Shepherd v. State, s. 01-8200935-C
Decision Date | 03 May 1984 |
Docket Number | 01-8200936-CR,Nos. 01-8200935-C,s. 01-8200935-C |
Citation | 673 S.W.2d 263 |
Parties | Marvin Ray SHEPHERD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. (1st Dist.) |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Randy Schaffer, Houston, for appellant.
Ray Elvin Speece, Houston, for appellee.
Before EVANS, C.J., and BASS and DUGGAN, JJ.
This appeal arises from appellant's convictions on two counts of aggravated robbery following his pleas of guilty in one case and nolo contendere in the other. After a presentence investigation and punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to 15 years confinement in each case.
In a single ground of error, appellant argues that both convictions must be reversed because his pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily, in that neither the trial court nor his attorney advised him that he was ineligible for probation from the court for the offense of aggravated robbery under Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 42.12, sec. 3f(a)(1)(E) or art. 42.12, sec. 3c (Vernon 1979). In arguing his ground of error, appellant asserts (1) that both defense counsel and the trial court had a duty to advise him of his statutory ineligibility for probation, and (2) that both defense counsel and the trial court "affirmatively misled" him into believing he was eligible for probation.
Appellant was tried simultaneously on both offenses. With his attorney's written approval, he executed separate waivers of jury trial, written stipulations of evidence, and applications for adult probation in each case.
After presenting the indictment in each case, hearing the appellant's respective pleas of guilty and no contest to the two indictments, and establishing that the appellant understood the meaning and consequence of a no contest plea, the court continued its colloquy with appellant as follows:
Is that your understanding of the agreement sir?
The court found appellant guilty in both cases, and made affirmative findings that a deadly weapon was used during the commission of each offense. Proceedings were then recessed for the conduct of the presentence investigation.
When the trial was reconvened some two months later, testimony of some six witnesses was heard on appellant's behalf, directed toward encouraging the court to grant him probation. Further, counsel for appellant urged in his final argument that the court grant probation. At one point he stated:
However, the people, through their Legislature, have said that, in this case, probation is a possibility. It would be a simple matter for society to bar probation in certain cases if the seriousness of the offense was to be the only factor.
As is shown in the quoted colloquy at the guilt/innocence hearing, the trial court correctly stated the punishment range for the offense of aggravated robbery. The court did not tell appellant that he was eligible for adult probation, as did the court in Ramirez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.) ("you should be advised that your application [for probation] may or may not be granted."); however, neither did the court advise appellant that probation was not available from the court for the offense of aggravated robbery, although appellant had filed application for probation in both his cases.
Appellant correctly states that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere will not support a conviction when that plea is motivated by significant misinformation conveyed by the court or one of its officers. McGuire v. State, 617 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Ex parte Burns, 601 S.W.2d 370 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Ramirez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.). Appellant asserts that the application of this rule to his case shows that the action of both his attorney and the trial court misled him into believing he was eligible for probation and rendered his guilty plea involuntary.
The record before us is limited to the statement of facts made at the guilt/innocence and punishment hearings. There is no testimony to indicate what advice was given appellant by his attorney, and no claim that counsel misstated the range of punishment to appellant in attorney-client consultations, or misadvised or misled the appellant to expect probation. Neither is there any evidence explaining defense counsel's reasons or strategy for conducting the punishment hearing as he did.
Examining first the actions of appellant's attorney, we note that events occurring at the punishment hearing have only an inferential bearing on the voluntariness of appellant's earlier plea. Appellant entered his two pleas approximately sixty days before the punishment hearing, such that nothing that occurred during the later punishment hearing could have affected the voluntariness of appellant's earlier acts. The events of the punishment hearing are therefore significant only to the extent that they demonstrate appellant's motivation for entering his earlier pleas. As such, appellant's argument on appeal that he was misled to expect probation, and that his pleas were thus involuntary, is based on a series of inferences.
Although appellant makes no assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground of error, he argues that we should find that his trial attorney was incompetent because he introduced evidence pertinent to probation after the court entered a finding of guilt on a non-probatable offense and argued that "probation is a possibility." Appellant argues that we should infer from this that his trial attorney misinformed him earlier regarding his ineligibility for probation. From the inference that he was misinformed, appellant argues we must conclude that his plea was motivated by misinformation and was...
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