Sheridan v. Sedlak
Decision Date | 18 March 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 78631,No. 76132,76132 |
Citation | 459 P.3d 238 (Table) |
Parties | Rene SHERIDAN, an Individual; and GoRock, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Appellants, v. Rudolf SEDLAK, an Individual, Respondent. Rene Sheridan, an Individual, Appellant, v. Gina G. Goff, an Individual; Goff Productions, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; Senior Moment Movie, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; Rudolf Sedlak, an Individual; Maier Gutierrez & Associates; and Albright, Stoddard, Warnick & Albright, Respondents. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
McDonald Carano LLP/Las Vegas
Maier Gutierrez & Associates
Albright Stoddard Warnick & Albright
These are consolidated pro se appeals from district court orders dismissing a party due to a lack of personal jurisdiction certified as final under NRCP 54(b) and dismissing the complaint with prejudice in a tort action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mark R. Denton, Judge.1
Appellant Rene Sheridan2 filed a complaint against respondents alleging various causes of action stemming from the parties’ agreement to produce a movie. After ordering limited jurisdictional discovery, the district court dismissed respondent Rudolf Sedlak for lack of personal jurisdiction. Sheridan appealed (Docket No. 76132) and the case was assigned to the NRAP 16 settlement program, at which time the parties reached a global settlement. After the settlement conference, the parties continued to disagree about certain terms of the settlement and respondents ultimately filed a motion to enforce. The district court granted the motion and ordered Sheridan to sign the settlement agreement. When Sheridan refused, the district court entered judgment reflecting the terms of the settlement agreement and dismissed Sheridan’s remaining claims. Sheridan also appealed that decision (Docket No. 78631), and we consolidated the cases for resolution.
Sheridan first argues that the district court erred by dismissing Sedlak because it failed to make several evidentiary inferences in her favor. Reviewing de novo, Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 131 Nev. 30, 35, 342 P.3d 997, 1001 (2015), we disagree. Because the district court conducted a full evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction, Sheridan had the burden to prove personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, and her evidence was not entitled to the presumptions of credibility that would otherwise apply. See Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 693-94, 857 P.2d 740, 744-46 (1993) ( ).
Furthermore, the district court correctly found that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Sedlak.3 The operative complaint included no allegations that would subject Sedlak, a California resident, to specific personal jurisdiction in Nevada. See id. at 699-700, 857 P.2d at 748 ( ). And our review of the record shows that Sheridan did not present any evidence supporting her argument that the district court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Sedlak, despite the district court giving her ample opportunity to do so.4 See id.; see also Catholic Diocese v. John Doe 119, 131 Nev. 246, 249, 349 P.3d 518, 520 (2015) ( ). We also reject Sheridan’s argument that personal jurisdiction existed because Sedlak’s agent had the requisite contacts with Nevada—all of the purported agent’s actions occurred outside of Nevada and were directed toward non-Nevada residents. See Trump, 109 Nev. at 694, 857 P.2d at 745 ( ).5 Finally, no adverse inference was warranted based on Sedlak’s admission that he deleted emails because Sheridan failed to prove that Sedlak had any obligation to preserve evidence when he deleted the emails. See Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 450, 134 P.3d 103, 108 (2006) ().
Sheridan next challenges the dismissal of her remaining claims, first arguing that the district court improperly relied on its previous grant of respondents’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement as the basis for dismissal. As to any challenge to the order granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, we disagree that the district court committed clear error in granting that motion because the record shows that the parties reached a settlement by agreeing to material terms at a settlement conference and that Sheridan failed to sign the settlement agreement when ordered, and Sheridan has not demonstrated that any of the additional terms on which the parties disagreed constituted material terms to the agreement. See May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672-73, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005) ( ).
We further disagree with Sheridan’s argument that she was excused from any obligation under the settlement due to a breach of the agreement’s confidentiality provision. Sheridan’s own counsel breached that provision. Cf. Lange v. Hickman, 92...
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