Shields v. State

Decision Date11 April 1939
Docket NumberCase Number: 29026
Citation184 Okla. 618,1939 OK 203,89 P.2d 756
PartiesSHIELDS v. STATE
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. OFFICERS--REMOVAL--Construction of Statute--"Willful Maladministration"-Mere Thoughtless Acts not Sufficient Ground for Removal.

Under subdivision 6 of section 3447, O. S. 1931, 22 Okla. St. Ann. sec. 1181, providing for removal from office for "willful maladministration," acts relied upon to constitute willful maladministration must have been committed with a bad or evil intent or contrary to a known duty; or be such acts as to require the implication or imputation of bad or evil intent or knowledge of breach of duty; or the officer must be guilty of some conscious wrong or inexcusable recklessness in the discharge or a failure to discharge an official duty. Mere thoughtless acts, with no bad or evil purpose, or not constituting inexcusable recklessness, even though involving serious errors of judgment, will not justify a removal on the ground of willful maladministration.

2. SAME--Municipal Corporations--Evidence Held not to Sustain Finding That City Police Commissioner Was Guilty of Willful Maladministration.

Record examined, and held, evidence insufficient to sustain finding that the defendant was guilty of willful maladministration in office.

Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; E. A. Summers, Assigned Judge.

Proceedings for removal from office, brought in the name of the State pursuant to an accusation of a grand jury, seeking removal of Eddie J. Shields, Police Commissioner of the City of Tulsa. The defendant appeals from judgment removing him from said office. Reversed and remanded with directions.

A. F. Moss, H. R. Young, and William Blake, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Randell S. Cobb, Asst. Atty. Gen., Owen J. Watts, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Dixie Gilmer, County Atty., for defendant in error.

DANNER, J.

¶1 On October 6, 1938, a grand jury in Tulsa county returned a written accusation against Eddie J. Shields, police commissioner of the city of Tulsa, wherein he was charged in four counts with being guilty of various acts and omissions constituting grounds for removal from office, and praying that he be removed.

¶2 In due time the defendant Shields filed his answer and the case came on for trial before an assigned judge, without a jury. At the conclusion of the state's evidence the court sustained the defendant's demurrer to three of the four counts, and overruled it as to the remaining count. The defendant then proceeded to put on his evidence in defense of that count. He was found guilty thereon, removed from office, and has appealed to this court.

¶3 The following is the count upon which defendant was found guilty:

"That said defendant, Eddie J. Shields, has been guilty of corruption in office, willful maladministration in office, and failure to produce and account for all public funds in his hands as required by law, in this, to wit:
"That on the 31st day of May, 1938, he received from the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, $18.76; that on the 30th day of June, 1938, he received from the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, $19.20; and on the 30th day of July, 19.38, he received from the CocaCola Bottling Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, $26.16; and that on the 31st day of August, 1938, he received from the CocaCola Bottling Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, $29.28, which checks were for the operation of a Coca-Cola vending machine in the police station of the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and that said money so received was the property of and belonged to the city of Tulsa, a municipal corporation; that the said defendant willfully and wrongfully, unlawfully and intentionally, did convert and appropriate said sum of money to his own use, and to a use and purpose not in the due and lawful execution of his trust."

¶4 The said count charged that for the foregoing reasons defendant was guilty of (1) corruption in office; (2) willful maladministration in office; and (3) failure to produce and account for all public funds in his hands as required by law. Of those charges the trial judge found him guilty of the second only, that is, willful maladministration in office, and removed him on account thereof. The parties are virtually agreed that embezzlement was not committed, due to the fact that since defendant was not authorized by the city to receive the money from the Coca-Cola Company, that company's payment to him would not bar the city from recovering from the company in any case, and therefore the money never became the property of the city. We do not pass on that question. The trial judge did not find the defendant guilty of embezzlement. Our only inquiry is whether the. facts are sufficient to constitute willful maladministration.

¶5 We do not at this time state the evidence in minute detail. The following is a brief general statement of the situation, which we shall later describe more particularly. Prior to the election of the defendant as police commissioner of the city of Tulsa, a peanut vending machine, a lunch stand, an automatic Coca-Cola vending machine, and another vending device were located within the police station. None of these devices or businesses was being conducted pursuant to any contract with the city of Tulsa. It appears that with the exception of the CocaCola vending machine the. owners of the other businesses were not paying rental or royalty either to the city or any other person.

¶6 The Coca-Cola machine had originally been installed by the local Coca-Cola Company, at the instance of the Fraternal Order of Police. At the end of the first month of its operation the Coca-Cola Company had sent a check to the Fraternal Order of Police, based on a royalty of one cent per bottle of the Coca-Cola sold during that month. This check was returned by the fraternal order to the company with directions to make the check payable to the city of Tulsa. Thereafter said monthly royalty checks were made by the Coca-Cola company payable to the city of Tulsa and same were received by the city treasurer and deposited in the general fund.

¶7 Shortly after the defendant was elected to office he and his secretary and others held a conference which will later be described, and, pursuant thereto, when the first check arrived, defendant's secretary, at his direction, notified the Coca-Cola company that the checks should be made payable to a special police fund, which fund had not theretofore existed. The company was told that otherwise it would have to remove the machine. The company then made said monthly checks payable to the special police fund, and each and all of said four checks mentioned in the accusation, down to the date of this action, were deposited in a bank by the defendant in a special account which came to be known as the "Eddie J. Shields, Special Police Fund."

