Sherman, In re
| Decision Date | 19 May 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 47209,47209 |
| Citation | 60 Ill.2d 590,328 N.E.2d 553 |
| Parties | In re Allan G. SHERMAN, an attorney, Respondent. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Mary M. Conrad, Chicago (Philip Schickedanz, Springfield, of counsel), for Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
George B. Collins, Chicago, for respondent.
This is a disciplinary proceeding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 751, Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110A, § 751 (55 Ill.2d R. 751) against respondent, Allan G. Sherman, for commingling and conversion of a client's funds. It was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law, and he contests the propriety of this sanction.
In 1968 respondent was retained by Lucy Smith to represent her in legal matters involving buildings which she owned and in the sale of certain real estate. Upon the closing of the real estate transaction, $5,500 was entrusted to respondent as escrow holder to be disbursed at the completion of specified conditions and the authorization of the buyer's attorney. Having no separate escrow account, respondent deposited these funds in his personal checking account. In February, 1969, respondent was authorized to disburse the funds, remitting $3,700 to Mrs. Smith but retaining $500 as his agreed fee, and, in addition thereto, $1,300 as fees which he claimed were owed to him for other services.
As a result of a disagreement with regard to other matters, Mrs. Smith complained to the Chicago Bar Association in the fall of 1969, charging that respondent had improperly retained part of the escrow funds. Subsequently, the complaint was referred to the Inquiry Committee of the bar association. On three occasions during the ensuing investigation, respondent represented in his correspondence to the bar association that he had disbursed all of the escrowed funds except for his $500 fee. In fact, he had not paid the remaining $1,300, and did not do so until 1973, over two years after the bar association began its investigation.
Later the complaint was transferred to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission which, at that time, had been authorized to conduct these proceedings, and the matter was submitted to the Hearing Board. Respondent admitted he had deposited the escrow funds in his personal checking account, and that during the period he held the funds, his account was overdrawn on some occasions. In mitigation of his actions, respondent explained that at all times during this period he possessed other assets of value in excess of the escrowed sum and was sufficiently solvent to disburse the funds. Respondent testified that when he remitted the $3,700 to Mrs. Smith, he also submitted a bill to her for the services he had rendered in the real estate sale and in other matters. This bill, he maintained, showed deductions for his fees of $500 and $1,300. She made no complaint concerning his action at that time, and it was not until their later disagreement over an unrelated matter that she questioned his retention of the money. Respondent said that, after the complaint was made to the bar association, he then realized that withholding the fees from an escrow fund under the circumstances was improper. He, therefore, paid all sums due and...
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In re Edmonds
...442 N.E.2d 206 (1982) (neglect); In re Clayter, 78 Ill.2d 276, 35 Ill.Dec. 790, 399 N.E.2d 1318 (1980) (commingling); In re Sherman, 60 Ill.2d 590, 328 N.E.2d 553 (1975) (same); In re Ahern, 23 Ill.2d 69, 177 N.E.2d 197 (1961) (neglect). Rejecting this suggestion, we agree with the Review B......
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Stone, In re
... ... This court has often recognized long periods of untainted practice as a mitigating factor in disciplinary proceedings. (See, e.g., In re Kutner (1979), 78 Ill.2d 157, 166, 35 Ill.Dec. 674, 399 N.E.2d 963; In re Sherman (1975), 60 Ill.2d 590, 593, 328 N.E.2d 553.) Additionally, respondent did not act with an evil motive in regard to the funds that disappeared. This factor has also been held to be relevant in the determination of a proper sanction. (See, e.g., In re Enstrom (1984), 104 Ill.2d 410, 418, 84 ... ...
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Teichner, In re
... ... Accord, E. g., In re Bossov (1975) 60 Ill.2d 439, 441, 328 N.E.2d 309 (weight accorded findings of Commissioners under prior rule).) However, the nature of this court's role in disciplinary proceedings (see, [75 Ill.2d 98] E. g., In re Sherman (1975), 60 Ill.2d 590, 593, 328 N.E.2d 553), as well as the complexity and subtlety of the distinctions between permissible and impermissible forms of solicitation (compare, E. g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Edelson (1924) 313 Ill. 601, 145 N.E. 246, and In re Moore (1956) 8 Ill.2d ... ...
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Cohen, In re
... ... Page 110 ... [74 Ill.Dec. 608] this is the only time he has been charged with misconduct (In re Freel (1982), 89 Ill.2d 263, 270, 60 Ill.Dec. 477, 433 N.E.2d 274; In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill.2d 276, 283, 35 Ill.Dec. 790, 399 N.E.2d 1318; In re Sherman (1975), 60 Ill.2d 590, 593, 328 N.E.2d 553; In re Bizar (1983), 97 Ill.2d 127, 73 Ill.Dec. 411, 454 N.E.2d 271); the respondent made complete restitution to his client and to both physicians several months before the Disciplinary[98 Ill.2d 145] Commission filed a complaint against him (In re ... ...