Shewack v. COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP., 1417 C.D. 2009
| Decision Date | 14 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 1417 C.D. 2009,1417 C.D. 2009 |
| Citation | 993 A.2d 916 |
| Parties | Daniel M. SHEWACK v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Philip M. Bricknell, Asst. Counsel and Harold H. Cramer, Asst. Chief Counsel, Harrisburg, for appellant.
Bruce S. Miller, Hazleton, for appellee.
BEFORE: LEADBETTER, President Judge, SIMPSON, Judge, and McCULLOUGH, Judge.
OPINION BY Judge SIMPSON.
In this statutory appeal, the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT) asks whether the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (trial court) erred in sustaining Daniel M. Shewack's (Licensee) appeal of the one-year disqualification of his commercial driver's license (CDL). PennDOT imposed the disqualification pursuant to Section 1611(h) of the Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1611(h) (). PennDOT argues the trial court erred in determining Licensee's out-of-state offense was not similar to the Pennsylvania offense, and Licensee's appeal represented an impermissible collateral attack on his underlying out-of-state conviction. Upon review, we affirm.
In 1999, Licensee received a citation in New York for operating a commercial motor vehicle (CMV) without a registration tag affixed to the trailer. Licensee did not appear at the hearing on the citation; as a result, the State of New York suspended Licensee's commercial operating privileges for failure to attend the hearing.
In 2008, Licensee was operating a CMV in Maryland when he was stopped and issued several citations. Ultimately, Licensee pled guilty to driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended in another state for failure to appear or pay a fine. See Md.Code Ann., Transp. § 16-303(i). The State of Maryland notified PennDOT of Licensee's conviction.
Shortly thereafter, PennDOT issued Licensee notice of a one-year disqualification of his CDL. Licensee filed a statutory appeal with the trial court.
At hearing, PennDOT produced a packet of certified documents including proof of Licensee's Maryland conviction. PennDOT also requested the trial court take judicial notice of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) Code Dictionary.1 Specifically, PennDOT noted Licensee's violation was a violation corresponding to B26 of the AAMVA Code Dictionary, which pertained to driving with a suspended license.
For his part, Licensee testified he received a citation in New York in 1999. He explained he gave the citation to his employer at the time, and the employer indicated it "would take care of the ticket." Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 30a. Licensee indicated he heard nothing further regarding the New York citation until he was stopped in Maryland in 2008, and, as a result, he was unaware his New York operating privileges were suspended for failure to appear on that citation. Licensee acknowledged he pled guilty to the Maryland charge of driving with a suspended license based on his failure to appear and pay a fine in New York.
Licensee also submitted documentary evidence, including a copy of the New York citation, and a "Defendant Trial Summary" from the District Court of Maryland for Washington County, which set forth the disposition of the citations Licensee received in Maryland. This document indicates Licensee was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while his licensee was suspended in another state for failure to appear or pay a fine. R.R. at 62a. Significant for our analysis, the document also indicates the remaining charges, including a charge of operating a CMV after having been disqualified or suspended in New York, were nolle prossed. R.R. at 62a-63a.
Before the trial court, PennDOT argued the offense to which Licensee pled guilty in Maryland was similar to the Pennsylvania statute, resulting in a one-year disqualification. PennDOT further argued Licensee could not collaterally attack his Maryland conviction. PennDOT asserted this Court's decision in Hyer v. Department Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 957 A.2d 807 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008), was controlling and required the trial court to deny Licensee's appeal.
Licensee asserted that, contrary to PennDOT's contentions, the statute he was convicted of violating in Maryland was not similar to the offense described in the Pennsylvania statute.
Ultimately, the trial court issued an order sustaining Licensee's appeal. The trial court stated PennDOT did not prove the Maryland offense was similar to an offense that would have resulted in disqualification of Licensee's CDL had the offense occurred in Pennsylvania. See Aten v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 251, 649 A.2d 732 (1994). PennDOT appealed. The trial court issued an order requiring PennDOT to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, which it did.
