conforming and a substitution was not permitted. The ZBA then determined that a primary school was not a permitted use in an area zoned OP. Finally, the ZBA denied plaintiffs request for a use variance because plaintiff failed to make the requisite showing that without the variance, there could be no viable economic use of the property.

On September 22, 2000, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit. The complaint alleged: violations of RLUIPA; violations of substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection; that the township's zoning ordinance was void for vagueness; that plaintiff was entitled to an order of superintending control; a statutory appeal as of right from the decision of the ZBA; and that defendants' actions and zoning ordinance were unreasonable. Subsequently, both parties filed motions for summary disposition. Plaintiff also filed a motion requesting a preliminary injunction.

On January 16, 2001, the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition, denied plaintiffs motions for summary disposition, and denied plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled that plaintiff had not met any of the jurisdictional elements required to invoke the protections of RLUIPA. The court also determined that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA because plaintiff failed to establish that the application of the zoning regulation substantially burdened plaintiffs right of free exercise of religion as required under RLUIPA. The court affirmed the ZBA's decision and determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to plaintiffs substantive due process, equal protection, procedural due process, and void for vagueness claims. It also denied plaintiffs petition for superintending control and motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiff appeals as of right.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, a trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition will be reviewed de novo. Spiek v. Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim. Spiek, supra at 337, 572 N.W.2d 201. The purpose of summary disposition is to avoid extensive discovery and an evidentiary hearing when a case can be quickly resolved on an issue of law. American Community Mutual Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Ins., 195 Mich.App. 351, 362, 491 N.W.2d 597 (1992).

When deciding a motion for summary disposition, a court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ritchie-Gamester v. City of Berkley, 461 Mich. 73, 76,...