Sherman v. Ronco

Decision Date26 January 2010
Docket NumberNo. 18320.,18320.
Citation294 Conn. 548,985 A.2d 1042
PartiesLawrence C. SHERMAN v. Eugene C. RONCO et al.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
985 A.2d 1042
294 Conn. 548
Lawrence C. SHERMAN
v.
Eugene C. RONCO et al.
No. 18320.
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued September 21, 2009.
Decided January 26, 2010.

[985 A.2d 1044]

Robert F. Ludgin, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas R. Gerarde, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant James Ellis).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.

McLACHLAN, J.


294 Conn. 550

General Statutes § 52-577d allows a person who claims that he or she was sexually abused, exploited or assaulted as a minor to bring a personal injury action on the basis of that abuse until the alleged victim reaches thirty years beyond the age of eighteen.1 The parties in the present case agree that the plaintiff, Lawrence C. Sherman, filed his original complaint within the limitations period established by § 52-577d. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that certain counts of the plaintiff's amended substitute complaint, which was filed after the limitations period had expired, did not relate back to the original complaint. The plaintiff appeals2 from the trial court's summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant James Ellis,3 on counts two, four and

294 Conn. 551

seven of the plaintiff's

985 A.2d 1045

amended substitute complaint.4 The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the relation back doctrine did not apply to the subject counts and that those counts were therefore barred by the limitations period set by § 52-577d. We conclude that the trial court properly declined to apply the relation back doctrine to the subject counts.

The record reveals the following procedural history. The plaintiff initiated this action by serving the original, nine count complaint on the defendants on December 1, 2005, three days before he turned forty-eight years old and when the limitations period under § 52-577d expired. The complaint alleged that beginning in 1972, when the plaintiff was a student at King Philip Junior High School (King Philip)5 in the town of West Hartford, the named defendant, Eugene C. Ronco, who was a teacher at King Philip during the relevant time period, through intimidation and coercion, subjected the plaintiff to inappropriate sexual contact.6 The plaintiff alleged that as a result of Ronco's actions he has suffered serious emotional and psychological injuries. The complaint brought various counts against Ronco and/ or the board sounding in negligence, assault and battery, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress,

294 Conn. 552

and derivative liability. The seventh count of the complaint, which was the only substantive count brought against Ellis, alleged negligent supervision, both as to Ellis and the board, arising from various alleged failures to supervise and investigate Ronco's relationship with the plaintiff. The ninth count sought indemnification against all three defendants. On June 13, 2006, the trial court granted the motion to strike filed by Ellis and the board as to all of the counts against them. As to count seven, the court concluded that the action was barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity and that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception did not apply.

The plaintiff filed a substitute complaint in twenty-two counts on June 20, 2006, after the statute of limitations had expired. With respect to Ronco and the board, the substitute complaint did not differ significantly from the original complaint, alleging intentional, reckless and negligent assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, negligent supervision and derivative liability. As to Ellis, with respect to Ronco's alleged sexual abuse of the plaintiff, the substitute complaint again alleged negligent supervision by Ellis, but also added counts alleging intentional, reckless and negligent assault and battery, intentional

985 A.2d 1046

and negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligence, which previously had been alleged as to Ronco and/or the board, but not as to Ellis. The substitute complaint also brought an additional assault and battery count as to Ellis only, alleging that Ellis had inappropriate sexual contact with the plaintiff in the school locker room.7 Ellis moved to strike all counts directed against him in the substitute complaint, with the exception of the two counts alleging assault and

294 Conn. 553

battery; the board moved to strike all the counts against it. The court granted the board's motion to strike in its entirety and granted Ellis' motion except as to the counts alleging reckless assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew the action as to the board and on February 23, 2007, filed a second substitute complaint, naming only Ronco and Ellis as defendants. The plaintiff later filed an amended substitute complaint on April 9, 2007, which is the operative complaint.8 The amended substitute complaint brought four counts against Ellis. Specifically, the second count alleged assault and battery stemming from Ronco's alleged sexual abuse of the plaintiff and the tenth count alleged assault and battery stemming from Ellis' alleged sexual abuse of the plaintiff. Both the fourth and seventh counts were predicated on Ellis' involvement with Ronco's alleged abuse of the plaintiff, and alleged reckless assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively. The trial court granted Ellis' motion for summary judgment as to all four counts, concluding that the claims were barred by the limitations period in § 52-577d because those counts did not relate back to the original, timely filed complaint. This appeal followed.9

"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

294 Conn. 554

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. ... The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court.... Our review of the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 293 Conn. 363, 371, 977 A.2d 650 (2009).10

985 A.2d 1047
294 Conn. 555

In reviewing whether the trial court properly concluded that the relation back doctrine does not apply to the amended substitute complaint, we look to our well established rules governing that doctrine. "[A] party properly may amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same.... If a new cause of action is alleged in an amended complaint, however, it will [speak] as of the date when it was filed.... A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief.... A right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff, and an invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which establish the existence of that right and that delict constitute the cause of action.... A change in, or an addition to, a ground of negligence or an act of negligence arising out of the single group of facts which was originally claimed to have brought about the unlawful injury to the plaintiff does not change the cause of action.... It is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same, but [when] an entirely new and different factual situation is presented, a new and different cause of action is stated." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 259 Conn. 114, 129-30, 788 A.2d 83 (2002).

"We have previously recognized that our relation back doctrine is akin to rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part ... [w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in

294 Conn. 556

the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.... The policy behind rule 15(c) is that a party, once notified of litigation based upon a particular transaction or occurrence, has been provided with all the notice that statutes of limitations are intended to afford." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 547, 590 A.2d 914 (1991); see also 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice (3d Ed.2009) § 15.02[2].

To summarize, in determining whether the relation back doctrine applies to an amended pleading, we inquire whether the amendment expands or amplifies

985 A.2d 1048

the original facts alleged in support of a cause of action, or whether the amendment presents a new and different factual situation that would require the presentation of different evidence. See, e.g., Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., 286 Conn. 789, 808-809, 945 A.2d 955 (2008) (trial court properly denied request to amend complaint where original complaint alleged various departures from applicable standard of care in performing plaintiff's back surgery, and...

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