Sheridan v. ST. LUKE'S REG. MED. CENTER

Decision Date22 May 2001
Docket NumberNo. 25810.,25810.
PartiesPatrick SHERIDAN, Susan Sheridan, husband and wife individually and as Guardians Ad Litem for Cal Sheridan, a minor, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. ST. LUKE'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellant, and John J. Jambura, M.D., David B. Bettis, M.D. and John Does I-V, Defendants.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Gjording & Garrett, Boise, for appellant. Jack S. Gjording, argued.

Hepworth, Lezamiz & Hohnhorst, Boise, for respondents. John J. Janis, argued.

TROUT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the district judge's grant of a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) and denial of St. Luke's Regional Medical Center's ("St.Luke's") motion for directed verdict.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is a medical malpractice case filed by respondents Pat and Sue Sheridan on behalf of themselves and their minor son, Cal ("the Sheridans"). In August 1997, the Sheridans filed suit against John J. Jambura, M.D., St. Luke's, Craig D. Wittlesey, M.D., Steven Mayfield, M.D., and David B. Bettis, M.D., alleging the defendants' medical treatment was negligent and fell below the applicable standard of care owed to Cal Sheridan, and as a direct and proximate result of the negligence, the Sheridans suffered severe physical, emotional and economic injuries. Specifically, the Sheridans argue St. Luke's and Dr. Jambura negligently treated their son Cal's jaundice and elevated bilirubin levels, leading to permanent and irreparable brain damage. Prior to trial defendant Mayfield obtained an Order Granting Summary Judgment, and defendant Whittlesey obtained an Order of Dismissal. Beginning February 8, 1999, a twenty-eight day trial was held, including 32 witnesses and the admission of 112 exhibits. The jury deliberated for two days and returned defense verdicts in favor of Dr. Jambura, Dr. Bettis and St. Luke's. The Sheridans filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or alternatively for new trial. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), the trial court granted the Sheridans' motion for new trial against Dr. Jambura and St. Luke's, but denied the motion for new trial against Dr. Bettis.

Cal Sheridan was born at 11:52 p.m. on March 23, 1995 at St. Luke's. Dr. Jambura examined Cal approximately 10 hours after birth. Within 17 hours of birth, a nurse's chart note indicated the presence of jaundice. The pediatrician, Dr. Jambura, was not notified. The next shift nurse also noted jaundice, approximately 24 hours after birth. Jambura again was not notified. On March 25, 33-34 hours after birth, Dr. Jambura examined Cal, performed a circumcision, and cleared Cal to leave the hospital. At the time of his discharge, the medical chart noted Cal "has moderate icterus on head, mild icterus on body." The Sheridan's were provided a handout on jaundice. Cal's bilirubin levels were not measured and the parents were not offered any special counseling regarding abnormal jaundice.

Dr. Jambura next saw Cal on March 28, approximately 78 hours after the hospital discharge and in his fifth day of life. Mrs. Sheridan called Dr. Jambura because Cal had ceased to feed as vigorously, seemed sleepy and lethargic and was still yellow. Dr. Jambura noted that Cal's jaundice had increased and discovered Cal was suffering from an ear infection in both ears. Cal was not hospitalized but was treated with an oral antibiotic for the ear infection.

On March 29, Mrs. Sheridan again telephoned Dr. Jambura to inform him Cal was not improving and the jaundice had increased. Dr. Jambura ordered Cal admitted to the St. Luke's pediatric unit. Upon admission at 4:50 p.m. Cal's bilirubin level was tested and reported to be 34.6/100ml. Dr. Jambura arrived at the hospital at 6:30 p.m. and consulted Dr. Mayfield, a hospital-based neonatologist regarding Cal's condition. Mayfield recommended a second bilirubin test. While awaiting the tests, Cal was placed under a double bank of bili lights for phototherapy treatment of his jaundice. The second test results confirmed the high bilirubin level. Phototherapy was continued. A blood exchange transfusion, which would have resulted in an immediate reduction in the bilirubin levels, was not performed.

On March 30, Cal began exhibiting movements described as opisthotonos, arching or hyperextension of the neck. Cal also exhibited a sharp, high-pitched cry. Dr. Jambura requested a neurological consultation from Dr. Bettis, and Dr. Merrit, an ear, nose and throat specialist. Dr. Bettis ordered a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study, x-rays, and other tests. Cal was released from the hospital on April 2, 1995.

Over the next sixteen months Cal was treated by Dr. Jambura and Dr. Bettis and was ultimately diagnosed with cerebral palsy. An evaluation by Forrest Bennett, M.D., eventually led to a diagnosis of kernicterus, a form of cerebral palsy associated with a neonatal history of elevated serum bilirubin and consequent jaundice.

II.

GRANT OF NEW TRIAL UNDER I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6)

A. Standard of Review

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(6) provides:

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action for any of the following reasons:...
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law.

A trial judge may grant a new trial based on I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) where "after he has weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of the credibility of the witnesses, he concludes the verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). The trial court is given broad discretion in this ruling. Id. The trial judge may set aside the verdict even though there is substantial evidence to support it. Id. (citation omitted). In addition, the trial judge is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict-winner. Id. Addressing the considerable discretion given to the trial court in deciding motions for new trials, this Court has said:

"[t]he trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or justice."

Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967) (citing Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 669, 603 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1979)). Furthermore, "[i]f having given full respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a new trial." Quick, 111 Idaho at 768, 727 P.2d at 1196.

This Court has specifically outlined the standard of appellate review of a grant of a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6).

When considering an appeal from a district court's ruling on a motion for new trial, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard. Bott v. Idaho State Building Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 835 P.2d 1282 (1992). This Court consistently has recognized the district court's wide discretion to grant or refuse to grant a new trial, and, on appeal, this Court will not disturb a district court ruling, absent a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion. First Realty & Investment Co. v. Rubert, 100 Idaho 493, 600 P.2d 1149 (1979). Although this Court necessarily must review the evidence, it primarily focuses on the process by which the district court reached its decision, not on the result of the district court's decision. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). Thus, the sequence of this Court's inquiry is:
(1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Hughes v. State of Id. Dept. of Law, 129 Idaho 558, 561, 929 P.2d 120, 123 (1996) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). This Court's review of the evidence is not a weighing of the evidence.

The trial court is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility and testimony of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of all the evidence. Appellate review is necessarily more limited. While we must review the evidence, we are not in a position to "weigh" it as the trial court can.

Quick, 111 Idaho at 770, 727 P.2d at 1198 (citing Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 626, 603 P.2d 575, 581 (1979)). The focus, instead, is on the process by which the court reached its result. Hughes, 129 Idaho at 561, 929 P.2d at 123.

B. Discussion

As noted above, the review of a grant of a new trial under I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) is under an abuse of discretion standard, which invokes the three-part Sun Valley test. See Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (1991)

.

(1) The district judge properly perceived the grant of new trial as an issue of discretion.

The first inquiry under the Sun Valley test is whether the district judge correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion. 119 Idaho at 94, 803 P.2d at 1000. The district judge's Memorandum Decision demonstrates the judge perceived the Rule 59(a)(6) issue as one of discretion, stating that:

Under Rule 59(a)(6), I am to make my own findings of fact and conclusions of law, and measure my findings against that of the jury.... If I conclude, based upon my assessment of the evidence, that the jury result was wrong, I may intervene and grant a new trial .... I am directed to act with restraint. I am to respect the collective wisdom of the jury, and to intervene only if I am
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