Sherod v. Comprehensive Healthcare Mgmt. Servs.
Decision Date | 16 October 2020 |
Docket Number | 20cv1198 |
Parties | VANESSA SHEROD AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH WILES, AND IN HER OWN RIGHT, Plaintiff, v. COMPREHENSIVE HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC doing business as BRIGHTON REHABILITATION AND WELLNESS CENTER, ET AL., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Defendants removed this negligence, misrepresentation, wrongful death and survival action, originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, to this Court, asserting federal question jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendants based their removal of this case on the Public Readiness and Preparedness Act ("PREP Act"), and now argue that the PREP Act completely preempts the claims asserted by Plaintiff in her Complaint. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand this matter back to state court (ECF 10), Defendants filed a Brief in Opposition (ECF 22), and Plaintiff filed a Reply (ECF 29) making the matter ripe for adjudication.
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-113 (1936). "The '[well-pleaded complaint] rule' makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal question jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
However, the "complete [or artful] pre-emption doctrine" applies where the pre-emptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it "converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987). "If a court concludes that a plaintiff has 'artfully pleaded' claims [by omitting to plead necessary federal questions], it may uphold removal even though no federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's complaint . . . where federal law completely preempts a plaintiff's state-law claim." Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998).
Removal is "strictly construed, with all doubts to be resolved in favor of remand." Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396, 403 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The removing party bears the burden of showing that removal is appropriate. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging that the decedent, Elizabeth Wiles, died from COVID-19 ("the virus") on May 10, 2020, after being exposed to, and infected by, the virus while working at Brighton Rehabilitation and Wellness facility ("Brighton") in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. ECF 1-1, ¶ 1-4. Plaintiff further alleged that the Brighton viral outbreak, "at its peak . . . accounted for 65% of all COVID-19 cases and 90% of all COVID-19 deaths in Beaver County, Pennsylvania." Id., ¶ 6. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant Brighton had been cited numerous times since 2014 by Pennsylvania's Department of Health for various "infection-contamination" risk violations, and was among one of the most fined nursing homes in Pennsylvania from March of 2017 to July of 2018. Id., ¶ 70.
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants' "systemic failure and outright refusal to protect . . . workers" despite Defendants' knowledge of the nature of the threat that COVID-19 posed to their workers, and that Defendants' "pattern of wanton and reckless conduct would leave workers exposed" to COVID-19. Id., ¶ 72-76. Plaintiff further claimed that Defendants knew or should have known that their workers (including decedent) would require personal protective equipment ("PPE"), but failed to provide or require PPE, and further, downplayed the danger posed by COVID-19. Id., 78-79. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that in March of 2020, Brighton had its "first COVID-19 case" but this information was withheld from the Brighton workers, residents, government officials, and public-at-large until April 1, 2020. As of April 1, 2020, Brighton allegedly had three residents who died from COVID-19, thirty-six known infected residents and six known infected facility workers. Id., ¶ 86.
Plaintiff has sued Defendants for negligence averring that Defendants:
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