Shepherd v. State ex rel. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 23 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | DA 20-0376 |
| Citation | 483 P.3d 518,2021 MT 70,403 Mont. 425 |
| Parties | Kila SHEPHERD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of Montana, EX REL. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: John C. Doubek, Doubek, Pyfer & Storrar, PC, Helena, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Sarah Mazanec, Drake Law Firm, PC, Helena, Montana
¶1 Kila Shepherd appeals from the summary judgment order entered by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissing her complaint with prejudice as time-barred. We reverse, addressing the following dispositive issue:
Did the District Court err by dismissing Shepherd's claim under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act as time-barred?
¶2 These facts were placed before the District Court as undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. Shepherd was employed as Human Resources Director for the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC). On July 23, 2018, DOC informed Shepherd that she was "being considered for termination." Due to potential conflicts of interest, DOC delegated the administrative handling of the matter to the Department of Administration (DOA), which hired an outside investigator. On August 10, 2018, following a pre-termination due process meeting, the State notified Shepherd she was being discharged from her position with the DOC, "effective today." In the termination letter, the State advised Shepherd she could challenge her discharge by filing "a grievance in accordance with Administrative Rules of the State of Montana, 2.21.8010."
¶3 Shepherd filed a grievance the same day as her termination, which was considered to be a request for a "Step III" grievance hearing. Shepherd asserted that her termination of employment was wrongful because of violations of "state and department statutes and policies."
¶4 The matter was assigned to a hearing officer with the Office of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Labor and Industry, who conducted a hearing on January 7, 2019. Over a year later, on February 3, 2020, the hearing officer issued a Hearing Summary and Recommended Decision that concluded Shepherd's termination was justified and recommended her grievance be denied. On February 14, 2020, a Final Administrative Decision was issued In the Matter of the Step III Grievance of Kila K. Shepherd vs. Department of Corrections , signed by the Director of DOA, which adopted the hearing officer's recommendation. The Decision concluded by stating that Shepherd could "appeal this decision to the Montana District Court under the provisions of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act [MAPA]."
¶5 On March 11, 2020, twenty-six days after the Final Administrative Decision was issued, Shepherd initiated this action by filing a complaint in District Court against the State of Montana, DOC.
¶6 DOC moved for summary judgment, arguing Shepherd's claim under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA) was time-barred under § 39-2-911, MCA. The District Court granted DOC's summary judgment motion and dismissed Shepherd's complaint with prejudice.
¶7 The District Court interpreted § 39-2-911, MCA, as tolling the one-year statute of limitations for no more than 120 days while administrative remedies are exhausted. The District Court held that if the administrative remedies are not concluded within 90 days, they are "considered exhausted." Since Shepherd's grievance procedures took longer than one year and one hundred twenty days from the date of her termination, the District Court concluded her WDEA claim was untimely.
¶8 Shepherd appeals.1
¶9 This Court reviews orders granting summary judgment de novo. Kulm v. Montana State University-Bozeman , 285 Mont. 328, 331, 948 P.2d 243, 245 (1997). Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery, disclosure materials, and affidavits show there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). "We review the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred." Kulm , 285 Mont. at 331, 948 P.2d at 245 (citing Bruner v. Yellowstone Cty. , 272 Mont. 261, 264-65, 900 P.2d 901, 903 (1995) ).
¶10 Did the District Court err by dismissing Shepherd's claim under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act as time-barred?
¶11 Section 39-2-911, MCA, provides in relevant part:
¶12 The statute of limitations on a WDEA claim commences on the employee's date of discharge. Section 39-2-911(1), MCA. The parties dispute what constitutes the "date of discharge" in this case, but because the outcome is not affected by the date of discharge, for purposes of this Opinion we consider Shepherd's date of discharge to be August 10, 2018, the date she was presented with the termination letter.
¶13 Since Shepherd's claim was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations, the issue is whether, and for how long, the limitation period was tolled. Section 39-2-911(2), MCA, requires an employee to exhaust an employer's "written internal procedures" prior to filing an action.2 The statute also expressly provides that "[t]he limitation period ... is tolled until the procedures are exhausted." Section 39-2-911(2), MCA. Shepherd commenced her grievance procedure on the same day that she was discharged; therefore, the tolling of the limitation period began on the same day that the limitation period would have otherwise commenced.
¶14 Since the statute expressly tolls the limitation period "until the procedures are exhausted," the issue then becomes when the procedures were exhausted, thus restarting the statute of limitations. The District Court held that the procedures were "considered exhausted after ninety days." The District Court based this conclusion on the provision of § 39-2-911(2), MCA, which provides "[i]f the employer's internal procedures are not completed within 90 days from the date the employee initiates the internal procedures, the employee may file an action under this part and for purposes of this subsection the employer's internal procedures are considered exhausted."
¶15 In construing statutes, the Court's role "is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted." Section 1-2-101, MCA. We look "to the plain meaning" of the statute's language. Eldorado Coop Canal Co. v. Hoge , 2016 MT 145, ¶ 18, 383 Mont. 523, 373 P.3d 836. Nowhere in § 39-2-911(2), MCA, does it state that the procedures are "considered exhausted after ninety days." The statute states that an "employee may file an action" if the procedures are not completed within 90 days. Section 39-2-911(2), MCA (emphasis added). The plain meaning of the statute evinces that only if, and when, the employee exercises that option are the grievance procedures considered exhausted. Shepherd elected not to exercise that option, opting instead to fully avail herself of the administrative due process to which she was entitled, as was her right under the statute. Therefore, by the express terms of § 39-2-911(2), MCA, the limitation period was tolled from the date Shepherd initiated the grievance procedures until the Final Administrative Decision was issued on February 14, 2020. Since Shepherd initiated the grievance procedures on the date of her discharge, the limitation period on her WDEA claim effectively commenced on February 14, 2020.
¶16 Although § 39-2-911(2), MCA, expressly provides that the "limitation period ... is tolled until the procedures are exhausted," and there is no question that the procedures were not exhausted until the Final Administrative Decision was issued on February 14, 2020, DOC argues that the limitation period may only be tolled for up to 120 days, regardless of whether or not the procedures are exhausted. DOC bases its argument on the final sentence of § 39-2-911(2), MCA, which provides that "[i]n no case may the provisions of the employer's internal procedures extend the limitation period ... more than 120 days." We disagree.
¶17 When the Legislature does not use identical language in different provisions of a statute, it is proper for us to assume that a different statutory meaning was intended. Zinvest, LLC v. Gunnersfield Enters. , 2017 MT 284, ¶ 26, 389 Mont. 334, 405 P.3d 1270 ...
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