Shibilski v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Marshfield, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 June 1978
• Docket Number: No. 75-774,75-774
• Citation: 83 Wis.2d 459,266 N.W.2d 264
• Parties: James F. SHIBILSKI, Individually and as special administrator of the Estate of Bonnie K. Shibilski, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL OF MARSHFIELD, INC., Defendant-Appellant, Marshfield Clinic, a Wisconsin Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 264

266 N.W.2d 264

83 Wis.2d 459

James F. SHIBILSKI, Individually and as special

administrator of the Estate of Bonnie K.

Shibilski, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL OF MARSHFIELD, INC., Defendant-Appellant, Marshfield Clinic, a Wisconsin Corporation, Defendant.

No. 75-774.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued March 6, 1978.

Decided June 6, 1978.

The portions of the order appealed from denied the motion of the defendant-appellant hospital to limit discovery sought by the plaintiff-respondent.

David L. Fulton, Appleton (argued), for appellant; Fulton, Menn & Nehs, Ltd., Appleton, on the brief.

Herman J. Glinski, Stevens Point (argued), for respondent; Glinski & Haferman, Stevens Point, on the brief.

BEILFUSS, Chief Justice.

This action was commenced on August 14, 1974, by service of summons on defendants, St. Joseph's Hospital of Marshfield, Inc., and the Marshfield Clinic. A complaint was filed on November 25, 1974, by James F. Shibilski, individually and as special administrator of the Estate of Bonnie K. Shibilski, deceased, claiming damages for her alleged wrongful death.

Bonnie K. Shibilski was admitted to St. Joseph's Hospital on August 28, 1971, for the delivery of her third child. She had previously been hospitalized at St. Joseph's on at least three occasions since 1963 for psychiatric illnesses. After the birth of this child she was transferred to the psychiatric ward.

On September 2, 1971, at approximately 1 p. m., while Bonnie K. Shibilski was locked in a room in the psychiatric ward of St. Joseph's, a fire broke out in her room resulting in second and third degree burns over 95 percent of her body which led to her death on September 18, 1971. Apparently she had been given a lighted cigarette by a hospital employee shortly before the fire. When the fire was discovered, Bonnie Shibilski resisted attempts at rescue.

The complaint alleged negligence in several respects, including confining Bonnie in a room with flammable and nonflame retardant furnishings and linen; lack of a sprinkler system and smoke or flame detector system; failure to keep Bonnie under constant supervision; failure to train and instruct hospital personnel in handling safety and emergency situations; and failure to establish rules and regulations for dealing with patients like Bonnie Shibilski.

On October 20, 1975, plaintiff James Shibilski filed a motion for the production of documents and to require the defendants to answer certain questions which had been certified at various depositions previously held. The defendants offered two affidavits in opposition to these motions. The affidavit of David R. Jaye, formerly the Administrator and now President of St. Joseph's, opposed inter alia the discovery of rules and regulations of the hospital and accreditation standards. He stated that this information was intended to be confidential and that disclosure of such information would prevent full and unfettered discussion of hospital problems by the various hospital committees in the future. The affidavit of St. Joseph's attorney, John B. Menn, stated that he was retained by St. Joseph's and its insurer on October 11, 1971, and that various reports and statements, sought by the plaintiff, were immune from discovery by reason of the attorney work-product privilege.

On October 16, 1975, the trial court issued a written document entitled "Ruling on Plaintiff's Motions," wherein the plaintiff's motions were, for the most part, granted. By notice of appeal dated April 1, 1976, the defendant, St. Joseph's Hospital, appealed from this October 16th document. Then on April 14, 1976, the trial court issued an order specifically granting various portions of the plaintiff's October 20, 1975 discovery motions. An amended notice of appeal from this order was thereafter served and filed by St. Joseph's.

Defendant, Marshfield Clinic, is not a party to this appeal.

