Sherman v. Bristol Hospital, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 August 2003
• Docket Number: (AC 23183).
• Citation: 79 Conn. App. 78,828 A.2d 1260
• Parties: WALTER SHERMAN ET AL. v. BRISTOL HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

79 Conn. App. 78

828 A.2d 1260

WALTER SHERMAN ET AL. v. BRISTOL HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL.

(AC 23183).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 26, 2003.

Officially released August 26, 2003.

Schaller, Dranginis and Hennessy, Js. Francis A. Miniter, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Amy F. Goodusky, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

DRANGINIS, J.

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff Walter Sherman¹ appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Bristol Hospital, Inc. (hospital), and its agent, nurse Sharon Silva, after the court granted the defendants' motion in limine precluding the plaintiff's expert witness from testifying on the issue of causation. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) found that his expert witness was not qualified to testify as to the issue of causation, (2) refused to allow his expert witness to testify as to the issue of causation because, he claims, the court determined that her qualifications as to that issue related to the weight of her testimony and not its admissibility, (3) found that expert testimony by a physician was required to support causation and (4) concluded that the deposition testimony of the defendants' experts was insufficient to support a showing of causation.² We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. In 1995, the plaintiff learned that he required wrist fusion surgery. Prior to having the surgery, the plaintiff's general physician examined the plaintiff and concluded that although the plaintiff was obese and had a history of heart problems, he could safely submit to the surgery. On November 3, 1995, the plaintiff underwent the wrist fusion surgery at the hospital on an outpatient basis. Following the surgery, however, he was admitted to the medical-surgical ward of the hospital because of intense pain. To alleviate the plaintiff's pain, an agent of the hospital prescribed the drug morphine, which the plaintiff self-administered by means of a patient controlled analgesia machine.

Silva, an employee of the hospital, was assigned to care for the plaintiff during the late evening hours of November 3 and into the morning of November 4, 1995. When Silva checked on the plaintiff at approximately 4 a.m., she found him to be grayish in color and unresponsive. Silva summoned the physician on duty, who administered Narcan, a drug used to reverse the effects of morphine, to the plaintiff. Even after repeated doses of Narcan, however, the plaintiff's condition did not improve. The physician subsequently determined that the plaintiff had suffered a heart attack and had congestive heart failure.

Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted the present action against the defendants. In his complaint, filed June 22, 1998, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants knew or should have known that he was obese and had a history of heart problems, and that morphine has a depressive effect on the cardiac and pulmonary systems.³ He further alleged that given the defendants' knowledge of those facts, the standard of care required that they monitor him much more frequently than they would other patients to assess the effect that the morphine was having on him. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had failed to monitor him for a four hour period, which constituted a breach of the standard of care that caused him to suffer injuries. The defendants denied the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint.

In accordance with Practice Book § 13-4,⁴ the plaintiff initially disclosed Sanford Lewis, a physician, as his expert witness. A short time before trial was scheduled to begin, the plaintiff learned that Lewis was unavailable to testify. Consequently, on January 14, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion for permission to disclose Victoria O. Odesina, an advanced practice registered nurse, as his expert witness. The court granted that motion on February 11, 2002. Thereafter, the plaintiff disclosed that Odesina would be testifying as to the standard of care required by a nursing professional, that the defendants had breached that standard of care and that it was their breach that caused the plaintiff's injuries. On May 7, 2002, the defendants filed a motion in limine, asking the court to preclude Odesina from testifying on behalf of the plaintiff as to those issues.

A hearing was scheduled to resolve the motion in limine. The parties agreed that a favorable ruling on that motion would be determinative of whether the plaintiff could maintain his action. After a two day evidentiary hearing, the court, Shortall, J., issued an order in which it concluded that although the plaintiff's proposed expert was qualified to testify as to the standard of care, the evidence presented by the plaintiff at the hearing did not demonstrate that Odesina possessed the experience or training that would qualify her to opine on the causation issues presented in this case. Accordingly, the court granted the defendants' motion in limine in part, thereby precluding Odesina from testifying as to the issue of causation.

Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in which they contended that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff was unable to produce expert testimony as to causation. Along with their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted the court's order precluding Odesina from testifying on the issue of causation.

The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. He argued that the defendants were not entitled to a summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of fact in dispute regarding causation. The plaintiff argued that he could produce expert testimony on the issue of causation by introducing at trial portions of the deposition testimony of the defendants' three expert witnesses and, therefore, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had caused his injuries. In the alternative, the plaintiff argued that expert testimony was not necessary to establish causation in the present case because the case falls within numerous exceptions to the general rule that expert testimony is required to establish a cause of action for medical malpractice.⁵ The plaintiff attached portions of the depositions of the defendants' three expert witnesses to his objection to the motion for summary judgment. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. The plaintiff raises numerous claims in his appeal. We will first address those claims that relate to the court's order on the motion in limine and then those claims that relate to summary judgment.

I

The plaintiff's first two claims relate to the defendants' motion in limine. Specifically, he argues that in partially granting the defendants' motion in limine, the court improperly (1) found that his expert witness was not qualified to testify as to the issue of causation and (2) refused to allow his expert witness to testify as to the issue of causation because, he claims, the court determined that her qualifications as to causation related to the weight of her testimony and not its admissibility. We address each of those claims in turn.

At the outset, we set forth the applicable standard of review. It is well established that "the trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony and, unless that discretion has been abused or the ruling involves a clear misconception of the law, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Thames Valley Council for Community Action, Inc., 69 Conn. App. 850, 871-72, 797 A.2d 1146, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 906, 804 A.2d 212 (2002).

A

The plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion in finding that his expert witness was not qualified to testify as to the issue of causation. Specifically, he argues that after having found that Odesina was qualified to testify as to the applicable standard of care and breach of that standard of care, the court logically could not find that she was not qualified to testify as to the issue of causation. In other words, he argues that an expert's qualifications to testify as to causation are inextricably bound with her qualifications to testify as to the standard of care and breach of the standard of care. We are not persuaded.

First, we note that the plaintiff has failed to cite any legal authority in support of his claim that if the court determines that a medical expert is qualified to testify as to the standard of care and breach of the standard of care, the court must also conclude that the expert is qualified to testify on the issue of causation. We are unaware of any such authority.

Second, the test for admissibility of expert testimony involves, inter alia, a determination as to whether "the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue . . . ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis D., 75 Conn. App. 1, 12-13, 815 A.2d 191, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 909, 819 A.2d 842 (2003). In the present case, the defendants challenged Odesina's qualifications to testify as to all three matters in issue, namely, (1) what was the applicable standard of care, (2) did the defendants breach that standard of care and (3) was the defendants' alleged breach the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Accordingly, before permitting the expert to testify, the court properly made an independent assessment as to whether the witness, Odesina, possessed sufficient skill or knowledge to testify as to each of the matters in issue. See Conn. Code Evid. §§ 1-3 (a) and 7-2; see also Hayes v. Decker, 263 Conn. 677, 683, 822 A.2d 228 (2003).

The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in...