Shields v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 31 December 1904
• Citation: 79 P. 394,10 Idaho 454
• Parties: SHIELDS v. JOHNSON
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

79 P. 394

10 Idaho 454

SHIELDS v. JOHNSON

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 31, 1904

INJUNCTIONS PENDENTE LITE-TO RESTRAIN TRESPASS-LARGELY DISCRETIONARY.

1. A large discretion is vested in the trial court in the granting of temporary injunctions to hold property in statu quo pending the determination of the action, and its exercise will not be reversed on appeal unless a clear abuse is shown.

2. Courts of equity should hesitate before granting injunctions to restrain trespass committed under color of title or right.

3. The statute (Rev. Stats., sec. 4288) authorizing the issuance of injunctions is liberally construed by the courts.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court in and for Latah County. Honorable Edgar C. Steele, Judge.

From an order granting an injunction pendente lite and an order refusing to dissolve such injunction, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Order affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

George W. Pickett and Stewart S. Denning, for Appellants.

Where defendant is in possession of ground in dispute, an injunction will not be granted, but the parties will be left to their remedy at law. (Washington etc. Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Ry., 2 Idaho 580, 21 P. 562.) Where a party seeks relief by interlocutory injunction, he should show some clear, legal or equitable right, and an apprehension of immediate injury to those rights. Where none such are shown the injunction will be denied. (McGinnis et al. v Friedman, 2 Idaho 393, 17 P. 635; Waldron v. Marsh et al., 5 Cal. 119.) There must be an urgent necessity and, as a general rule, the title and right of the plaintiffs should be shown to be clear, well established and not in dispute. The application should also be made promptly and not delayed until large expenditures have been made by the defendants. (Real Deal Min. Co. v. Pond Min. Co., 23 Cal. 85; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, secs. 418, 419 817, 1359; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 802, under "Injunctions," and subd. 12, "Laches," and notes.) The absence of a plain and adequate remedy at law affords the only test of equity jurisprudence, and the application of this principle to a particular case must depend altogether upon the character of the case as disclosed in the proceedings. (10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 878, "Injunctions," subject "Trespass," subd. "Test of Jurisdiction," and notes; Aveline v. Ridenbaugh, 2 Idaho 168, 9 P. 601; Dewitt v. Hays, 2 Cal. 463, 56 Am. Dec. 352; Tomlinson v. Rubio, 16 Cal. 203; Tevis v. Ellis, 25 Cal. 515; Leach v. Day, 27 Cal. 644; Richards v. Kirkpatrick, 53 Cal. 433.)

Forney & Moore, for Respondent.

Injunction will issue to restrain temporarily an act which will result in great damage to the plaintiff, although the injury is not irreparable, and notwithstanding that other remedies lie on behalf of the plaintiff. (Staples et al. v. Rossi, 7 Idaho 618, 65 P. 67; Wilson v. Eagleson, 9 Idaho 17, 71 P. 613; Gilpin v. Sierra Nev. Con. Min. Co., 2 Idaho 696, 23 P. 547, 1014.) An interlocutory injunction is not a matter of strict right. Its issuance rests in the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of this discretion in granting and refusing the injunction will not, as a general rule, be reviewed on appeal, or otherwise controlled or interfered with. (Washington etc. Ry. Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Ry. & Nav. Co. et al., 2 Idaho 439, 17 P. 142, 4 L. R. A. 409, and cases cited in the opinion of the court on page 441 [2 Idaho]; 16 Am. & Eng. of Law, 2d ed., p. 358, and authorities cited.)

AILSHIE J., STOCKSLAGER, C. J. Sullivan, C. J., Stockslager, J., and Ailshie, J., concurring.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

This is an appeal from an order made by the district judge on the eighth day of August, 1904, refusing to dissolve a temporary restraining order theretofore issued, and making and entering his further order continuing in force such restraining order during the pendency of the action. The action was commenced on the eighteenth day of July, 1904, by the plaintiff, M. J. Shields, against the defendants, praying for an injunction against the defendants restraining them from cutting, removing or interfering with the plaintiff's crops growing upon a certain one hundred and sixty acre tract of land which plaintiff had leased from the defendant Johnson, and for an order restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's leasehold estate in and to the tract of land and for damages for trespasses committed. Upon the filing of the complaint a temporary restraining order was issued and an order to show cause why the same should not be continued in force pending the litigation was at the same time issued and served. Thereafter the defendants moved to dissolve the injunction and quash the writ that had been issued, which motion was heard at the same time and with plaintiff's motion to continue the order in force pending the action. After the hearing the trial judge made and entered his order continuing the injunction in force upon the execution and delivery of a good and sufficient bond by the plaintiff in the sum of $ 300.

On the tenth day of October, 1900, the defendant. Frank M. Johnson and his wife, Emma A. Johnson, by an instrument in writing, leased and let unto the plaintiff their one hundred and sixty acre tract of land situated in Latah county, for the period of four years, for an annual rental of $ 250, payable on or before the first day of November each year. This lease also contained an option whereby the lessee might continue in possession of the premises for an additional period of two years upon paying a rental of $ 300 per annum, and it contained a further option whereby the lessee might purchase the farm, upon compliance with certain conditions, for the sum of $ 4,500. Plaintiff alleged that after entering into the possession of this tract of land he caused the same to be farmed and cultivated and part of it sown in alfalfa and the remainder in Bromus Innermis, and that while these grasses were growing upon the land the defendants entered and plowed up some eighty acres and sowed oats thereon, and that at the time of the commencement of this action the defendants were cutting and removing the grasses and oats to the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of $ 2,000. The plaintiff also filed an affidavit showing that the defendants were wholly insolvent and unable to respond to any judgment for damages, and that the defendant Johnson and his wife had filed a statutory homestead upon such tract of land. The defendants claim by their answer, and affidavits filed in support thereof, that they entered the premises after a breach of the terms of the lease by the plaintiff and in pursuance of the stipulation contained in the lease. They also filed affidavits tending to show that they were not wholly insolvent, but were able to respond in damages in at least the sum of $ 500. After an examination of the record, it is sufficient to say that we feel about this case very much as was expressed by Chief Justice Beatty in Gilpin v. Sierra Nevada Con. Min. Co., 2 Idaho 696, 23 P. 547, wherein he said: "Admitting the defendant is right, the inconvenience to it from an injunction will be less than will be the damage to the plaintiff should he prove to be...