Sheppey v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 24 March 1910
• Citation: 177 F. 484
• Parties: SHEPPEY v. STEVENS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

177 F. 484

SHEPPEY v. STEVENS.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. New York.

March 24, 1910

H. & W A. Hendrickson (G. M. Palmer, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Fowler & Schenck (Henry J. Cookinham, of counsel), for defendant.

RAY District Judge.

The substance of the complaint is as follows:

(1) In September, 1898, Ezra G. Benedict, a relative of the plaintiff and also of the defendant, formed an alliance with a number of women of questionable character, and had expended and was expending large sums of money on them, and was contemplating marriage with one of them.

(2) In September or October of that year the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement whereby the defendant here agreed to look after the spiritual welfare of the said Benedict, and the plaintiff here agreed to use his best endeavors in breaking up the said alliance between said Benedict and said women, and in influencing and attempting to influence said Benedict to cease and discontinue his relations with said women, and, in consideration thereof, the plaintiff and defendant further agreed that, if either of them should receive less than the other under the will of said Benedict the party receiving the most thereunder would divide the excess so received by him equally with the other.

(3) In compliance with such contract, the plaintiff did what he agreed to do, and fully performed on his part.

(4) November 20, 1902, Benedict died and left a last will and testament wherein and whereby defendant was made sole executor thereof and was given a large legacy determined on the settlement of the estate to be $1,538,244.91, and such sum or legacy was paid over to the defendant, said will having been duly proved and the estate administered.

(5) By said will the plaintiff herein was not remembered as devisee legatee, or otherwise, and was not entitled to receive, and did not receive, anything thereunder.

(6) Thereafter plaintiff demanded of the defendant the one-half of such sum so received by him as a legacy under the said last will and testament of said Benedict, but the defendant has neglected and refused to pay same, except the sum of $300 paid on account thereof about March, 1903, and there is now due and owing plaintiff from defendant by reason of such facts the sum of $768,822.45.

The fact will be noted that it is not alleged that either the plaintiff or the defendant were of the heirs at law or next of kin to said Benedict and entitled to share in his estate in case of intestacy. There is no allegation that Benedict was imbecile or unable to care for himself or his property.

The defendant insists that these allegations fail to state a cause of action.

(1) That the alleged agreement was void as contrary to public policy, as one to interfere with and prevent a proposed marriage.

(2) That it was an agreement to dispose of or transfer the property of another in which the contracting parties, so far as appears, had no right or interest present or prospective contrary to the will of the testator, and hence void.

(3) That there was no moral or legal, good, or valuable consideration for the agreement.

(4) That the alleged contract was a wagering contract and void.

(5) That the alleged contract was void for indefiniteness and for want of mutuality, and is unconscionable.

As between themselves, Sheppey and Stevens agreed that they would interfere in the private life and conduct of Benedict, their relative. It may be assumed that they had an interest in the good name of Benedict, as his disgrace would to some extent affect all his relatives. It cannot be assumed they or either of them had any actual pecuniary interest, present or prospective, in his conduct or expenditures, or use of his money, as there is no allegation to that effect. The one was to look after his spiritual welfare while the other was to use his best efforts to break up existing alliances between Benedict and 'women of questionable character,' one of whom he contemplated marrying. He had expended money on such women, and was then expending money on them. But it was his own money and he had the right to expend it as he pleased, so far as the plaintiff and defendant and the public were concerned, provided he violated no law.

