SHERWOOD DIST. 88J v. Washington Cty. Ed.

Decision Date24 May 2000
Citation167 Or. App. 372,6 P.3d 518
PartiesSHERWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT 88J, Mark Christie, Sherry Taxes, Fred Macklin and Donna Macklin, Appellants, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY EDUCATION SERVICE DISTRICT, Tigard-Tualatin School District 23J, State of Oregon, Laura Aust and Ralph Cellarius, Respondents.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

Helen T. Dziuba argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.

Christine A. Chute, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents State of Oregon and Tigard-Tualatin School District 34J. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, Derryck H. Dittman, and Anderson & Dittman, LLP.

Diana E. Godwin argued the cause for respondents Laura Aust and Ralph Cellarius.

E. Andrew Jordan waived appearance for respondent Washington County Education Service District.

Before LANDAU, Presiding Judge, and DEITS, Chief Judge,1 and EDMONDS, Judge.

LANDAU, P.J.

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of a state law that alters the boundary of a local school district. The case was submitted to the trial court on stipulated facts, and the trial court concluded that the boundary change effected by the state law was constitutional. We agree and affirm.

The dispute concerns a 333-acre parcel of land known as the "Hedges Creek subdivision," located in the southernmost corner of the city of Tualatin. Two school districts are located in Tualatin: the Tigard-Tualatin School District and the Sherwood School District. Before 1995, the Tigard-Tualatin School District served nearly all of the city; indeed, the only portion of Tualatin not within the Tigard-Tualatin School District was the Hedges Creek subdivision.

Some parents living in the Hedges Creek subdivision sought permission from the Sherwood School District to send their children to schools in the Tigard-Tualatin School District. The nearest Tigard-Tualatin School District schools are located much closer to the Hedges Creek subdivision than are the nearest schools in the Sherwood School District, located some four to five miles away. The Sherwood School District, however, did not grant the requested permission. There followed various efforts of the parents and others to remove the Hedges Creek subdivision from the Sherwood School District and to have it made part of the Tigard-Tualatin School District. All of those efforts proved unsuccessful.

In 1995, the supporters of removing the Hedges Creek subdivision from the Sherwood School District sought help from the legislature. The legislature ultimately responded by adding to an existing bill concerning education service districts generally a specific section concerning the alteration of the Sherwood and Tigard-Tualatin School District boundaries. The legislative history of the amendment makes clear that the principal purpose of the amendment was to bring an end to a long-standing dispute that the legislature concluded could not be resolved by existing dispute procedures. Supporters also suggested that the amendment was necessary to reduce traffic congestion in the area and to "send a message" to local districts that if they cannot resolve such disputes themselves, the legislature will be forced to intervene. The text of the amendment, commonly referred to as "Section 22," because it was added as Section 22 of Senate Bill 262, provides, in part:

"(1) A district boundary board shall approve a request or petition for a minor boundary change involving only the Sherwood and Tigard-Tualatin School Districts in Washington County when:
"(a) A majority of the electors residing in the affected area petition the district boundary board to make the change;
"(b) No student in the affected area lives more than one mile from an existing boundary between the affected school districts;
"(c) The nearest school for the students in the affected area is located in the school district into which the affected area will be transferred; and
"(d) The school board of the school district into which the affected area will be transferred approves the minor boundary change.
"(2) Notwithstanding ORS 330.101 [requiring notice and opportunity to remonstrate against proposed boundary changes], for any minor boundary change for a school district approved as required by this section, no remonstrance petition or election shall be allowed.

"* * * * *

"(5) As used in this section:
"(a) `Affected area' means the territory proposed to be moved from one school district to another school district in a request or petition for a minor boundary change.
"(b) `Minor boundary change' means a school district boundary change that:
"(A) Involves no more than two school districts;
"(B) Involves only one education service district;
"(C) Does not include in the affected area any real property owned or leased by the school district that currently serves the affected area;
"(D) Does not include any industrial property in the affected area; and
"(E) Involves an affected area that is not larger than 350 acres and that represents not more than five percent of the total real market value of all real property within the school district that currently serves the affected area."

Or Laws 1995, ch 611, § 22, compiled as a note after ORS 330.310.

Following the enactment of Section 22, plaintiffs—the Sherwood School District and several area voters whose children attend school within that district—initiated this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of the law. Plaintiffs allege that Section 22 is unconstitutional on four grounds: (1) It violates Article IV, section 23, of the Oregon Constitution, because it is a special law that provides for supporting common schools and the preservation of school funds; (2) it violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution, because plaintiffs have been deprived of the right to vote on a school district boundary change without a sufficient justification; (3) it violates the voting rights provisions of Article II, sections 2 and 8, and Article VIII, section 6, of the Oregon Constitution, for the same reason; and (4) it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, for the same reason. Defendants—the Washington County Education Service District, the Tigard-Tualatin School District, the State of Oregon and one of the parents residing in the Hedges Creek subdivision—answered, denying the unconstitutionality of Section 22. The parties negotiated a statement of stipulated facts and submitted the matter to the trial court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of Section 22 in all respects.

On appeal, plaintiffs assign error to the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment and its decision to grant defendants' motion. Because there are no disputed issues of fact, we review the trial court's decision to determine if either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 223, 851 P.2d 556 (1993).

We begin with plaintiffs' argument that Section 22 violates Article IV, section 23, of the Oregon Constitution. In evaluating that argument, we examine the text of the relevant constitutional provision, its historical context, and any judicial decisions pertaining to it. Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415-16, 840 P.2d 65 (1992).

Article IV, section 23, provides, in part:

"The Legislative Assembly, shall not pass special or local laws, in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say:
"Regulating the jurisdiction, and duties of justices of the peace, and of constables;
"For the punishment of Crimes, and Misdemeanors;
"Regulating the practice in Courts of Justice;
"Providing for changing the venue in civil and Criminal cases;
"Granting divorces;
"Changing the names of persons;
"For the laying, opening, and working on highways, and for the election, or appointment of supervisors;
"Vacating roads, Town plats, Streets, Alleys, and Public squares;
"Summoning and empaneling (sic) grand, and petit jurors;
"For the assessment and collection of Taxes, for State, County, Township, or road purposes;
"Providing for supporting Common schools, and for the preservation of school funds[.]"

Plaintiffs argue that the adjustment in the school boundary between the Sherwood and Tigard-Tualatin School Districts required by Section 22 removes certain real property from the Sherwood School District, and, as a result, that district suffers a reduction in real property tax revenues that it once recovered from taxation of the property when it was within district boundaries. Because the effect of Section 22 is to reduce revenues to the Sherwood School District, plaintiffs argue, the law offends Article IV, section 23. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the revenue reduction is only an indirect effect of the enactment of Section 22. Nevertheless, relying principally on Indiana case law, plaintiffs argue that the prohibition of Article IV, section 23, was intended to prohibit any special or local law that affects—directly or indirectly—the state system of funding public schools.

Defendants acknowledge that Section 22 is a special or local law, but they insist that it is not the sort of special or local law that is prohibited by Article IV, section 23. They argue that, when viewed in the context of other constitutional provisions and relevant cases concerning public schools and public school funding, Article IV, section 23, properly may be seen as a more narrow prohibition against directly providing funds to one school district not made available to others.

Prohibitions against enactment of certain special or local laws such as the ones contained in Article IV, section 23, of the Oregon Constitution, were a common feature of mid-nineteenth century constitutions, reflecting widespread concern with the power of state legislatures to...

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