Sherbert v. Verner, 526

• Decision Date: 17 June 1963
• Docket Number: No. 526,526
• Citation: 10 L.Ed.2d 965,374 U.S. 398,83 S.Ct. 1790
• Parties: Adell H. SHERBERT, Appellant, v. Charlie V. VERNER et al., as members of South Carolina Employment Security Commission, and Spartan Mills
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

374 U.S. 398

83 S.Ct. 1790

10 L.Ed.2d 965

Adell H. SHERBERT, Appellant,

v Charlie V. VERNER et al., as members of South Carolina Employment Security Commission, and Spartan Mills.

No. 526.

Argued April 24, 1963.

Decided June 17, 1963.

William D. Donnelly, Bethesda, Md., for appellant.

Daniel R. McLeod, Columbia, S.C., for appellees.

Mr. Justice BRENNANdelivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.¹ When she was unable to obtain other employment because from conscientious scruples she would not take Saturday work,²she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act.³ That law provides that, to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be 'able to work and * * * is available for work'; and, fur- ther, that a claimant is ineligible for benefits '(i)f * * * he has failed, without good cause * * * to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer * * *.'The appelleeEmployment Security Commission, in administrative proceedings under the statute, found that appellant's restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail, without good cause, to accept 'suitable work when offered * * * by the employment office or the employer * * *.'The Commission's finding was sustained by the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County.That court's judgment was in turn affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected appellant's contention that, as applied to her, the disqualifying provisions of the South Carolina statute abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion secured under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment.The State Supreme Court held specifically that appellant's ineligibility infringed no constitutional liberties because such a construction of the statute'places no restriction upon the appellant's freedom of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience.'240 U.S. 286, 303—304, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746.⁴We noted probable jurisdiction of appellant's appeal.371 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 321, 9 L.Ed.2d 273.We reverse the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I.

The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213.Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292;Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 64 S.Ct. 717, 88 L.Ed. 938;cf.Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660.On the other hand the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for 'even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, (it) is not totally free from legislative restrictions.'Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1146, 6 L.Ed.2d 563.The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244;Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643;Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645;Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 67 S.Ct. 13, 91 L.Ed. 12.

Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation.If, therefore. the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate * * *.'NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 341, 9 L.Ed.2d 405.

II.

We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion.We think it is clear that it does.In a sense the consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the State's general competence to enact; it is true that no criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to work a six-day week.But this is only the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry.⁵For '(i)f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.'Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, 366 U.S., at 607, 81 S.Ct., at 1148.Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable.The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.

Nor may the South Carolina court's construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant's 'right' but merely a 'privilege.'It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.⁶American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390, 70 S.Ct. 674, 679, 94 L.Ed. 925;Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191—192, 73 S.Ct. 215, 218—219, 97 L.Ed. 216;Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155—156, 66 S.Ct. 456, 461, 90 L.Ed. 586.For example, in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, the Court recognized with respect to Federal Social Security benefits that '(t)he interest of a covered employee under the Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded by the Due Process Clause.'In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, we emphasized that conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.We there struck down a condition which limited the availability of a tax exemption to those members of the exempted class who affirmed their loyalty to the state government granting the exemption.While the State was surely under no obligation to afford such an exemption, we held that the imposition of such a condition upon even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deterred or discouraged the exercise of First Amendment rights of expression and thereby threatened to 'produce a result which the State could not command directly.'357 U.S at 526, 78 S.Ct., at 1342.'To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.'Id., 357 U.S., at 518, 78 S.Ct., at 1338.Likewise, to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.

Significantly South Carolina expressly saves the Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind of choice which we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian's religious liberty.When in times of 'national emergency' the textile plants are authorized by the State Commissioner of Labor to operate on Sunday, 'no employee shall be required to work on Sunday * * * who is conscientiously opposed to Sunday work; and if any employee should refuse to work on Sunday on account of conscientious * * * objections he or she shall not jeopardize his or her seniority by such refusal or be discriminated against in any other manner.'S.C.Code, § 64—4.No question of the disqualification of a Sunday worshipper for benefits is likely to arise, since we cannot suppose that an employer will discharge him in violation of this statute.The unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus compounded by the religious discrimination which South Carolina's general statutory scheme necessarily effects.

III.

We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right.It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '(o)nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible...