Shewbart v. Shewbart
Decision Date | 10 December 2010 |
Docket Number | 2090702. |
Citation | 64 So.3d 1080 |
Parties | Beverly Renee SHEWBARTv.John Michael SHEWBART. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gary L. Jester of Jester & Jenkins, Florence, for appellant.Eddie Beason of McDowell, Beason & Hamilton, P.C., Russellville, for appellee.MOORE, Judge.
This is the second time these parties, Beverly Renee Shewbart (“the wife”) and John Michael Shewbart (“the husband”), have been before this court. 1 In Shewbart v. Shewbart, 19 So.3d 223 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) ( “ Shewbart” ), the wife appealed from the trial court's July 10, 2008, judgment of divorce. In that judgment, the trial court divided the parties' marital property, assigning a value of $14,000 to the parties' business, known as John Shewbart d/b/a Swamp John's Restaurant & Catering, and awarded the wife one-half of that value. The wife appealed, asserting that the trial court had erred in its valuation of the business and by failing to award her alimony.
This court reversed the trial court's judgment as to the property division and the failure to award alimony, concluding that, in valuing the business, the trial court had failed to consider the consistent income stream derived from the business. Shewbart, 19 So.3d at 232. We remanded the cause “for the trial court to determine the fair-market value of the sole proprietorship, taking into consideration all of its assets, and to then consider that value in fashioning an equitable division of the marital property.” 19 So.3d at 233. We also instructed the trial court to reconsider, in light of any new property division it entered on remand, whether the wife was entitled to an award of alimony. Id. We affirmed all other aspects of the trial court's judgment.
On February 25, 2010, the trial court conducted another evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, in addition to taking further testimony from the husband and the wife, the trial court heard the testimony of Carter Norvell, a certified public accountant with expertise in business valuations who had been hired by the wife. Norvell stated that, in his opinion, the income-approach method was the most appropriate way to value the parties' business and that he had calculated a value for the business under the income-approach method using two different sources of information.
Norvell first relied on information obtained from the husband's 2006 and 2007 federal income-tax returns. He calculated the earnings of the business before any deductions were taken for interest, taxes, depreciation, or amortization (generally referred to as “EBITDA”), averaged the EBITDA obtained for those two years, and then applied a multiple of four to arrive at an estimated value of the business as an ongoing enterprise.2 Using that income-approach method, Norvell valued the business at $191,376.3
Norvell then calculated the value of the business by considering the husband's deposition testimony, in which the husband testified that he withdrew $1,500 per week from the business as his salary. Norvell multiplied that $1,500 weekly salary by 50 weeks (allowing two weeks a year as vacation), which provided a total annual net income of $75,000; to that annual net income, Norvell applied a multiple of four to arrive at an estimated value of the business of $300,000.
Norvell explained his decision to apply a multiple of four in his valuation as follows:
Responding to the trial court's request for further information regarding the multiple to be applied in the valuation, Norvell stated:
Norvell admitted that his decision to use a multiple of four could be considered arbitrary.
Norvell also acknowledged that the husband's 2008 income had not been provided to him and that the 2008 data was more relevant than the 2006 and 2007 data in determining the value of the business. Norvell admitted that the economy in the United States had suffered a downturn in the last several years and that a downturn in the economy could negatively impact the husband's income. Norvell, however, testified that he had no indication that the economy had, in fact, impacted the husband's income.
Norvell also acknowledged that, at the time he performed his valuation, he had been unaware that the husband worked 70 to 80 hours per week in the business. Norvell agreed that, if the husband's net income for 2008 had been $14,352, as represented, and the husband had worked 70 to 80 hours a week to earn that amount, Norvell would have placed a different, presumably lower, value on the business. Norvell also testified that he had been unaware that the business was located in a facility owned by the husband's sister and rented by the husband; Norvell testified that the location of the business was relevant to its value.
On March 23, 2010, the trial court entered an amended divorce judgment, stating:
The wife again appeals.4
Analysis
On appeal, the wife asserts that the trial court failed to follow this court's mandate on remand; that the judgment entered by the trial court on remand was against the great weight of the evidence and, thus, exceeded the trial court's discretion; that the trial court's valuation of the business was the result of a miscalculation; and that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to award her alimony.
Business Valuation
We first address the wife's argument that the trial court failed to follow this court's mandate on remand. In Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 431 So.2d 151, 155 (Ala.1983), the supreme court, quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 991 (1962), stated:
“ ” As stated above, in Shewbart, supra, we remanded the cause “for the trial court to determine the fair-market value of the sole proprietorship, taking into consideration all of its assets, and to then consider that value in fashioning an equitable division of the marital property.” 19 So.3d at 233. We also instructed the trial court to reconsider, in light of any new property division entered, whether the wife was entitled to an award of alimony. Id.
On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing and received evidence for the purpose of determining the value of the business. The trial court then entered a judgment addressing the value of the business in light of the evidence presented at that hearing. The trial court divided the remaining marital asset and, although it did not expressly address the issue, it implicitly denied the wife's claim for alimony. In light of the hearing held on remand, the issues considered at that hearing, and the language of the trial court's judgment, we must conclude that, on remand, the trial court complied with this court's mandate in Shewbart, supra.
The wife next asserts that the trial court erred in valuing the business. The judgment indicates that the trial court accepted Norvell's opinion that the “income-approach” method should be used to assess the value of the business. As explained by Norvell, under that method, the evaluator first determines the EBITDA average of the...
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