The following four issues stated in capsulized form are raised on this appeal:

I. Are hospital rules and regulations discoverable?

II. Are hospital committee reports privileged?

III. Does the attorney work-product privilege bar discovery?

IV. Were certain questions which the trial court ordered answered irrelevant?

The first challenge leveled by appellant against the trial court's discovery rulings is against the demand for evidence of rules and regulations adopted by the hospital applicable to the operation of the psychiatric ward. Specifically, the trial court ordered that the hospital furnish the plaintiff with copies of any rules and regulations of the hospital applicable to the psychiatric ward pertaining to fire drills and the training and education of personnel to deal with fires. Also, the trial court ordered that the assistant administrator and administrator of the hospital answer the questions certified at their depositions as to whether the hospital had adopted any accreditation standards or rules or regulations pertaining to the operation of its psychiatric ward.

Appellant contends that any rules, regulations, or standards adopted by the hospital are irrelevant and inadmissible; that generally, rules and regulations adopted by private organizations are irrelevant because the standard of care upon which recovery must be based is set by law. In Marolla v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Wis.2d 539, 157 N.W.2d 674 (1968), this court affirmed a trial court refusal to admit a railroad safety rule in a case involving a collision between a motorized railway track car and an automobile. The action was brought by the operator of the track car against the automobile operator. The trial court refused to admit evidence proffered by the defendant's insurer of a safety rule adopted by the railroad relating to the stopping of track cars at highway crossings. We held that company rules of safety and operation should not be admitted in litigation against noncompany parties because to do so could result in holding an employee of one railroad company to a higher standard of care on the basis of more stringent company rules than an employee of another railroad with less stringent private standards.

It is the hospital's position that Marolla holds that rules and regulations of the sort sought by Shibilski are inadmissible and, therefore, not discoverable. The hospital's reliance on Marolla is misplaced. Marolla dealt with admissibility, not discovery. Admissibility relates to the actual admission of documents or statements into evidence. Discovery, on the other hand, although it has a purpose of finding admissible evidence, does not imply that that which is discovered is always to be introduced as evidence. Rather "Pretrial discovery is designed to formulate, define and narrow the issues to be tried, increase the chances for settlement, and give each party opportunity to fully inform himself of the facts of the case and the evidence which may come out at trial." State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis.2d 559, 576, 150 N.W.2d 387, 397 (1967).

Therefore, even if the evidence the plaintiff seeks was inadmissible, this does not necessarily prevent discovery. If the rules and regulations are relevant to the case in some way, they should be discoverable. Relevant evidence is defined in the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, sec. 904.01, Stats., as follows:

" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."

Respondent contends that these rules and regulations could be valuable in determining whether hospital personnel were properly trained or instructed. The rules and regulations could be relevant to show lack of conformity with minimum standards accepted by the hospital industry as a whole. As noted in Marolla, citing Wis J I Civil, Part I, 1005:

" 'Negligence may also be said to mean a want of, or failure to exercise that care and caution which a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence usually exercises in a like or similar situation, work, or operation, under like or similar circumstances." 38 Wis.2d at 546, 157 N.W.2d at 678.

Thus, were the instant rules and regulations of the hospital shown to be less stringent than those accepted by other hospitals as minimum requirements, they would be relevant to the issue of negligence.

We conclude the rules and regulations sought by the plaintiff are discoverable.

The next orders and rulings challenged by St. Joseph's relate to medical staff or hospital staff committee meetings which might have taken place after the fire.

The trial court, among other things, ordered that reports made by employees or by doctors relating to the investigation of the fire be furnished to the plaintiff. Also, the court ruled that various administrative, nursing, and staff personnel answer the questions certified at their depositions relating to whether they had attended or participated in any post-fire official or nonofficial hospital committee or staff meetings relating to the care and treatment of Bonnie Shibilski on September 2, 1971, or discussing the fire. The hospital contends that these meetings were intended to be confidential and are privileged.

St. Joseph's places primary reliance upon two cases from other jurisdictions. Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.1970), affirmed, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 199, 479 F.2d 920 (1973), and Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital, 191 Neb. 224, 214 N.W.2d 490 (1974). Both cases hold that confidentiality of committee reports and meetings is in the best interests of the public because only with a complete assurance of confidentiality can the free and unfettered discussion and evaluation necessary to improving medical care take place. But cases from other jurisdictions have held that hospital committees are not cloaked with a privilege of confidentiality. Nazareth Literary & Benevolent...