¶8 It is not contended that any dishonesty is involved, or that the defendant appropriated any of said fund to his own purely personal use, unless the following be so construed. The defendant, who is the only person who wrote checks on the account, on several occasions ordered and paid for flowers for sick policemen, for the funerals of deceased policemen, and purchased flowers for several sick persons who had no official connection with the police department. Also, one check was written for $4.65 reimbursing two policemen who had made a trip to another county to investigate the murder of the sheriff there. A check for $8 was made payable to a local newspaper or magazine called "The West Side Journal", which had solicited funds from said police department on this occasion. The florist always enclosed a card with the flowers indicating that they were sent by the police department, and the defendant was not mentioned. "The West Side Journal", however, in one issue, carried a space recognizing the contribution of the Tulsa Police Department, and this did contain the names of the chief of police, chief of detectives, the defendant, and his secretary.

¶9 Section 3447, O. S. 1931, 22 Okla. St. Ann. sec. 1181, reads:

"Any officer not subject to impeachment elected or appointed to any, taro, county, township, city, town, or other office under the laws of the state may, in the manner provided in this article, be removed from office for any of the following causes:
"First. Habitual or wilful neglect of duty.
"Second. Gross partiality in office.
"Third. Oppression in office.
"Fourth. Corruption in office.
"Fifth. Extortion or willful overcharge of fees in office
"Sixth. Wilful maladministration.
"Seventh. Habitual drunkenness
"Eighth. Failure to produce and account for all public funds and property in his hands, at any settlement or inspection authorized or required by law."

¶10 As stated heretofore, the defendant was found guilty of the sixth subdivision only, 'willful maladministration. In appealing the contention of the defendant is that the word "willful," within the purview of the above statute, means more than the intentional or voluntary commission of au act, and means that the act must nave beer done with an evil intent or with a bad or corrupt motive. He further contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that be exercised an evil or bad intent in doing the things charged. The state contends that the word means simply an omission of duty or the committing of an act knowingly and willingly, and that it implies simply a purpose or intention to do the act; that said act need not be done with an evil or corrupt motive or purpose.

¶11 Therefore, the issues now under consideration are (1) the question concerning the correct construction of the words "willful" and "willful maladministration;" and (2) sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment, under whatever constitutes the proper definition of those terms.

¶12 The state cites Bradford v. Territory ex rel. Woods, 2 Okla. 228, 37 P. 1061, as authority for its...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • State on Inf. of McKittrick v. Graves
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 9, 1940
    ......v. Hasty, 63 So. 559; In re Advisory. Opinion, 60 So. 337; State ex rel. v. Patton, . 131 Mo.App. 628. (2) The commissioner erred in the admission. of incompetent evidence and in predicating his findings. adverse to respondent thereon. State ex inf. v. Wymore, 132. S.W.2d 979; Shields v. Railways, 264 S.W. 890;. Shafer v. Railways, 201 S.W. 611; Green v. Water. Co., 101 Wis. 258, 77 N.W. 722, 43 L. R. A. 117; 10 R. C. L. 1160; 20 R. C. L. 352; Frink v. Fire Ins. Co., . 90 S.C. 544; Yocum v. Morice, 4 Phila. 106;. Hartford Trust Co. v. West Hartford, 84 Conn. 646,. ......
  • State ex Inf. McKittrick v. Graves, 36717.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 9, 1940
    ......v. Hasty, 63 So. 559; In re Advisory Opinion, 60 So. 337; State ex rel. v. Patton, 131 Mo. App. 628. (2) The commissioner erred in the admission of incompetent evidence and in predicating his findings adverse to respondent thereon. State ex inf. v. Wymore, 132 S.W. (2d) 979; Shields v. Railways, 264 S.W. 890; Shafer v. Railways, 201 S.W. 611; Green v. Water Co., 101 Wis. 258, 77 N.W. 722, 43 L.R.A. 117; 10 R.C.L. 1160; 20 R.C.L. 352; Frink v. Fire Ins. Co., 90 S.C. 544; Yocum v. Morice, 4 Phila. 106; Hartford Trust Co. v. West Hartford, 84 Conn. 646, 81 Atl. 244; ......
  • Estes v. Conocophillips Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • March 4, 2008
    ......On . 184 P.3d 522 . August 25, 2005, Conoco moved to dismiss Estes' complaint for failure to state a cause of action under the Testing Act. On November 7, 2006, the federal court certified the questions to this Court. . I. .         ¶ 6 ...1087. . 35. Childers v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Bryan County, 1981 OK 123, ¶ 19, 645 P.2d 992. . 36. Shields v. State, 1939 OK 203, ¶ 21, 89 P.2d 756. . 37. Title 40 O.S.2001 § 553(A-B), see note 9, supra. . 38. Bullard's Oil Field Serv. Inc. v. ......
  • State v. Price (In re Pawnee Cnty. Grand Jury)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • June 5, 2012
    ...were taken from Phillips v. State, 75 Okla. 46, 181 P. 713 (1919) (Syllabus 2) (wilful neglect of duty), and Shields v. State, 184 Okla. 618, 89 P.2d 756 (1939). We note that the comments refer to Shields as a criminal case but it is actually a civil case cited as Shields v. State, 1939 OK ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT