Sheppard v. Tex. Roadhouse, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 September 2022
• Docket Number: 4:21-cv-01183-KGB
• Parties: JENNIFER SHEPPARD PLAINTIFF v. TEXAS ROADHOUSE, INC., JONATHAN WALSH, and JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

JENNIFER SHEPPARD PLAINTIFF
v.
TEXAS ROADHOUSE, INC., JONATHAN WALSH, and JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS

No. 4:21-cv-01183-KGB

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Central Division

September 6, 2022

ORDER

Kristine G. Baker United States District Judge

Before the Court is plaintiff Jennifer Sheppard's motion to remand (Dkt. No. 11). Defendants Texas Roadhouse, Inc. (“Texas Roadhouse”) and Jonathan Walsh filed a response and a supplement to their response (Dkt. Nos. 14-15). Also before the Court is Ms. Sheppard's unopposed motion for extension of time to add parties/amendment of pleadings (Dkt. No. 21). In addition, before the Court is defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time for discovery cut off (Dkt. No. 26).

For the following reasons, the Court denies Ms. Sheppard's motion to remand, grants Ms. Sheppard's motion for extension of time to add parties/amendment of pleadings, and defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time for discovery cut off (Dkt. Nos. 11, 21, 26).

I. Factual And Procedural Background

This is a negligence action. On November 3, 2021, Ms. Sheppard filed a complaint against Texas Roadhouse, Mr. Walsh, and John Doe in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas (Dkt. No. 2). Ms. Sheppard alleges that she sustained personal injuries after contacting a diabetic lancet device in a booth at a Texas Roadhouse restaurant in North Little Rock, Arkansas (“the

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Restaurant”) on July 6, 2021^[1] (Id., ¶ 9-18). Ms. Sheppard alleges that she is a resident of North Little Rock, Arkansas; that Texas Roadhouse is a corporation headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky; and that Mr. Walsh is the managing partner of the Restaurant and resident of North Little Rock, Arkansas (Id., ¶¶ 3-5). She seeks damages “in an amount greater than the amount of damages required for Federal Court Jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases,” in addition to punitive damages (Id., ¶ 37).

On December 7, 2021, Texas Roadhouse and Mr. Walsh removed the case to this Court (Dkt. No. 1). In their notice of removal, Texas Roadhouse and Mr. Walsh assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Walsh was improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4, 5, 7-8).^[2] They maintain that Mr. Walsh was neither the managing partner of the Restaurant nor an employee of Texas Roadhouse at the time of the alleged incident and, as a result, “there is no reasonable basis in fact or law” to support Ms. Sheppard's claims against Mr. Walsh (Id., ¶ 5).

Ms. Sheppard now moves for remand to state court (Dkt. No. 11). Texas Roadhouse and Mr. Walsh responded in opposition (Dkt. Nos. 14-15). Ms. Sheppard also moves for an extension of time to add parties or amend pleadings following the Court's decision on the motion to remand

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(Dkt. No. 21). Defendants move to extend the discovery deadline (Dkt. No. 26). The Court addresses each pending motion in turn.

II. Motion To Remand

A. Legal Standard

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a state law claim to federal court only if the action originally could have been filed there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 619 (8th Cir. 2010). The removing defendant bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper. See Altimore v. Mount Mercy College, 420 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2005). Because removal raises federalism concerns, any doubt as to the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand to state court. See Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 478 F.3d 965, 968 (8th Cir. 2007); Wilkinson v. Shackleford, 478 F.3d 957, 963(8th Cir. 2007).

For a party to remove a case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 and there must be complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Complete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.” OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir.2007) (internal citation omitted). Additionally, a case cannot be removed based on diversity jurisdiction if any properly joined defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).

If a plaintiff has improperly joined a non-diverse or in-state defendant, however, the citizenship of that defendant is disregarded for purposes of determining diversity. See Simpson v. Thomure,

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484 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Knudson v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 976 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A] plaintiff cannot defeat a defendant's ‘right of removal' by fraudulently joining a defendant who has ‘no real connection with the controversy.'” (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914))). “The burden of persuasion on those who claim fraudulent joinder is a heavy one.” Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing B. Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981)).

“Joinder is fraudulent and removal is proper when there exists no reasonable basis in fact and law supporting a claim against the resident defendants.” Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1983)); see generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446. “However, if there is a ‘colorable' cause of action-that is, if the state law might impose liability on the resident defendant under the facts alleged-then there is no fraudulent joinder.” Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Foslip Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 891, 903 (N.D. Iowa 2000)). In predicting whether the state law might impose liability, the court “should resolve all facts and ambiguities in the current controlling substantive law in the plaintiff's favor.” Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 3 F.4th 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Filla, 336 F.3d at 811).

It is well-settled law that the motive for joining a resident defendant is immaterial. See Williams v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 120 F.Supp.2d 776, 779 (E.D. Ark. 1998); Barnes v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 596 F.Supp. 1046, 1049 (W.D. Ark. 1984); see also Chi., R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 193 (1913) (explaining that “the motive of the plaintiff, taken by itself, does not affect the right to remove,” and that, “[i]f there is a joint liability, he has an absolute right to enforce it, whatever the reason that makes him wish to assert the right” (citing Chi. B. & Q. Ry.Co. v. Willard,

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220 U.S. 413, 427 (1911), and Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Sheegog, 215 U.S. 308,...