Sherman v. Town of Chester
| Decision Date | 31 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | 12 Civ. 647 (ER) |
| Parties | NANCY J. SHERMAN, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF CHESTER, TOWN BOARD OF THE TOWN OF CHESTER, and PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWN OF CHESTER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
This matter is once again before the Court on a motion to dismiss brought by the Defendants Town of Chester, New York ("the Town"), the Town Board of the Town of Chester, and the Planning Board of the Town of Chester.1 (Doc. 21). Steven M. Sherman,2 a real estate developer, initially filed this suit on January 12, 2012, in the Supreme Court for Orange County, New York, generally alleging that for over the previous decade, the Town wrongfully obstructed his efforts to develop MareBrook, a 398 acre parcel of land he purchased in 2001 for $2.7 million. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 39, 353.3 Specifically, Plaintiff claims that by implementing a series of amendments to the local zoning laws that specifically targeted his project, and otherwiseengaging in conduct that frustrated his ability to even begin development, the Town violated his rights to freedom of religion, freedom to petition, substantive due process, procedural due process, equal protection, and his right not to have his property taken without just compensation under the federal and New York state constitutions.
Pending before the Court is the Town's renewed motion to dismiss following the Second Circuit's reversal of this Court's determination that Sherman's federal takings claim was unripe. The Town argues that all of Sherman's remaining claims, both federal and state, are time barred, and even if not, fail to state a claim for relief. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Also before the Court is a motion to intervene brought by Laroe Estates, Inc. ("Laroe"), on the basis that as holder of "equitable title" to MareBrook, Laroe is the owner of the property and therefore has standing to intervene as of right, or at least permissively, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (a) and (b), respectively. (Doc. 24). Laroe's motion is DENIED.
The background of this case is set forth in great detail in this Court's March 2013 Order, as well as the Second Circuit's decision in Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554 (2014), familiarity with which is assumed. Thus, the Court will only state facts necessary for disposition of the instant motions.
As originally conceived, the MareBrook project was to include 385 residential housing units, a golf course, an equestrian facility, baseball fields, tennis courts, a clubhouse and an on-site restaurant. Compl. ¶ 10. By way of general background, Sherman claims that the Town wrongfully prevented him from developing MareBrook because it variously wanted: (1) to makeMareBrook a "de facto nature preserve," id. at ¶¶ 21, 30, 285, 299; (2) to retaliate against him for instituting several lawsuits against the Town over the development of MareBrook, id. at ¶¶ 26-29, 61, 225, 231, 241, 262; and (3) to discriminate against him because he is Jewish, one of his business associates is Jewish, and Town residents are worried about MareBrook becoming a Hasidic community, id. ¶¶ 31-32, 222, 225, 307-24, 326. Plaintiff concludes that the Town's obstruction shows that a "[s]ecret 'final decision'" was made to block him from developing his property. Id. at ¶ 56.
The Town filed its first motion to dismiss on May 7, 2012. (Doc. 6). By Opinion and Order issued on March 20, 2013 (the "March 2013 Order") (Doc. 14), the Court granted the motion, finding that each of Sherman's federal constitutional claims were unripe pursuant to Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), and declining supplemental jurisdiction over Sherman's state claims. Sherman appealed.5
As relevant to this motion, Sherman first filed suit in federal court on May 5, 2008. See Sherman v. Town of Chester et al., No. 08-civ-4248 ("Sherman I"); Compl. ¶ 218. In that lawsuit, as in the instant one, he alleged a federal takings claim. As the Second Circuit observed, Sherman voluntarily dismissed that action on January 6, 2012,6 in response to the Town's argument that the takings claim was unripe because Sherman had not alleged that he sought and was denied just compensation by an available state procedure. Sherman, 752 F.3d at 563-64. He then re-filed his federal takings claim and his state law claims for compensation in SupremeCourt, Orange County, several days later on January 12, 2012. It was that subsequently filed lawsuit that the Town removed to this Court on January 26, 2012.
In Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second Circuit reversed this Court's determination that Sherman's federal takings claim was unripe. Applying the test stated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Circuit Court found that Sherman had stated a non-categorical taking. Sherman, 752 F.3d at 566. In reaching that conclusion, the Circuit found that the Town's actions "effectively prevented Sherman from making any economic use of this property," interfered with his reasonable investment-backed expectations, and "singled out [his] development, suffocating him with red tape to make sure he could never succeed in developing MareBrook." Id. at 565. The Circuit Court then determined that the takings claim was not barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the Circuit Court rejected the Town's position that only actions taking place within three years of filing of the complaint should be considered:
While the Circuit Court did not subject Plaintiff's other constitutional claims—which allege First Amendment, Equal Protection and Due Process violations—to the same analysis, it held that to the extent they had been dismissed solely on ripeness grounds, this Court's ruling can no longer stand. Id. at 567. Accordingly, it remanded those claims for the purpose of determining whether Sherman has stated a claim. Finally, the Circuit Court vacated this Court's decision remanding the state law claims because of its determination that Sherman had plausibly stated at least one federal claim. Id. at 568.7
When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014). The court is not required to credit "mere conclusory statements" or "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also id. at 681 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). More specifically, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show "more than a sheerpossibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. If the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.
The question in a Rule 12 motion to dismiss "'is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 278 (2d Cir.1995)). "[T]he purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 'is to test, in a streamlined fashion, the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's statement of a claim for relief without resolving a contest regarding its substantive merits,'" and without regard for the weight of the evidence that might be offered in support of Plaintiffs' claims. Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Global Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2006)).
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Sherman overly relies on the Second Circuit's conclusion that his takings claim constitutes a continuing violation. He assumes that each of his federal constitutional claims are saved by the same analysis. He is mistaken. Under the continuing violation doctrine, "[w]here a plaintiff can demonstrate an ongoing or continuing violation of his federally protected rights, the...
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