Shields v. Helena School Dist. No. 1, 1

• Decision Date: 07 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-471,No. 1,1,96-471
• Citation: 284 Mont. 138,943 P.2d 999
• Parties: , 120 Ed. Law Rep. 1194 Greg SHIELDS, Kerbie Shields, individually and as parents and guardians of Nathan Shields, and Nathan Shields, on his own behalf, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HELENA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, C.R. Anderson School, Helena School DistrictTrustees, Supt. Gary Toothaker, Sec. 504 Coordinator Shirley Devoe, Title IX Coordinator Marion Evenson, C.R. Anderson Principal Pep Jewell, C.R. Anderson School Assistant Principal Bruce Campbell, Team Teachers: Carl Anderberg, Cathy Collins, Hans Martin, in their capacities as team teachers only, Pat Grassl, Lona Carter, individually and in her official capacity as instructor and counselor at C.R. Anderson School, and William G. Everett, individually and in his official capacity as an instruction and advisor at C.R. Anderson School, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 999

943 P.2d 999

284 Mont. 138, 120 Ed. Law Rep. 1194

Greg SHIELDS, Kerbie Shields, individually and as parents and guardians of Nathan Shields, and Nathan Shields, on his own behalf, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HELENA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, C.R. Anderson School, Helena School District No. 1 Trustees, Supt. Gary Toothaker, Sec 504 Coordinator Shirley Devoe, Title IX Coordinator Marion Evenson, C.R. Anderson Principal Pep Jewell, C.R. Anderson School Assistant Principal Bruce Campbell, Team Teachers Carl Anderberg, Cathy Collins, Hans Martin, in their capacities as team teachers only, Pat Grassl, Lona Carter individually and in her official capacity as instructor and counselor at C.R. Anderson School, and William G. Everett individually and in his official capacity as an instruction and advisor at C.R. Anderson School, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 96-471.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Jan. 30, 1997.

Decided Aug. 7, 1997.

Matthew J. Sisler, Missoula, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Terry B. Cosgrove, Steven R. Milch; Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, P. Keith Keller; Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Johnson & Gillespie, Helena, Allen B. Chronister; Chronister, Moreen & Larson, Helena, for Defendants and Respondents.

NELSON, Justice.

Greg, Kerbie and Nathan Shields (the Shieldses) brought this action in the District Court for the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, to recover monetary damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights and other claims. On Defendants' motion, the District Court dismissed the action on the basis that the Shieldses failed to exhaust the administrative procedures available under federal and state law. The Shieldses appeal the dismissal of their cause of action. We affirm.

We address the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the Shieldses' Notice of Appeal was premature thereby divesting this Court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

2. Whether the District Court erred in failing to consider the Shieldses' Amendment to Complaint prior to entering its Order.

3. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the Shieldses' claims on the basis that they failed to exhaust the available administrative procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

4. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the Shieldses' claims on the basis that they failed to exhaust the available administrative procedures under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA).

Factual and Procedural Background

The Shieldses filed their Complaint in this action on October 13, 1995, and their First Amended Complaint on October 16, 1995. They alleged that Defendants failed to properly identify, evaluate, and classify Nathan as a disabled student thereby denying Nathan his right to an appropriate education. In addition, they alleged various state tort claims contending that due to Nathan's disability, he was discriminated against by certain Defendants.

The latter allegations stem from incidents in which Nathan was prevented from accompanying other students on a ski trip and was allegedly humiliated by one of his teachers in front of his classmates. Based on these incidents, the Shieldses filed a grievance with the school. On January 21, 1995, the school principal informed the Shieldses that she was in agreement with the decision not to allow Nathan to attend the ski trip. No mention was made of any disciplinary action against the teacher. The Shieldses appealed this decision to the superintendent of the Helena School District. On February 10, 1995, the superintendent informed the Shieldses that he would uphold the principal's determination. The Shieldses next appealed to the Board of Trustees of the Helena School District (the Board). The Board conducted a grievance hearing on June 21, 1995. The Shieldses were notified by letter dated June 30, 1995, that the Board had voted unanimously to uphold the superintendent's determination.