Was Benedict's conduct and the control of it by his relatives the subject-matter of a valid contract or agreement by and between such relatives? If the conduct and associations of A. are such that they tend to bring disgrace on B., a relative of A., and B. agrees with C. that C. shall do all he can and use his best efforts to break up such associations and cause such conduct to cease, and that he will, in consideration of such efforts and expenditure of time and thought, pay C. the sum of $5,000, and there is a time limit for performance, and C. fully performs on his part, can there be any doubt that C. may recover the consideration agreed to be paid? I think not. It is not necessary that the promisor in such a case receive an actual benefit by way of the success of the efforts of C. It is all-sufficient that he has had the benefit of the efforts of C. in a matter which interested him, B. True, B. had no legal or moral duty to interfere with the movements or associations of A. as between himself and A., or as between A. and the public, but it is all-sufficient that he had an interest in the conduct and associations of A., and that his interference in the way mentioned was not immoral, or illegal, or in any way forbidden by law or a sound public policy. But it is said that another element enters into this contract, viz., an agreement on the part of Sheppey, the plaintiff, to use his best efforts to prevent the marriage of Benedict to a woman 'of questionable character,' and that the law favors marriage and makes no distinction between marriage to or with a woman of good character and marriage to or with one of 'questionable character'; that, in either case, a contract for services to be performed in preventing a marriage and for which a compensation is agreed to be paid is illegal as opposed to a sound, public policy, and therefore not enforceable; that this would be true in case such efforts were expended pursuant to the contract and met with full success. A contract to pay money for procuring a marriage is void, and the payment cannot be enforced. Marshall v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 16 How. 314, 333, 14 L.Ed. 953.

Conditions 'in general restraint of marriage' are void 'as contrary to public policy and the common weal and good order of society,' said Andrews, Ch. J., in Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N.Y. 162, 170, 171, 42 Am.Rep. 244. In Conrad v. Williams, 6 Hill (N.Y.) 444, 451, the defendant promised the plaintiff he would 'marry her if he ever married,' and the court held the contract void as in restraint of marriage, and that an action for its breach could not be maintained.

The proposition is that relatives should not be at liberty to contract to prevent the marriage of one whose marriage to a particular person may be distasteful, or, in their opinion, may disgrace the family or relatives, or deprive those making the agreement of a possible share in the property of the prospective bride or bridegroom, as the case may be. The law ought not, it is urged, to encourage, or recognize, or enforce such contracts. In Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr, 2225, a man agreed to pay a woman a certain sum of money if he married any one but her, and the agreement was held void. Here the plaintiff contracted with the defendant that he, the plaintiff, would use his best endeavors or efforts to break up the alliance between Benedict and the women mentioned, with one of whom he contemplated marriage, and use his best endeavors to induce Benedict to cease and discontinue his relations with said women. This, of course, included the one he contemplated marrying, and the result of such endeavors, if successful, would have been to prevent a marriage of Benedict with said woman.

Other cases to the effect stated are Bostick v. Blades, 59 Md. 231, 43 Am.Rep. 548; Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. 291; Sterling v. Sinnickson, 5 N.J.Law, 756; Chalifant v. Payton, 91 Ind. 202, 46 Am.Rep. 586; Maddox v. Maddox, 11 Grat. (Va.) 804. Here, however, the contract itself was not in restraint of marriage, not to marry, or to marry on conditions only, but, in effect, that Sheppey would use his best endeavors to prevent the contemplated marriage of a third person, Benedict. In short, Sheppey, for a consideration to be paid by Stevens, which was to come out of the estate left by Benedict if paid at all, agreed to use his best endeavors to prevent Benedict from marrying the woman he had in view. It was an agreement by him to prevent, if he could, a contemplated marriage. Its execution was intended to be, and was necessarily, in restraint of marriage. Can the law sanction such contracts by outside parties; that is, by persons other than the ones contemplating, or who might contemplate marriage? If it recognizes and enforces such contracts, then they are encouraged, and the law has lent its sanction to contracts for all sorts of 'endeavors' short of illegal acts by outside parties and by relatives and friends to break up and prevent contemplated marriages. Jealousy, hatred, malice, and interest will induce the hiring of the dissolute, or the irresponsible, or the evil-disposed, to use their 'best endeavors' to break up contemplated marriages, and such 'endeavors' might consist of slander and many other illegitimate practices injurious and detrimental to the well-being of the community and of the public generally. In 9 Cyc. 518, the rule is stated in this language:

'Restrictions on marriage are contrary to public policy, and therefore agreements or conditions creating or involving such restrictions are illegal and

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