Shields v. State

• Citation: 722 So.2d 584
• Decision Date: 15 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-KA-00612-SCT.,97-KA-00612-SCT.
• Parties: Clonelle SHIELDS v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

722 So.2d 584

Clonelle SHIELDS v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 97-KA-00612-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

October 15, 1998.

Richard Flood, Ridgeland, Attorney for Appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Dewitt T. Allred, III, Attorney for Appellee.

En Banc.

WALLER, Justice, for the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1. Clonelle Shields, "a.k.a. Stank", was indicted and found guilty of aggravated assault. The evidence demonstrated only simple assault; but, Shields was not indicted for simple assault, nor was the jury instructed on simple assault. The State concedes that the trial judge erred and argues that the case should be remanded for a trial on the simple assault charge. Shields contends that the proper remedy is dismissal of the State's charges against Shields. Shields raises the following issues on appeal.

I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED [SIC] AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE-IN-CHIEF.

II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED [SIC] AFTER THE DEFENDANT RESTED HIS DEFENSE.

III. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION D-1.

FACTS

¶ 2. On May 26, 1995, Elaine Brown ("Brown") and her brother returned to her apartment in the Canal Street apartments in Canton, Mississippi. Brown's brother parked in front of her door and, as they were exiting the car, an altercation developed between Brown's brother and a person identified as "the Rivers boy." The "Rivers boy" apparently had a gun, which he passed to Shields, who sat down on the back of Brown's car. Brown told Shields and "the Rivers boy" to leave and get off her car, at which point Shields removed the weapon from his pocket and threatened to kill Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown went in to her apartment and called the police. Shields was arrested.

DISCUSSION

¶ 3. All three issues raised by Shields on appeal turn on the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted charge of aggravated assault. The State wisely concedes that there was insufficient evidence to carry the aggravated assault charged in the indictment.

¶ 4. There is simply no evidence rising to the level of attempt under Brown v. State, 633 So.2d 1042 (Miss.1994). Here, the evidence demonstrates that, while Shields threatened Brown, he made no attempt to cause her harm. Thus the State and the Appellant are correct that insufficient evidence exists to sustain a verdict of guilt upon aggravated assault.

¶ 5. The question remains, however, as to the proper remedy. Shields contends, without citation to authority, that since the State choose to exclusively pursue the aggravated assault charge through the indictment and through its objection to instruction D-1, that he should be released.

¶ 6. Alternatively, the State contends that this Court may not effect such a release under the authority of Craddock v. State, 204 Miss. 606, 37 So.2d 778 (1948). The State does not specify whether it is asking for a retrial on the merits, or simply a remand for sentencing, but only asks that this Court "remand the case to the Circuit Court for proceedings on the charge of simple assault."

¶ 7. In a series of cases, this Court has stated that when the jury convicts of a greater offense, which is invalidated on appeal for want of sufficiency of the evidence, no new trial is required and the defendant may be remanded for sentencing upon the lesser included offense where the proof establishes proof of the lesser offense. Yates v. State, 685 So.2d 715 (Miss.1996); Alford v. State, 656 So.2d 1186 (Miss.1995); Bogard v. State, 624 So.2d 1313, 1320 (Miss.1993); Dedeaux v. State, 630 So.2d 30, 33 (Miss.1993); Clemons v. State, 473 So.2d 943 (Miss.1985); Biles v. State, 338 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Miss.1976); Anderson v. State, 290 So.2d 628, 628-29 (Miss.1974); Wells v. State, 305 So.2d 333, 337-38 (Miss.1974). The logical underpinnings for this rule, which will be termed hereinafter the "direct remand rule" for want of a better tag, have long been grounded on the fact that guilt of a true lesser included offense is implicitly found in the jury's verdict of guilt on the greater offense. Washington v. State, 222 Miss. 782, 787, 77 So.2d 260, 263 (1955); Anderson, 290 So.2d at 628-29.

