Shepherd v. International Paper Co.

• Citation: 372 F.3d 326
• Decision Date: 28 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-20721.,03-20721.
• Parties: Felicia SHEPHERD, Alex Grisby, Melvin Jackson, Gerald Thomas, Claudine Falkner, Rufino Razo, David Criswell, Larry Oliver, Michael Cloudy, Mark Fletcher, Quincy Ratcliff and Randy Horn, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

372 F.3d 326

Felicia SHEPHERD, Alex Grisby, Melvin Jackson, Gerald Thomas, Claudine Falkner, Rufino Razo, David Criswell, Larry Oliver, Michael Cloudy, Mark Fletcher, Quincy Ratcliff and Randy Horn, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-20721.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 28, 2004.

Stanley Byron Broussard, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Jay Ronald Aldis, Asst. County Atty., Tracy Caldwell Temple, Bracewell & Patterson, Houston, TX, Jonathan Paul Harmon, McGuire Woods, Richmond, VA, Mary Jane Palmer, International Paper, Memphis, TN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, International Paper contends that the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration once plaintiffs appealed the district court's order dismissing their case. We agree with International Paper and vacate the district court's order granting plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.

Facts and Proceedings Below

In October 2002, plaintiffs filed this suit against International Paper for racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiffs served International Paper with the lawsuit in January 2003. International Paper, however, moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds, among others, that plaintiffs had failed to properly serve it. By order entered on Monday, April 28, 2003, the district court granted International Paper's motion, reciting that process had not been properly served, and dismissed the suit without prejudice.

On Wednesday, May 14, 2003, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which in this case we treat as a Rule 60(b) motion.¹ On May 27, 2003, plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal, appealing the April 28, 2003 order dismissing their suit. Even though the appeal was pending, on June 18, 2003, the district court, now convinced that the service of process had been effective, granted plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and vacated its April 28, 2003 judgment. Before granting plaintiffs' motion, the district court did not seek leave of this court to do so. Plaintiffs also did not file with this court a motion for remand to the district court to allow it to grant the motion for reconsideration.

Following the June 18 order granting plaintiffs' motion, plaintiffs filed with this court a notice to abandon their appeal, and this court dismissed the appeal on June 26, 2003. On July 18, 2003, International Paper timely appealed from the order granting plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.

Discussion

International Paper asserts that once plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal, the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs' previously submitted Rule 60(b) motion. Plaintiffs contend, however, that we do not have jurisdiction to entertain International Paper's appeal because the order granting the Rule 60(b) motion is not a final judgment. We agree with International Paper on both issues.

I. Jurisdiction over this appeal

We first address our jurisdiction over this appeal. The district court's order granting reconsideration of its dismissal of plaintiffs' claims is not a final order, but is nevertheless appealable. While "[o]rdinarily an order granting a motion under Rule 60 for relief from a final judgment is purely interlocutory and not appealable[,] ... when the appellant attacks the jurisdiction of the district court to vacate the judgment..., an appeal will lie to review the power of the court to enter such an order." Hand v. United States, 441 F.2d 529, 530 n. 1 (5th Cir.1971) (per curiam) (emphasis added). See also Fuller v. Quire, 916 F.2d 358, 360 (6th Cir.1990) ("This appeal [of the order setting aside the judgment and reinstating the case pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)] is clearly not from a final order of the district court.... There is, however, a reasonably well grounded common-law exception to the final-judgment rule where the district court acts without the power to do so." (emphasis added) (citing, among others, Hand, 441 F.2d at 530 n. 1)). Cf. Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665, 6 S.Ct. 901, 903, 29 L.Ed. 1013 (1886) (if order vacating judgment and granting a new trial "was made without jurisdiction on the part of the court making it, then it is a proceeding which must be the subject of review by an appellate court"); Arenson v. S. Univ. Law Ctr., 963 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Phillips, 6 S.Ct. at 903); National Passenger R.R. Corp. v. Maylie, 910 F.2d 1181, 1183 (3d Cir.1990) (order granting new trial, though generally a nonappealable interlocutory order is appealable if made without jurisdiction).