The trial court subsequently issued an opinion in support of its order in which it stated PennDOT bore the burden of proving the offense Licensee was convicted of was similar to a Pennsylvania offense. The trial court noted PennDOT's failure to produce a copy of the Maryland statute hindered the trial court's ability to make such a determination. The trial court indicated the documents Licensee produced at the hearing revealed the Maryland and Pennsylvania statutes were not similar. Thus, the trial court sustained Licensee's appeal and reinstated his CDL. This matter is now before us for disposition.
On appeal,2 PennDOT raises two issues. First, PennDOT argues it is required to disqualify the CDL of a license holder who is convicted of an out-of-state offense that is essentially similar to an offense that warrants disqualification in Pennsylvania, even if the relevant out-of-state and Pennsylvania statutes have minor differences. Aten. In addition, PennDOT argues a CDL holder may not use the appeal of the disqualification of that license to collaterally attack an underlying conviction for a motor vehicle violation.
PennDOT first contends the offense of operating a CMV without a CDL is essentially the same in both Maryland and Pennsylvania. It asserts that when Maryland reported Licensee's conviction for that offense to it, the statute required it to impose a one-year disqualification of Licensee's CDL.
PennDOT maintains this Court should not look beyond Licensee's Maryland conviction to review the circumstances of that conviction; the issue is whether Licensee was convicted, not whether he should have been convicted.
PennDOT contends Licensee is incorrect when he argues that the Maryland and Pennsylvania statutes must be essentially similar, while this Court has held it is the actual elements of the offense that must be similar. Aten. PennDOT asserts Maryland and Pennsylvania—having both adopted the federal regulations regarding CDLs—disqualify the operating privileges of CDL holders who operate CMVs while their CDLs are suspended by other states.
Licensee responds in order for PennDOT to impose a one-year disqualification of his CDL, it must prove Section 16-303(i) of the Maryland Transportation Code and Section 1606(c) of the Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1606(c), are substantially similar. Licensee acknowledges it is the actual elements of the offenses that must be similar. Licensee maintains the only similarity between the provisions at issue here is that they both concern driving under suspension. He contends the statutes are dissimilar because Section 1606 of the Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act specifically relates to CDLs while the Maryland statute does not. Licensee further contends the provisions are dissimilar because the Maryland statute specifically applies to licensees who are suspended by another state for failure to appear or failure to pay a fine, and the Pennsylvania statute contains no analog.
Licensee further responds he has not used the appeal of the disqualification of his CDL to collaterally attack his Maryland conviction. Rather, he maintains the statutes are dissimilar and that given the circumstances and equities here, his disqualification will in no way promote the public health, safety and welfare.
Courts of this Commonwealth consistently recognized a license suspension is a collateral civil consequence of a criminal conviction and in an appeal from the suspension, a licensee may not attack the validity of the underlying criminal conviction. Aten. The only relevant issues in a civil license suspension appeal are whether the motorist was in fact convicted and whether PennDOT acted in accordance with applicable law. Id.
Thus, we agree with PennDOT that Licensee may not collaterally attack his underlying criminal conviction in this civil license suspension proceeding. Id.; Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Barco, 656 A.2d 544 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994). As such, we lack authority to consider the validity of Licensee's Maryland conviction. To consider the underlying basis for that conviction would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the conviction. Our sole inquiry is whether the offense on which Licensee was convicted in Maryland is sufficiently similar to a Pennsylvania offense so as to justify PennDOT's disqualification of Licensee's CDL.
For purposes of determining whether an out-of-state offense is similar to one that would result in disqualification of a CDL if the conviction occurred in Pennsylvania, it is the offense and not the statute of the other state that must be essentially similar to the offense proscribed in Pennsylvania. Aten. In Aten, this Court noted the relevant comparison is between the elements of the foreign state's statute and the elements of Pennsylvania's statute.
A review of the statutory provisions at issue is helpful in discerning the elements of...
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