Sherwood v. Baker

• Decision Date: 01 July 1891
• Citation: Sherwood v. Baker, 105 Mo. 472, 16 S.W. 938, 24 Am.St.Rep. 399 (Mo. 1891)
• Parties: SHERWOOD v. BAKER et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

16 S.W. 938

105 Mo. 472

SHERWOOD v. BAKER et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

July 1, 1891.

EQUITY — PROBATE ORDERS — LIMITATIONS — ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. The orders and judgments of probate courts, when acting within their jurisdiction, are entitled to the same favorable presumptions as are accorded to the judgments of courts of general jurisdiction, and are no more subject to collateral attack.

2. Where the records of the probate court show that the administrator was ordered to sell the land to pay debts, that he made the sale, that his report of sale was approved, and that he was ordered to make a deed to the purchaser, which was not done, the purchaser has the equitable title, which will be enforced in equity against the heirs.

3. A purchaser at an administrator's sale who fails to get a deed, and who permits the widow to remain in possession for nearly 20 years without bringing action or having dower assigned, is not guilty of laches, and may have the title decreed in himself.

4. Possession by the widow, under such circumstances, is not adverse, and does not extinguish the title acquired by the purchaser.

Appeal from circuit court, Greene county; W. D. HUBBARD, Judge.

Silsby & Buckley and Drew & Jump, for appellant. Goode & Cravens, for respondent.

MACFARLANE, J.

The probate court of Lawrence county, on the 23d day of February 1869, made an order directing Daniel Biddlecome, public administrator of said county, having in charge the estate of Jonathan L. Fare, deceased, to sell the real estate in controversy herein for the payment of debts. The land was sold to respondent for $605, and the sale duly reported to the probate court of said county, August 2, 1869. The purchase price was paid to the administrator, and was applied to the payment of debts. The report of the sale was approved by the order of said court, October 23, 1869. A deed was never made to respondent by the administrator. Defendant Jemima Fare was the widow of deceased, Jonathan L. Fare, lived on this property up to the time of his death, and thereafter his widow continued to reside thereon, with her children, making no claim other than dower, until the trial of this cause in the circuit court. This is a suit in equity, commenced May 27, 1884, against the widow and heirs of deceased, by which plaintiff undertook, by decree of court, to have vested in himself the legal title to said real estate by virtue of the equity acquired through his purchase from the administrator, and to have an assignment of the dower of the widow. The answer was a general denial, a plea of the 10-years statute of limitation, and of 10 years' adverse possession.

Several questions were raised at the trial respecting the admissibility of evidence offered and admitted to prove the foregoing facts, and as to the force and effect of orders of probate courts. It is now well settled that the orders and judgments of probate courts, when acting within their jurisdiction, are entitled to the same favorable presumptions as are accorded to courts of general jurisdiction, and are no more subject to collateral attack. Price v. Association, 101 Mo. 107, 14 S. W. Rep. 57; Camden v. Plain, 91 Mo. 117, 4 S. W. Rep. 86; Rowden v. Brown, 91 Mo. 429, 4 S. W. Rep. 129. The records of the probate court of Lawrence county, introduced in evidence, showed an order on Daniel Biddlecome, public administrator, in charge of the estate of Jonathan L. Fare, to sell the land in controversy for the payment of debts; a report of the administrator, showing a sale to plaintiff for $605; an order approving the sale; and an order on the administrator to make a deed conveying the land to the purchaser. From these orders it will be presumed that the sale was authorized, and that "all requisite antecedent steps had been duly and timely taken, until the contrary is made to appear." Price v. Association, supra. The purchase of the land under these orders, the payment of the purchase money, and the approval of the sale gave to the purchaser a clear right to a deed from the administrator. Did he acquire such an equity in the land as can be enforced in a suit against the heirs? The question whether a court of equity would lend its aid in such cases was carefully and exhaustively considered by this court in the case of Henry v. McKerlie, 78 Mo. 419, and all the decisions in this state on the subject reviewed, and an affirmative answer to the inquiry was reached. In conclusion of this review, the court, by MARTIN, C., says: "When the sale by an administrator or curator under an order of the court has been regularly approved by the court, this fact of itself passes to the purchaser an equity for the legal title, which equity, notwithstanding an irregular deed or the want of any deed, the court will enforce in his favor by denying recovery in ejectment by the heirs, or by vesting him with the perfect title: provided, always, that he has on his part complied with the terms of the sale. See, also, Grayson v. Weddle, 63 Mo. 523; Long v. Smelting Co., 68 Mo. 422; Gilbert v. Cooksey, 69 Mo. 42." This decision was approved in the cases of Burden v. Johnson, 81 Mo. 323, and...