On October 16, 1995, the Shieldses filed their First Amended Complaint in the First Judicial District Court, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794), as well as various state tort claims. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 6, 1995, alleging that the Shieldses had not exhausted administrative procedures under the IDEA or the MHRA. The Shieldses responded to Defendants' motion asserting that the exhaustion of IDEA and MHRA administrative procedures was not required in this case.

A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was held on May 2, 1996. The Shieldses filed an amendment to their complaint on June 3, 1996. That same day, the District Court issued its Order dismissing all of the claims made by the Shieldses on the basis that the Shieldses failed to exhaust the available administrative procedures and that the Shieldses failed to prove they were exempt from the exhaustion requirements. The Shieldses appeal the District Court's Order.

Issue 1.

Whether the Shieldses' Notice of Appeal was premature thereby divesting this Court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

The District Court entered its Order dismissing the Shieldses' First Amended Complaint on June 3, 1996. On June 10, 1996, the Shieldses filed what they termed a Motion for Reconsideration. The District Court did not rule on the motion, thus, pursuant to the 60-day time limit for ruling on post-trial motions contained in Rules 59(d) and (g), M.R.Civ.P., the motion was deemed denied on August 9, 1996, 60 days after its filing. However, on July 3, 1996, prior to the disposition of their motion, the Shieldses filed a Notice of Appeal.

Defendants contend that the Shieldses' Motion for Reconsideration was, in effect, a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P. They also contend that, pursuant to Rule 5(a)(4), M.R.App.P., since the Shieldses filed their Notice of Appeal prior to the disposition of their motion, the Notice of Appeal was premature, thus this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Rule 5(a)(4), M.R.App.P., (as amended December 19, 1995) ¹ provides, in part:

If a timely motion under the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: (i) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (ii) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (iii) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (iv) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion, or if applicable, from the time such motion is deemed denied at the expiration of the 60-day period established by Rule 59(d), Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order disposing of the motion as provided above, or if applicable, from the date of the expiration of the 60-day period established in Rule 59(d), Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. [Emphasis added.]

A motion for reconsideration is not one of the post-judgment motions provided for, or authorized by, the Rules of Civil Procedure. Haugen v. Blaine Bank of Montana (1996), 279 Mont. 1, 11, 926 P.2d 1364, 1370 (citing Taylor v. Honnerlaw (1990), 242 Mont. 365, 367, 790 P.2d 996, 997-98; Anderson v. Bashey (1990), 241 Mont. 252, 254, 787 P.2d 304, 305). We have previously stated, however, that a motion for reconsideration will be equated to a Rule 59(g) motion to alter or amend a judgment if the substance of the motion constructively requests the court to alter or amend the judgment. Haugen, 926 P.2d at 1370 (citing Miller v. Herbert (1995), 272 Mont. 132, 135-36, 900 P.2d 273, 275). In order to make that determination, it is necessary to look at the substance of the motion to identify what type of motion has been presented. Haugen, 926 P.2d at 1370.

We note that Defendants, contrary to the argument they make on appeal, argued in their Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration that there was no procedural basis for the motion and that it was not a Rule 59(g) motion. After reviewing the Shieldses' motion, we agree with Defendants' original contention and we conclude that the Shieldses' motion is not a Rule 59(g) motion as it does not seek to alter or amend the judgment. Nor can the motion be considered equivalent to any of the motions provided for in Rule 5(a)(4), M.R.App.P. Hence, the Shieldses are not bound by the requirement of Rule 5(a)(4) that a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of one of the stated motions shall have no effect and that a new notice of appeal must be filed.

Instead, the Shieldses are bound by the requirements of Rule 5(a)(1), M.R.App.P., ² which provides:

In civil cases the notice of appeal required by Rule 4 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days from the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from, except that in cases where service of notice of entry of judgment is required by Rule 77(d) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure the time shall be 30 days from the service of notice of entry of judgment....

Rule 77(d), M.R.Civ.P., provides:

Notice of entry of judgment or order served. Within 10 days after entry of judgment or an order in an action in which an appearance has been made, notice of such entry, together with a copy of such judgment or order or general description of the nature and amount of relief and damages thereby granted, shall be served by the prevailing party upon all parties who have made an appearance, but any other party may in addition serve a notice of such entry in the manner provided in Rule 5 for the service of papers.

As the prevailing party, Defendants...