Shepherd v. State, s. 01-8200935-C

Decision Date03 May 1984
Docket Number01-8200936-CR,Nos. 01-8200935-C,s. 01-8200935-C
Citation673 S.W.2d 263
PartiesMarvin Ray SHEPHERD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. (1st Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Randy Schaffer, Houston, for appellant.

Ray Elvin Speece, Houston, for appellee.

Before EVANS, C.J., and BASS and DUGGAN, JJ.

OPINION

DUGGAN, Justice.

This appeal arises from appellant's convictions on two counts of aggravated robbery following his pleas of guilty in one case and nolo contendere in the other. After a presentence investigation and punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to 15 years confinement in each case.

In a single ground of error, appellant argues that both convictions must be reversed because his pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily, in that neither the trial court nor his attorney advised him that he was ineligible for probation from the court for the offense of aggravated robbery under Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 42.12, sec. 3f(a)(1)(E) or art. 42.12, sec. 3c (Vernon 1979). In arguing his ground of error, appellant asserts (1) that both defense counsel and the trial court had a duty to advise him of his statutory ineligibility for probation, and (2) that both defense counsel and the trial court "affirmatively misled" him into believing he was eligible for probation.

Appellant was tried simultaneously on both offenses. With his attorney's written approval, he executed separate waivers of jury trial, written stipulations of evidence, and applications for adult probation in each case.

After presenting the indictment in each case, hearing the appellant's respective pleas of guilty and no contest to the two indictments, and establishing that the appellant understood the meaning and consequence of a no contest plea, the court continued its colloquy with appellant as follows:

THE COURT: As to your plea of guilty and plea of no contest, you understand that in each of those cases you are entitled to a trial by jury?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Are you willing to give up your rights to your trial by jury in each of the cases and enter your plea of guilty and your plea of no contest?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything in order to get you to do that?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Has anybody threatened you in any way?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Are you entering your plea of guilty and your plea of no contest freely and voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: The range of punishment for each of those offenses that you are charged with is by confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for any term of years not less than five years nor more than 99 years or a sentence of life, and the Court could also assess a fine of up to $10,000.00. That is true in each case. Do you understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: It is my understanding that your attorney and the State's attorney have talked, there has been no agreement, that they will recommend a pre-sentence investigation be conducted, and that at the conclusion of that pre-sentence investigation the State has reserved its right to argue that you be sent to the penitentiary.

Is that your understanding of the agreement sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Cahoon [Defendant's Attorney], is that your understanding and are you satisfied?

MR. CAHOON: Yes, that is our understanding.

THE COURT: Have you counseled with Mr. Shepherd in both cases and explained to him the consequences of his pleas and the possible punishments involved?

MR. CAHOON: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Shepherd, do you know what a pre-sentence investigation is?

MR. CAHOON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand that you will have a right to furnish to the probation officer names and address, phone numbers and all information of people that can speak well of you and all information that can speak well of you? Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the State will have a right to produce the offense report in both cases, any prior criminal history that you have or anybody that speaks badly of you, so that before I assess punishment I will have all that in writing before me, both the good and the bad? Do you understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Knowing all this, do you still wish to proceed in this manner?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Even though you plead guilty, even though you plead no contest, under our law the State must offer some evidence against you to show that you are guilty in each case. They are going to show you an instrument that you signed and swore to with the advice of your attorney. Each instrument will contain a stipulation of evidence in this case, a judicial confession in that case and waiver of your constitutional rights, your right to a jury trial in that case. You signed and swore to each of these with the advice of your attorney. I want you to look at them and then answer as to whether or not it is agreeable with you if the State offers those into evidence against you at this time.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

THE PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, at this time the State has tendered to Mr. Shepherd those same stipulations of evidence and waiver of constitutional rights in each case which have been marked for identification as State's Exhibit One. And in each such stipulation and waiver of constitutional rights the defendant has signed and sworn to in open court on the advice and assistance of his attorney, who has signed this form. Upon tendering those to counsel, the State will offer State's Exhibit 1 in each case.

MR. CAHOON: No objection.

THE COURT: They will be admitted.

THE PROSECUTOR: The State rests in each cause.

THE COURT: Mr. Shepherd, have you ever been before convicted in this state or any other state or the courts of the United States of a felony?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Have you ever been granted adult probation before in this state or any other state?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

The court found appellant guilty in both cases, and made affirmative findings that a deadly weapon was used during the commission of each offense. Proceedings were then recessed for the conduct of the presentence investigation.

When the trial was reconvened some two months later, testimony of some six witnesses was heard on appellant's behalf, directed toward encouraging the court to grant him probation. Further, counsel for appellant urged in his final argument that the court grant probation. At one point he stated:

However, the people, through their Legislature, have said that, in this case, probation is a possibility. It would be a simple matter for society to bar probation in certain cases if the seriousness of the offense was to be the only factor.

As is shown in the quoted colloquy at the guilt/innocence hearing, the trial court correctly stated the punishment range for the offense of aggravated robbery. The court did not tell appellant that he was eligible for adult probation, as did the court in Ramirez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.) ("you should be advised that your application [for probation] may or may not be granted."); however, neither did the court advise appellant that probation was not available from the court for the offense of aggravated robbery, although appellant had filed application for probation in both his cases.

Appellant correctly states that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere will not support a conviction when that plea is motivated by significant misinformation conveyed by the court or one of its officers. McGuire v. State, 617 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Ex parte Burns, 601 S.W.2d 370 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Ramirez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.). Appellant asserts that the application of this rule to his case shows that the action of both his attorney and the trial court misled him into believing he was eligible for probation and rendered his guilty plea involuntary.

The record before us is limited to the statement of facts made at the guilt/innocence and punishment hearings. There is no testimony to indicate what advice was given appellant by his attorney, and no claim that counsel misstated the range of punishment to appellant in attorney-client consultations, or misadvised or misled the appellant to expect probation. Neither is there any evidence explaining defense counsel's reasons or strategy for conducting the punishment hearing as he did.

Examining first the actions of appellant's attorney, we note that events occurring at the punishment hearing have only an inferential bearing on the voluntariness of appellant's earlier plea. Appellant entered his two pleas approximately sixty days before the punishment hearing, such that nothing that occurred during the later punishment hearing could have affected the voluntariness of appellant's earlier acts. The events of the punishment hearing are therefore significant only to the extent that they demonstrate appellant's motivation for entering his earlier pleas. As such, appellant's argument on appeal that he was misled to expect probation, and that his pleas were thus involuntary, is based on a series of inferences.

Although appellant makes no assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground of error, he argues that we should find that his trial attorney was incompetent because he introduced evidence pertinent to probation after the court entered a finding of guilt on a non-probatable offense and argued that "probation is a possibility." Appellant argues that we should infer from this that his trial attorney misinformed him earlier regarding his ineligibility for probation. From the inference that he was misinformed, appellant argues we must conclude that his plea was motivated by misinformation and was...

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    ...when that plea is motivated by significant misinformation conveyed by the court or one of its officers. Shepherd v. State, 673 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st] 1984), and cases there Further, a guilty plea is void if induced by promises or threats which deprived it of the character of a ......
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