¶ 8. The direct remand rule has also been followed in numerous other state and federal courts, with varying rationales, either statutory, rule based or inherent power. See State v. Cummings, 229 Mich.App. 151, 580 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Mich.Ct.App.1998)

("Where a trial court improperly fails to include an instruction on a lesser included offense, the remedy is to remand for entry of a conviction on the lesser included offense and for resentencing, or, if the prosecution desires, for retrial on the charge for which the defendant was convicted."); State v. Robinson, 517 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Minn.1994); State v. Arlt, 9 Haw.App. 263, 833 P.2d 902, 909 (Haw.Ct.App.1992)("Under the modern practice prevailing in most jurisdictions, the appellate courts have the power, in a proper case, to modify rather than reverse a judgment, where such action seems appropriate")(quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error §§ 937 and 938); State v. Bay, 567 So.2d 798, 799 (La.Ct.App.1990)("However, when it is clear from the verdict that the trial judge or jury necessarily found the elements of a lesser and included offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the state, constrained by the double jeopardy clause, cannot seek anew a conviction on the greater offense, a remand for a new trial would serve no useful purpose.")(quoting State v. Byrd, 385 So.2d 248, 252 (La.1980)); Davidson v. State, 305 Ark. 592, 810 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ark.1991)("Under appropriate facts we will modify a conviction from the greater offense to the lesser included offense and either fix punishment ourselves or remand the case to the trial court for the assessment of punishment.")(citing Trotter v. State, 290 Ark. 269, 719 S.W.2d 268 (Ark.1986)); State v. Edwards, 513 A.2d 669, 675 n. 6 (Conn. 1986)("The jury's verdict on the second count necessarily determined that the state had proven all the elements of accessory to robbery in the third degree beyond a reasonable doubt upon which the trial court instructed the jury. Under the circumstances of this case, the reduction of the defendant's conviction on the second count to the lesser included offense cannot prejudice the defendant.") (citations omitted); State v. Eiseman, 461 A.2d 369, 384 (R.I.1983) ("`[S]tate and federal appellate courts have long exercised the power to reverse a conviction while at the same time ordering the entry of judgment on a lesser-included offense.' This court has never availed itself of the opportunity to adopt this practice, but we shall implement it in this case.")(quoting Dickenson v. Israel, 482 F.Supp. 1223, 1225 (E.D.Wis.1980)); Searcy v. State, 163 Ga.App. 528, 295 S.E.2d 227, 229 (Ga.Ct.App.1982); State v. Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 297 S.E.2d 585 (N.C.1982) disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Richmond, 347 N.C. 412, 495 S.E.2d 677 (N.C.1998).

¶ 9. In addition to the many States which have applied the rule, many federal courts have recognized it as well. See inter alia, United States v. Hunt, 129 F.3d 739, 745-46 (5th Cir.1997)

; United States v. Dickinson, 706 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Figueroa, 666 F.2d 1375, 1377 (11th Cir.1982).

¶ 10. Furthermore, any constitutional infirmity in the rule has apparently been resolved in dicta by the recent Supreme Court decision in Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996). In that case the Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged application of the direct remand rule in the lower federal court and stated:

[F]ederal appellate courts appear to have uniformly concluded that they may direct the entry of judgment for a lesser included offense when a conviction for a greater offense is reversed on grounds that affect only the greater offense. This Court has noted the use of such a practice with approval.

Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 306, 116 S.Ct. 1241 (citations omitted).

¶ 11. Thus, the power of this Court to modify and directly remand for sentencing on a lesser included offense is well established. The exact context in which that power should be exercised, however, is not as clear.

¶ 12. In particular, there is some question as to whether the jury must have been instructed upon the lesser offense before this Court should remand for sentencing.¹ This point was the subject of Justice McRae's dissent in Yates and Justice Banks' special concurrence. Yates, 685 So.2d at 722 (McRae, J., dissenting)(Banks, J., concurring). Other courts have had difficulty with this issue as well and have taken a variety of positions.

¶ 13. In Rutledge, the Supreme Court specifically recognized the test propounded by the D.C. Circuit in Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445 (D.C.Cir.1969). The Allison test is as follows:

It must be clear (1) that the evidence adduced at trial fails to support one or more elements of the crime of which appellant was convicted, (2) that such evidence sufficiently sustains all the elements of another offense, (3) that the latter is a lesser included offense of the former, and (4) that no undue prejudice will result to the accused.

Allison, 409 F.2d at 451.

¶ 14. The Supreme Court did not draw a distinction between cases in which there has been instruction at the lower court level on the lesser offense, and in that case it is not clear whether there was specific instruction on the lesser offense. Several courts have, however, made such a distinction, most notably the Ninth Circuit which has formulated a test which explicitly requires that the instruction must have been before the jury before the direct remand rule applies. In United States v. Dinkane the Ninth Circuit stated:

We may nonetheless direct the trial court to enter a judgment on a lesser offense if the evidence is insufficient to

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