On appeal, International Paper challenges the district court's jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. This case, therefore, falls within an exception to the final judgment rule, and we do have jurisdiction over the appeal.

II. District Court's Jurisdiction to Grant the Rule 60(b) Motion

A. Standard of Review

"Challenges to a district court's jurisdiction are reviewed de novo." United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir.2003).

B. Notice of Appeal and District Court's Jurisdiction

"[A] perfected appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction." Winchester v. United States Atty. for S.D. of Tex., 68 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir.1995). Once the notice of appeal has been filed, while the district court may consider or deny a Rule 60(b) motion (filed more than ten days after entry of the judgment), it no longer has jurisdiction to grant such a motion while the appeal is pending. Id. at 949. "`When the district court is inclined to grant the 60(b) motion, ... then it is necessary to obtain the leave of the court of appeals. Without obtaining leave, the district court is without jurisdiction, and cannot grant the motion.'" Id. (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters. Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1407 n. 3 (5th Cir.1994)). If the district court "`indicates that it will grant the motion, the appellant should then make a motion in the Court of Appeals for a remand of the case in order that the district court may grant such motion.'" Winchester, 68 F.3d at 949 (quoting Ferrell v. Trailmobile, Inc., 223 F.2d 697, 699 (5th Cir.1955)).

The relevant procedural facts in this case are similar to those in Winchester: the party first filed a Rule 60(b) motion, then a notice of appeal. Winchester, 68 F.3d at 948. In the present case, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' case on April 28, 2003, and on May 14, 2003, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal to this court on May 27, 2003. No leave of this court was either requested or granted, and plaintiffs made no motion in this court for a remand. Thus, the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion following plaintiffs' notice of appeal. See id. at 949.²

C. Plaintiffs' Counter-Arguments

In spite of our well-established procedure for Rule 60(b) motions during the pendency of an appeal, plaintiffs argue that their notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction to grant their motion. We find plaintiffs' arguments unconvincing.

1. Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Plaintiffs claim that they were "forced" to file a notice of appeal in order to preserve their appellate issues while the district court was considering their Rule 60(b) motion. Plaintiffs, however, do not point to any authority suggesting that this "forced" situation creates an exception to the general rule that the district court's jurisdiction is divested upon filing the notice of appeal. Furthermore, we have previously determined that our procedure — an appellant may make a motion to the court of appeals for a remand if the district court indicates an intention to grant the Rule 60(b) motion — "will relieve a party from being forced to elect between two available remedies." Winchester, 68 F.3d at 949.³ This argument, therefore, is without merit.

2. Granting a Rule 60(b) Motion Regardless of a Pending Appeal

Plaintiffs cite cases stating that a district court may entertain, or even grant, a Rule 60(b) motion regardless of a pending appeal. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1547, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) ("[T]he pendency of an appeal does not affect the district court's power to grant Rule 60 relief."); Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1080-81 (5th Cir.1987) ("[A] Rule 60(b) motion may be entertained in the district court at any time within a year of judgment, regardless of the pendency or even the completion of an appeal."); Ames v. Miller, 184 F.Supp.2d 566, 575 (N.D.Tex.2002) ("The fact that the judgment sought to be set aside had been affirmed on appeal does not impair the trial court's ability to grant Rule 60(b) relief."). Plaintiffs also cite Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 97 S.Ct. 31, 50 L.Ed.2d 21 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held "that the District Court may entertain a Rule 60(b) motion without leave by this Court." Id. at 31.

These cases do not support plaintiffs' position. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, Ingraham is not inconsistent with our procedure described in Winchester. Ingraham merely states that the district court may entertain the Rule 60(b) motion, and the ability to entertain or consider the motion at any time and without leave of the appellate court does not compel the conclusion asserted by plaintiffs that the district court may also grant the motion without such leave.⁴ Standard Oil and Ames dealt with a clearly different procedural issue — the ability of the district court to dispose of a Rule 60(b) motion after a completed appeal, rather than during the pendency of an appeal. See Standard Oil, 97 S.Ct....